The political economy of distributive conflict : a corporate analysis of the determinants of strikes and wage inflation among the Group of Ten by Davies, Robert J.
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
Permanent WRAP URL:
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/78608
Copyright and reuse:
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it.
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICT: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALY~IS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF 
STRIKES AND WAGE INFLATION AMONG THE 
GROUP OF TEN 
by Robert J. Davies 
A Thesis presented in partial 
fulfilment of the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy 
The University of ~'Jarwick 
March 1981 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Bostqn Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ 
www.bl.uk 
SOME PAGES BOUND 
INTO/CLOSE TO SPINE. 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ 
www.bl.uk 
BEST COpy AVAILABLE. 
VARIABLE PRINT QUALITY 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, lS23 7BQ 
www.bl,uk 
Best copy available 
Print close to the edge of 
the page and some cut off 
Contents 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Introduction 
Single Country Studies of Strike Activity 
The Ashenfelter-Johnson Model 
The Analysis of Pencavel 
The Analysis of Hunter 
The Shorey Model 
Conclusions 
Comparative Studies of Strike Activity 
The Analysis of Hibbs 
The Analysis of Shorter and Tilly 
The Analysis of Snyder 
Conclusions 
\ 
Comparative Theories of Strikes and the Pattern of Wage 
Inflation: A Preliminary Historical Evaluation 
'Cost-Push' Theories 
The International Monetarist Explanation of Inflation 
and Industrial Conflict 
The International Monetarist Argument: An Assessment 
International Strike and Wage Experience: An Alternative 
Explanation 
Conclusions 
A Theoretical Model of Comparative Strike Behaviour 
The Formal Model 
An Operational Specification of the Model 
Conclusions 
Incomes Policy, Collective Bargaining, and the Nature 
of the Institutional Environment 
1.1 
2.1 
2.2 
2.S 
2.11 
2.14 
2.16 
3.1 
3.1 
3.16 
3.23 
3.36 
4.1 
4.2 
4.7 
4.17 
4.24 
4.31 
5.1 
5.2 
5.1S 
5.22 
6.1 
Incomes Policy: A Simple Definition 6.1 
Incomes Policy and the Nature of the Institutional 
Environment 6.2 
Incomes Policy: The Post-War Experience of the Group 
of Ten 6.6 
Post-War Incomes Policies and the Institutional 
Environment: A Summary 
Incomes Policy, the Institutional Environment and 
Strikes: A Formal Analysis 
Incomes Policy and the Process of Wage Determination 
Incomes Policy and Wage and Strike Behaviour 
Conclusions 
Empirical Tests of the Strike Wage Model 
Belgium 
Germany 
6.15 
6.1S 
6.31 
6.36 
6.41 
7.1 
7.2 
7.7 
8. 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
France 
Italy 
Japan 
Canada 
United States 
United Kingdom 
Conclusions 
Summary and Conclusions 
Theories of Strikes 
Theories of Inflation 
Appendices 
A. Notes on Statistical Sources 
B. Correlation Coefficients 
Bibliography 
7.12 
7.16 
7.20 
7.24 
7.28 
7.33 
7.37 
7.40 
7.50 
8.1 
8.11 
8.13 
A.l 
B.l 
(i) 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Starting in the late 1960s, both the incidence of strike activity 
and the rate of inflation - measured either by wages or prices - showed 
signs of substantial increase in virtually every member of the Group of 
y 
Ten. (The relevant details are presented in Figures 1.1 and 1.2.) 
y 
Reference to the strike frequency figures plotted in Figure 1.1 indicates 
the existence of two distinct strike waves occurring across the diverse 
industrial relations systems of the Group: the first in 1970-71: the 
second in 1974. Further, reference to the wage inflation figures plotted 
in Figure 1.2 depicts a broadly similar pattern, with evidence of 
pronounced wage escalations in most Group of Ten nations over the periods 
1970-71 and 1974-76. 
As joint outputs of the process of collective bargaining these 
wage and strike developments are obviously related. This much is beyond 
dispute. However, consensus rapidly evaporates as soon as attempts are 
made to move beyond the simple assertion of the existence of a relationship, 
and towards the attribution of a dominant line of causality. The problem 
is that the broadly contemporaneous occurrence of wage and strike 
'explosions' is equally consistent with at least three distinct lines of 
causality. The first, running directly from strikes to wages, carries 
the implication that trade union action is capable of causing upward pressure 
on the pace of wage change indep~ndent of the state of the labour market. 
The second, running from wages to strikes, is consistent with an essen-
tially reactive role for trade unions concerned about the impact of wage 
inflation on wage structure, and eager to protect their relative wage 
position •. The third line of causality, that both wage inflation and 
1.2 
s 
4000 UNITED KINGDOM 
3000 
2000 
rooo 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 
S 
7000 
UNITED STATES 
6000 
5000 
4000 
3000 
1950 
S 
1955 1960 1965 1970 ,1975 
200 
CANADA 
roo 
____ . _____ ... -.-J 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 
JAPAN 
-- ----5000 
-~--- 4000 
- - - 3000 
------ 2000 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 
Figure 1.1 
POst-war aggregate strike frequency: The Group of Ten. 
1.3 
5 
FRANCE 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1915 
1950 1955, 1960 1965 1970 1975 
v 
--4000 -.-------------- .. ----.----
GERMANY f ______ _ 
,--loco 
; ... ~ - : 
, -----1000 
-~.-.-
:---.. ~.--.- .. - -----.. _.- -. _ .. ----
Figure I. I cont.-
-.----.~ 
1.4 . 
300 --- ._ .. _----\ 
! BELGIUM I 
! 
200 
I. 
i 
~.------
1955 1965 '9/0 .'9,5 
-.-----
s 
.. .lQ() 
NETHERLANDS 
100 
S 
.100 
SWEDEN 
100 
Figure 1.1 cont. 
. 
w 
2.0 . 
IS 
10 
5 
1950 
. 
vJ 
'-'.- .-.. 15 
/0, 
'9;-0 
. 
vJ 
IS' 
10 
2.0 
IS 
10 
5 
19';0 
Figure 1.2 
1.5 
UNITED KINGDOM 
\. 
1955 '900 1970 ,1975 
UNITED STATES 
1955 19bO 19b5 1910 1915 
CANADA 
lC)bO F)"io 
JAPAN 
19"70 19"75 
POst-war wage inflation in manufacturing industry: The Group of Ten. 
._. 1.6 .' 
. 
w 
.- ........ ·..20 FRANCE 
15 
~--.-..... - S 
·/~'5 
. 
'\AJ 
:-'--"'--' 30 .- ........... ---.' ---..... -. 
ITALY 
'-- .. 2S 
-.-- ·20 .-.. ---...... -.---...... -----.-.. - .. -.--- .. ---.-...... _, ... _._. -
... 1'5 
·10-· ..... --_ .... -,. - ..... - .- ...... 
l')bO 19"70 
. 
W 
2.0 GERMANY 
I~ 
10 
'960 
Figure 1.2 cont. 
1.7 
w 
BELGIUM 
: .J.o 
- 10 
------r------r------r------r------..-------..- -,--- .--
I 
,----.. - -._---_ .. _--_ .. _---.-------- ~-- --- -- -
, . 
:w 
I 
I 
'- 15" 
- 10 
. 
\N 
)- 15 
-- It> 
5 
) Figure 1.2 cont. 
1900 
_! NETHERLANDS 
1900 
SWEDEN 
1,)70 
I 
1970 
1915 
1975 
1.8 
strikes are positive functions of the expected rate of inflation, is also 
consistent with a primarily reactive role for unions, with strikes occurring 
as the consequence of the emergence of unanticipated inflation, rather than 
as a causal factor in wage inflation. 
The resolution of these conflicting propositions in an inter-
national context as a means of explaining the events depicted in Figures 
1.1 and 1.2 involves the detailed examination of the determinants of both 
strike activity and wage inflation across a variety of institutionally 
diverse industrial relations systems. It is this task which the present 
thesis sets out to accomplish. 
As a convenient starting point Chapter 2 contains a critical 
analysis of the various economic models of cyclical strike activity that 
have been applied to explain fluctuations in strike frequency in the 
United States (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969), the United Kingdom (Pencavel 
1970; Hunter 1973; Shorey 1977), and Canada (Smith 1972). The underlying 
assumption of these models is that the decision to strike can be viewed 
as a primarily economic one, made by bargaining agents operating at plant 
level: an assumption, that is, of decentralised business unionism. Despite 
differences in the precise theoretical underpinnings of these models, and 
ambiguities over the precise nature of the behavioural relationships 
involved, their general thrust is that strikes are broadly responsive to 
the business cycle, and in particular to such individual components as 
the state of the labour market, changes in real wages (as well as their 
separate money wage and price components), and the level or share of 
profits. 
In Chapter 3 this rather narrow focus is widened both 
'1.9 
conceptually and geographically as attention is directed towards a 
critique of international comparative explanations of fluctuations in 
strike activity. On a conceptual level detailed consideration is given 
to an evaluation of the theoretical and empirical validity of strike 
models which emphasise the significance of political factors, either as 
a supplement to an economic explanation of strike fluctuations (Hibbs 
1976), or, combined with organisational factors, as an empirically or 
theoretically superior alternative explanation (Shorter and Tilly 1974; 
Snyder 1974, 1975 and 1977). In terms of geographical scope, the analysis 
is broadened to encompass the process of strike determination in countries 
whose industrial relations systems are not confined to the predominantly 
North American pattern of decentralised business unionism. Thus attention 
is also given to countries in which trade unions espouse more political 
objectives, operate under centralised bargaining arrangements, and where 
the relationship between organised labour and the state is based upon 
either alienation (France, Italy and Japan), or integration (Sweden, 
Belgium and Germany), rather than institutional isolation as in the United 
States and Canada. 
In Chapter 4, the focus is again broadened, this time to encompass 
the international experience of wage inflation. Through a critical 
theoretical and empirical evaluction of rival historical accounts of recent 
international trends in strikes and wage inflation, the Chapter seeks to 
make explicit contrasting views on the causal links between these two 
variables. Two such accounts are singled out for particular attention. 
The first, termed the 'international monetarist' explanation (Johnson 
1972; Parkin 1972; Laidler and Nobay 1974; Zis 1975), argues that the 
international escalations in inflation occurring in the late 1960's and 
early 1970's were primarily an excess demand phenomenon, deriving from 
1.10 
escalations occurring in world money supply in the late 1960s. It is 
further argued that the strike 'explosions' depicted in Figure 1.1 must 
be seen as deriving from the emergence of unanticipated inflation. While 
not denying the importance of world money supply, the second account, 
attributed to the work of Soskice (1978), places much greater emphasis 
on cost push forces as the key determinants of wage inflation in the late 
1960 s and early 1970 s. In particular, this analysis puts considerable 
stress on the role of common institutional responses by governments, 
particularly in the form of incomes policies, as a major factor in 
accounting for both strike and wage explosions. In the context of strikes, 
. 
the key determining influences are seen as a variety of economic 'frus-
tration factors', including increased employer pressure aimed at restoring 
plant level prerogatives during periods of labour market slack, moderated 
real wage growth due to increasing world prices in the face of increasing 
corporate profits, and finally the operation of some form of income or 
wage restraint policy. Thus, despite their contrasting perspectives, one 
conclusion that emerges from both analyses is that recent international 
escalations in strikes have been a primarily economic phenomenon, derived 
from broadly similar behavioural responses by trade unions and their 
members across institutionally diverse industrial relations systems. 
Against this background, Chapter 5 develops and operationalizes 
a comparative model of strike activity which, while firmly based upon the 
pursuit of economic concerns, makes more concessions to reality than is 
usual by allowing for symmetrical responses to changing economic condi-
tions by employers and unions; and also by allowing for the likely effects 
of bargaining at levels above that of the indiyidual plant. In addition, 
in line with a number of previous economic models, allowance is made 
for the existence of three parties to negotiation: namely, management, 
loll 
union leadership, and union rank and file. This assumption is, however, 
relaxed in Chapter 6 as account is taken of the intervention of government 
as a fourth partner to bargaining, acting through the imposition or 
encouragement of some form of incomes policy. Chapter 6 also provides a 
review of the diverse forms that such policies have taken among the 
member nations of the Group of Ten, and seeks to account for their 
emergence by reference to the dynamics of the prevailing industrial 
relations structure, and the need on the part of governments to achieve 
certain macroeconomic policy targets. The latter analysis, in turn, 
provides the starting point for the model of wage determination under 
incomes policy which is also presented in Chapter 6. 
The results obtained from estimating the strike and wage 
equations developed in Chapters 5 and 6 are analysed in detail on a country 
by country basis in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 then draws the various strands 
of the analysis together, and by way of conclusion, summarises and 
outlines the implications that may be derived from the empirical work. 
Finally, details of the data sources and the correlation matrices derived 
during the estimations of Chapter 7 are presented in Appendices 1 and 2. 
1.12 
Footnotes to Chapter 1 
1. The Group of Ten is comprised of the following countries: Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
2. Strike frequency figures are not published for the Federal Republic 
of Germany, therefore strike volUme (working days lost) figures are 
substituted both in Figure 1.1 and in subsequent analyses. 
2. 1 
Chapter 2 
Single Country Studies of Strike Activity 
The notion that strike activity is broadly responsive to changes in the 
level of economic activity has a venerable history, dating as far back as 1868 
and the early contribution of Ward (1868). Since that time, numerous studies 
have addressed the issue with varying degrees of theoretilcal and empirical 
rigour. These have· ranged from the early empirical studies of Weyforth 
(1919), Hansen (1921), Griffin (1939), Yoder (1940), Gomburg (1944) I Jurkat 
and Jurkat (1949), Knowles (1952), Rees (1952, 1954), and Levitt (1953); to 
the more recent contributions of Weintraub (1966) and O'Brien (1965). 
However, one of the most significant breakthroughs in the analysis of strikes 
Undoubtedly came with the application of multivariate econometric techniques. 
This opened up a whole new vista of possibilities, freeing empirical work on 
strikes from its previous reliance on the use of individual business cycle 
Components such as money national income (Gomburg), wholesale prices (Hansen), 
and components of industrial production (Weyforth); or the rather clumsy tool 
of business reference cycles l (Rees), and facilitating a much more precise 
form of model building and quantification. 
The first, and in many ways still the most important study of this kind 
is that of Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969). Their work unleashed a flurry of 
activity in the analysis of strikes, particularly in Britain 2, and several 
features of their theoretical and operational specfications have been adopted 
in subsequent analyses. For this reason their work represents an essential 
starting point for any serious analysis of the economics of strike activity. 
. '. ' " .. y . . '. ~.'~ • -. ,J .... ,. , ~.': ,' .. ; ...• 
2.2 
I. The Ashenfelter and Johnson Model 
In addition to its pathbreaking use of econometric estimating techniques, 
the work of Ashenfelter and Johnson represents the first attempt to incorpo-
rate the analysis of strikes into a formal wage bargaining model with the aim 
of testing its predictions empirically. In developing this model, Ashenfelter 
and Johnson initially postulate three parties to wage negotiations at the 
level of the individual bargaining unit: namely, management, union leader-
ship, and union rank and file. Following Ross (1948), the leadership is 
viewed as having objectives that are distinct from those of its members -
including the survival and growth of the union, as well as the maintenance of 
its own political position - the achievement of which is largely dependent 
Upon its ability to satisfy rank and file wage expectations. It is further 
aSsumed that under some circwnstdnces these expectations will be in excess of 
What management will agree to. Knowing this, and in order to safeguard their 
authority, the union leadership is assumed to call a strike, the primary pur-
Pose of which is to bring about a downward revision in the minim~n acceptable 
wage increase demanded by the rank and file. The strike then continues until 
a pOint is reached at which negotiations with management can be successfully 
Concluded. 
Basically, therefore, the strike is seen by Ashenfelter and Johnson as a 
tnechanism for bringing rank and file expectations into line with the firm's 
ability to pay - a mechanism which union leaders, "feel impelled to utili~e to 
SolVe their own political problems and facilitate the survival and growth of 
the organizations they lead" (Ross and Irwin, 1951). By making certain addi-
tional assumptions about'the determinants of rank and file expectations and 
tnanagement's ability to pay, Ashenfelter and Johnson arrive at a model which 
links the probability of a strike to a series of observable economic variables 
as follows: 
s 
m 
1: 
i=O 
b 
i 
tf. 
t-i. 
+ aZU 
t 
2.3 
+ a J D t-1 + a 1+ T + Et 
where S 
t 
m 
is the probability of a strike occuring in period t, E 
i=O 
bAR. 
i t-l. 
is 
a lagged moving average of real wage changes, Ut is the unemployment rate, 
Dt - 1 is a lagged profit variable, T is a trend term and Et a disturbance 
term. 
In this formulation the probability of a strike is assumed to be nega-
tively related both to past changes in real wages and to the unemployment 
rate. With regard to the latter variable, inclusion is viewed as a means of 
testing the proposition that strike activity is sensitive to labour market 
Conditions. The relationship is considered an inverse One for three reasons. 
First, when unemployment is low, workers will be faced with improved job 
Possibilities, raising their opportunity costs and hence their expectations in 
their current job. Second, leadership will be less constrained by the possi-
ble employment effects of a large wage demand and will also have larger strike 
funds. Finally, low un~nployment will increase the availability of part-time 
jObs and hence potential in-strike sources of income, thereby lowering strike 
Costs. 
With regard to the real wage variable, specification as a lagged moving 
aVerage provides a theoretical test of the existence of an expectations-
aChievement gap. Thus, large increases in the recent past are assumed to be 
assOciated with broadly realized expectations and hence fewer strikes. 
No a priori restrictions are placed upon the lagged profits variable, 
Since while high profits are assumed to lead to increased union 
.;,' , ... , •. , .... , ... ,.. .. '."C·:. 
:.: 
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aggressiveness, they are also asswned to enhance ability to pay on the part of 
employers. Finally, the trend term is included to control for secular 
movements in strike activity. This is asswned to have a negative sign, 
reflecting the increased effectiveness of methods of resolving a variety of 
non-pecuniary issues in short, the progressive institutionalization of 
industrial conflict. 
Before the model can be tested empirically, a proxy must be found for the 
dependent variable, since strike probabilities are unobservable. To solve 
this problem Ashenfelter and Johnson asswne that strike probability may be 
reasonably approximated by the ratio of the number of strikes in a given 
period to the nwnber of contract expirations. In the absence of reliable data 
on contract expirations, however, the final estimating equation is specified 
in terms of frequency, while seasonal dummy variables are included on the 
right-hand side to pick up the seasonal pattern in expirations. 
The resulting estimating equation is fitted to U.S. quarterly data for 
the period 1952-1967. Their results indicate that, except for the profits 
Variable, all partial coefficients are highly significant, stable over sub-
periods, and of the expected sign. Moreover, the equation is capable of 
, 
explaining' over 90 percent of the variance in aggregate strike frequency. 
These results are summarized in Table 2.1 on page 2.10. 
Despite its empirical success, several important criticisms may be made 
j 
Of Ashenfelter and Johnson's analysis. First, it places the whole onus of 
adjustment firmly on union rank and file expectations, while no parallel 
adjustment by management is envisaged. Thus, union leaders are asswned to 
aCcept the management's offer as a dictwn, so that strikes become lost causes 
for the rank and file by definition. Second, the model is heavily reliant on 
the existence of perfect knowledge on the part of both management and union 
leaders - an omniscience that is conveniently not extended to the union rank 
I . . . 
I~ 
I 
" .. ,
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and file. Indeed, it is this verY fact which rationalizes the latter's pur-
suit of a strike that all other parties to negotiations already know to be 
futile. In short, Ashenfelter and Johnson have constructed a bargaining model 
that effectively abstracts from many of the key aspects of real world collec-
tive bargaining situations. They have chosen to ignore the fact that bargain-
ing outcomes are jointly determined within an economic environment that is 
characterized by a significant degree of uncertainty, and in which the infor-
mation available to both sides is far frrnn perfect. 
In addition to the unsatisfactory nature of the behavioural assumptions 
underlying the Ashenfelter and Johnson model, doubts must also be expressed 
oVer certain aspects of its empirical specification. First, there is the 
question of the ~ priori restrictions placed on several of the independent 
variables. Thus, while Ashenfelter and Johnson admit to the ambiguity of the 
effects of profits on strike freqllency, such problems of interpretation are 
not confined to this variable alone. First, consider the inverse relationship 
POstulated between unemployment and strikes. Though all of the arguments 
adVanced are plausible, they are certainly not the only ones that could rea-
SOnably be advanced. It could, for example, also be argued that feelings of 
Worker discontent are likely to be greatest during recessions, particularly if 
employers seek to exploit looser labour markets to regain concessions made 
dur ing booms. Al ternati vely , unions may call strikes as a form of protest 
OVer high unemployment, directing attention as much against the government (in 
the hope of proluoting expansionary policies) , as against individual 
employers. In short, unemployment may actually be a significant cause of 
strikes, rather than simply a factor affecting expectations or relative 
bargaining power, and hence merely their timing. j 
. . -
'. "- .. , . 
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Further, with respect to real wage changes, Ashenfelter and Johnson sug-
gest that rapid increases in the recent past will reduce current wage expecta-
tions by narrowing the expectations-achievement gap. Equally plausible, how-
ever, is the argument that this will simply lead workers to expect increases 
that are at least as large in the future. Indeed, just such an argument has 
been used by Smith (1976) to explain why union leaders might be unwilling to 
fully exploit their short-run bargaining advantage during wage negotiations. 
Alternatively, it could be argued that in terms of the formation of rank and 
file wage expectations, recent gains by other groups wi thin the appropr ia te 
'orbits of coercive comparison' (Ross 1948), or 'wage contours' (Dunlop 1950), 
will be just as important as workers' own past gains. Moreover, to the extent 
that they pick up this effect, lagged aggregate real wage changes are as 
likely to be positively related to strikes as they are negatively related. 
Finally, it could be argued that workers' wage concerns do not so Inuch revolve 
around changes in gross real wages as around net (i.e. after tax) take home 
pay (Jackson et ale 1972). Indeed, this is particularly likely to be signifi-
Cant in an inflationary environment where workers face high marginal tax 
rates, and social security thresholds denominated in nominal rather than real 
income. 
Next, there is the inclusion of dummy variables to, represent variations 
in Contract expirations. In practice these are likely to pick up considerably 
, 
IUore than expirations, since it is well known that strikes also follow a 
pronounced seasonal pattern, reflecting in part variations in the costs of 
striking at different times of year (Shorey 1974). 
Finally, there is the question of the use of aggregate strike frequency 
as the dependent variable. Ashenfelter and Johnson's specification is firmly 
based upon a model of wage bargaining, yet as they themselves admit, not all 
- . ~ .. ., 
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stoppages can be traced to wage issues. Indeed, two categories other than 
matters of pay are referred to in their discussion: namely, non-wage items 
such as fringe benefits; and institutional reasons such as union recognition 
and grievances. In order to handle these, the first category is assumed to 
have a money equivalent so that it can be 'imputed to the contract wage' 1 
while the second; which lies outside the scope of their theory, is asswned to 
be absorbed into the constant term. However, it has been estimated that over 
the post-war period only about half of the strikes occurring in the united 
States in any given year have been over wage related issues (including fringe 
benefits, incentive rates, job classifictions and paid vacations) (Shalev 
1980) • Thus, even if their model is consistent with aggregate variations in 
these strikes - and its high overall explanatory power would seem to suggest 
that this is in fact the case - Ashenfelter and Johnson's hypotheses provide 
no specific clues as to why this might be so. 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that Ashenfelter and Johnson's 
analysis has many serious weaknesses. In making an overall assessment, how-
ever, it must be emphasized that in spite of its grossly oversimplified view 
Of the collective bargaining process, the Ashenfelter and Johnson model does 
provide both valuable insights into the economics of the strike decision, and 
a variety of testable predictions concerning the probability of a strike's 
OCCurrence. This fact, together with its highly satisfactory empirical per-
formance with u.s. data, has undoubtedly contributed to the widespread appli-
Cation of the basic estimation equation to explaining strikes in a number of 
other countries. One such study is that of Pencavel (1970) using United 
Kingdom data. 
., -,...-r'. "<' •• , . , ... " 
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The Analysis of Pencavel 
The importance of Pencavel's work lies in the fact that it was the first 
1+ 
of many subsequent attempts to apply Ashenfelter and Johnson's model to a 
different institutional context. o However, while the specification employed 
is virtually identical to that of Ashenfelter and Johnson, the precise 
interpretation given to several of the variables is modified to take account 
of the different institutional environment prevailing in the United Kingdom. 
For example, the absence of legally binding collective agreements in Britain, 
and hence the absence of enforceable no-strike clauses, means that workers are 
not constrained to the same degree to strike only dllring those periods when 
agreements expire. b There is, however, a pronounced seasonal pattern in the 
U.K. strike activity (Knowles 1952), and quarterly d~uny variables are 
included in Pencavel's equation to pick up this phenomenon rather than 
Contract expirations. 
Certain other institutional modifications introduced into the analysis, 
including a consideration of the role of shop stewards in the bargaining 
process, have only cosnetic significance. For example, Pencavel suggests that 
while shop stewards generally exert a moderating influence over their members, 
they will nevertheless seek to safeguard both their own position, and the 
SOlidarity of the union, by calling a (usually unofficial) strike, 'rather 
than allowing the initiative to slip into the hands of militants'. Thus, in 
l?encaval's reinterpretation, the shop steward movement simply takes on the 
rOle of Ashenfelter and Johnson's union leadership, leaving the behavioural 
assumptions of the latter analysis unchanged. 
The actual equation fitted by Pencavel is as follows: 
= 
_;1 • 
• .. ~ J" 
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where Nit are the seasonal variables, dnd the new variables J and L 
represent dwrumies for the effects of incomes policy, and a Labour Goverrunent, 
respectively. It is expected that: 
a J.; a lab; and a 7 < U 
< 
a 3 > 0 
In fitting this estimating equation to U.K. quarterly strike frequency 
d d · . 7 f ata outsi e nunl.ng or the period 1950-1967, Pencavel confirms its empirical 
credentials, with all the variables except the third quarter seasonal dummy 
Variable significant and correctly signed. In addition, 87 percent of the 
Variance in aggregate strike frequency is accounted for. These findings are 
summarized in Table 2.1 on page 2.10. 
Pencavel's findings for the U.K. reveal one interesting contrast with 
those of Ashenfelter and Johnson for the United States. Pencavel obtains a 
Significant positive trend term with U.K. strike frequency, whereas the U.s. 
apparently experienced the opposite pattern. Pencavel seeks to attribute this 
result to the fact that in the United Kingdom, the rising expectations of 
workers have not been accompanied by institutional developments on the 
industrial relations front which are capable of handling employee grievances 
Speedily and effectively. In short, that "Britain's system of industrial 
relations has been suffering from the rigidity of an old established structure 
inflexible in relation to a change in the relative bargaining power of the 
participants" (p. 247). Thi~ argument clearly bears a strong family 
resemblance to the Donovan Commission's (1968) notion of the 'inadequacy of 
institutions', in which respect it contrasts markedly with Ashenfelter and 
JOhnson's assumption of the progressive institutionalization of industrial 
conflict in the United States. 
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Table 2.1 
Quarterly Strike Frequency Studies, Three Countries, The Post-War Period. 
Author 
A-J 
Pencavel 
Smith 
-
Source: 
Notes: 
b 
T L. D-W country Period U iJ16 Rt _ i D NL. N j NIf R t t-1 
USA 1952-67 -** -** + +** +** +** -** 0.94 1.44 
UK 1950-67 -** -** +** +** +** + +** 0.87 1.36 
Canada 1953-68 -** 
-** -** +** +** +** +** 0.82 1.66 
Ashenfelter and Johnson ( 1969); Pencavel (1970); Smith (1972) 
R L. is the unadjusted correlation coefficient; D-W the Durbin-Watson 
statistic. 
** indicates a coefficient is significant at the 1% level, while +/-
indicates its sign. 
The independent variables are defined as follows: 
Ut = unemployment in 'OOO's; 
~ AR . = six quarter lagged moving average of real wage changes, 
i=1 t-l 
estimated using an Almon (1965) lag technique; 
= lagged profits variable; 
N L.' N j' N If = seasonal dummy variables representing the second, third and 
fourth quarters of the year. 
T = trend term 
.. ' .. ~. \' ,:., , \",' 
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An important conclusion that would seem to emerge from a comparison of 
these finding~ is that, despite obvious differences in labour relations insti-
tutions, as well as in the secular performance of these institutions between 
the two countries, they have apparently not substantially affected the overall 
performance of the Ashenfelter and Johnson model, at least over the period 
Under consideration. Moreover, this conclusion would appear to gain further 
credence in the light of the findings of both authors with respect to the 
structural stability of their fitted equations over time, despite the occur-
rence of institutional developments of the type adduced to explain the con-
trasting trend terms. As Table 2.1 illustrates, on the basis of the findings 
reported by Slui th ( 1972), in an application of the Ashenfelter and Johnson 
lQodel to Canadian quarterly strike data, this conclusion can also be 
generalized to include the post-war experience of canada. 
These findings clearly raise the question of whether the model can be 
applied equally successfully to countries with industrial relations systems 
that are even more institutionally diverse than those of the United Kingdom, 
the United states and canada. This issue is addressed in some detail in 
Chapter 3; however before moving on, it is important to emphasize that two 
more recent studies of British strikes have reported results which raise some 
dOUbt about the continued stability of the Ashenfelter-Johnson model. 
are th~. studies of Hunter (1973) and Shorey (1974). 
~ Analysis of Hunter 
These 
The starting point for Hunter's analysis is an attempt to fit the basic 
AShenfelter-Johnson model to a later period than that undertaken by Pencavel -
namely the period 1968-1972. The result is the serious underprediction of the 
Observed level of strike activity, a problem which leads Hunter to suggest a 
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number of modifications to the basic model. These modifications center around 
the possible inconsistency of the une.nployment rate as an indicator of the 
state of the labour market, the interpretation of the trend term, and the 
inclusion of a variety of additional explanatory variables. 
In particular, Hunter substitutes the unfilled vacancy rate (V t) for 
un~nployment as an index of labour market conditions; replaces the trend term 
with the female participation rate (~), as a proxy for the availability of 
alternative sources of household income for strikers (and hence a major deter-
minant of strike costs); and adds the lagged rate of change of unionization, 
(~-1)g, as a measure of trade union militancy. Finally, Hunter also adds a 
series of dummy variables proxying the effects of incomes policy in both its 
'hard' (IPH) and 'soft' (IPS) phases, and the impact of Labour Governments 
(LG) • 
Estimating this modified model using annua1 9 non-mining strike frequency 
data for the period 1950-1971, Hunter obtains a significant negative coef-
ficient on the real wage change variable, thereby confirming previous 
findings; and obtains significant positive coefficients on both the female 
participation rate, and the lagged rate of change of unionization. He finds 
no significant relationship between strike frequency and either profits, or 
more disturbingly, the state of the labour market as proxied by the new 
variab~e unfilled vacancies. With regard to his dwnmy variables, contrary to 
expectations, neither the presence of a Labour Government, nor the operation 
Of either hard or soft phases of income policy, appeared to have any 
Significant depressive effect on strikes. Indeed, in the case of the hard 
Phase the estimated coefficient was actually positive. !U 
I .. . . 
I~ 
-::. 
I 
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By omitting the non-significant variables from his original specifica-
tion, Hunter transforms his strike frequency model into .a new form as follows: 
m 
= + a 1 L b t.R . + al A + a::! M + E i=O i t-~ t t-1 t 
where all variables are as previously defined, and a.L < 0; a l > 0 and a j > O. 
While this model perfonns marginally better than the original 
Ashenfelter-Johnson formulation in the context of more recent data, it is 
still prone to serious underprediction. Moreover, there are several doubts 
about the validity of certain aspects of its specification. Of particular 
concern is the theoretical justification for the inclusion of the rate of 
change of union density as an index of worker militancy. This variable, which 
HUnter derives from Hines (1964) on the suggestion of Pencavel (1970), has 
been subject to extensive criticism in the context of wage inflation studies 
(Purdy and Zis 1973). In addition, on an empirical level, it is well esta-
blished that the rate of change of union density is itself partly a function 
Of the rates of change of wages and prices, and the level and/or rate of 
Change of unemployment (Bain and ElSheikh 1976). Consequently, inclusion of 
Unionization as an additional explanatory variable in the strike equation is 
likely to introduce a high degree of collinearity, a fact which makes the 
pr.ecise interpretation of Hunter's findings problematical. Given this, the 
mOdel cannot be seen as in any sense displacing that of Ashenfelter and 
JOhnson in the British context. Nevertheless, Hunter's reformulation does 
draw attention to the possible role of additional explandtory variables as 
determinants of strike fluctuations, as well as introducing an empirical 
qUestion mark over the relevance of the Ashenfelter-Johnson model to more 
recent British strike experience. 
I.·' 
\ ,.. 
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The Shorey Model 
The importance of Shorey's analysis lies, in part, in his attempt to 
derive a formal strike model from premises that are considerably more 
realistic than those of Ashenfelter and Johnson. While his initial frame of 
reference is still that of plant level wage negotiation by an individual 
bargaining unit, his analysis seeks to explicitly acknowledge the existence of 
imperfect knowledge and economic uncertainty. Consequently, both short-run 
profit and wage-bill maximization are rejected as useful or appropriate 
deCision criteria in favour of an analysis based on the pursuit on longer-run 
objectives. This is of particular importance in the context of strike costs 
which, insofar as they depend upon probable strike length, are considered to 
be largely unknown quantities during collective bargaining. 11 
Against this background, Shorey postulates a model firmly rooted in the 
Conventional economic analysis of bilateral monopoly, in which the probability 
of a strike is related to the size of the gap between the union's final demand 
and management's final offer, with each side's willingness to move toward an 
Ultimate settlement assumed to depend upon its (uncertain) estimate of its 
respective strike costs. Strike probability is then related to a series of 
Observable economic variables via the specification of the likely determinants 
of the union demand and employer offer. 
In particular, the management side is assumed to respond positively to 
, 
the settlement-.s recently granted by other employers (Wt _ j ), the rate of 
Change of productive activity within the bargaining unit (K·t ) ll, and recent 
Changes in its product prices 
.w 
(Pt-1); while union demands are assumed to 
depend positively upon the settlements recently achieved by other workers 
(Wt _ j ), the level of local productive activity and recent changes 
in consumer prices 
.c 
(Pt - j ) • Strike costs for the employer are then assumed 
,: ' .. 
'.' \ ,., . . .-
/ .. 
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to depend positively on the level of profits (Dt ); while for the union they 
are assumed to depend positively upon the size of the total wage bill 
(WBt ) 1'+, the level of unemployment (Ut>, and variously on the time of 
year. Finally, the occurrence of a strike is also assumed to depend 
positively on the union's anticipation of success in calling a strike, which 
. 1~ ~s proxied by strike frequency in the previous period (SSt_1)' 
Omitting seasonal variables, these arguments may be combined to produce a 
comprehensive estimating equation in strike frequencylb as follows: 
.c 
S = aU + a J. W . + aZ P . + a3 A + a'+ K 
t t-J t-J t. t 
+ a ~ U + a b D + a7 WB + a B SS + a 9 T + E 
t t t t-1 t 
Where the additional variables are the trend term, T, and a disturbance term, 
E; and with a3, aB > 0 and a'+, as, a6, a7 < O. With regard to the wage and 
price J. 7 terms, insofar as these affect both management offers and union de-
rnands in the same direction, their impact is considered ambiguous. However, 
.c ~horey argues on 2: priori grounds that Pt - j will be positively related, and 
Wt _j negatively related to aggregate strike frequency. 
Estimation of this model using quarterly data on U.K. strike frequency 
OUtSide mining over the period from first quarter 1959 to first quarter 1967 
indicates a significant positive relationship between strikes and the rate of 
Change 'of consumer prices, stoppages in the previous period, the trend term, 
and the first quarter seasonal dummy; while a significant negative relation-
Ship is established with the rate of change on money wages. No Significant 
r.elationship is found with either real profits, the rate of change of produc-
tiVity, the aggregate wage bill, unemployment, or additional dummy variables 
included to proxy incomes policy and the effects of a labour goverrunent. 
Omitting non-significant variables effectively reduces Shorey's model to 
the following form: 
. -;-... ~ 
S 
t 
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.c 
= a 0 + a 1 W . + alP + a j A + a 4 SS + a!> T + E 
t-] t-j t t-1 t 
Taking the index of prodllctive activity (At) as a proximate indicator 
of excess demand, the only substantive difference between this model and that 
of Ashenfelter and Johnson is the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable - a 
Somewhat ~bious distinction given the estimating problems it introduces. 18 
Moreover, applica tion of this slimmed down model to predict U. K. stoppage 
frequency over the period 1967-1972 also produces serious underprediction of 
the observed values. -
Shorey seeks to explain this phenomenon via recourse to a series of ad 
~ arguments based upon the effects of structural and institutional changes -
including incomes policy, employer resistance due to falling profits; and 
stagnant real wages - but goes on to argue that there is nothing to suggest 
that post-1967 behaviour is really significantly different flom previous 
eXperience. Given the presence of all these variables in his estimating 
equation, however, this conclusion is hard to sustain. What Shorey's findings 
do provide, in fact, is further confirmation of the unsatisfactory perfor-
mance of a conventional economic model in explaining recent British strike 
eXperience. 
~nclusions 
Despite differences in their precise theoretical underpinnings, all of 
• 
the approaches surveyed in this chapter demonstrate a number ~f major similar-
ities. First, all are essentially micro-economic in orientation. That is, 
they are all explicitly derived from a basic conception of the strike as the 
result of a breakdown in plant level negotiations over pay. Despite this 
micro orientation, however, all are nevertheless ultimately tested at the 
macro level. 19 
. \ ........... . 
-, 
-' I~ -- .. ~ .... "t--
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Second, all the studies employ a strike frequency measure as their depen-
dent variable, ignoring other measures such as working days lost (or strike 
volume), average strike duration and average strike size. In part, this 
reflects the fact that the bargaining models on which these studies are based 
are all formulated in terms of strike probability which, though not observ-
able, can be readily translated into strike frequency. However, this also 
reflects recognition of the fact that strike frequency is much more sensitive 
to economic fluctuations than other measures (Skeels 1971, Walsh 1975). 
A third similarity derives from the fact that several of the explanatory 
variables are co~non to all studies. Thus, labour market conditions - proxied 
by unemployment or vacancies - the rates of change of wages and prices, and 
profits are included in all specifications, as are dummy variables for such 
factors as incomes policy and changes in government. The great divide comes 
in terms of the empirical significance of these variables. That is, while all 
the studies surveyed find that inflation has had a significant positive influ-
ence, and wages a significant negative influence on strikes regardless of 
institutional context, the later studies of Shorey and Hunter suggest little 
influence for either profits or unemployment in the recent British context, 
thus contradicting the earlier findings of Pencavel. 
An additional point that emerges fairly clearly is that none of the equa-
tions surveyed performs well in the British context when extended beyond the 
Period for which it was originally estimated. In particular, none of the 
mOdels seems capable of handling the explosion in strike frequency that occur-
r.ed in Britain in 1970. On an ad hoc basis it has been argued that an under-
lYing change may have taken place in the structure of the relationship between 
strike activity and economic variables from the late 1960s onward,2U and there 
wOuld seem to be some evidence to support this contention. The per iod was 
2.18 
indeed characterized by a degree of economic turmoil unparalleled since the 
War, with accelerating rates of domestic and world inflation, growing unem-
ployment, a decline in the rate of profit, and a much greater degree of 
goverrunent intervention via successive incomes policies all contributing to a 
climate of greater uncertainty in collective bargaining. 
It is important to emphasize that these problems were not confined to the 
United Kingdom. Most Western nations found themselves subject to similar 
pressures, and as the graphs in Chapter 1 clearly show, all experienced 
significant escalations in strike activity at about the same time. This 
SUggests, at least Circumstantially, that the search for the factors contrib-
uting to recent strike experiences might usefully be pursued at an inter-
na tional level. Accordingly, Chapter 3 shifts the focus away from single 
COuntry studies, and toward more broadly based international cOblparative 
eXplanations of strike experience. Moreover, in addition to widening the geo-
graphical focus, attention is directed toward a broader conceptual framework 
than that provided by purely economic models. 
.:., .. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 2 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
See A.F. Burns and W.C. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, New York, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946. 
In addition to the contributions reviewed in this Chapter, studies have 
been undertaken in Britain by R. Bean and D.A. Peel, 'A Quantitative 
Analysis of Wage Strikes in Four U.K. Industries 1962-1970', Journal 
of Economic Studies, 1974, pp. 88-97~ D. Sapsford, 'A Time Series 
Analysis of U.K. Industrial Disputes', Industrial Relations, vol. 14, 
No.2, 1975, pp. 242-249~ and K.G. Knight, 'Strikes and Wage Inflation· 
in British Manufacturing Industry, 1950-1968', Bulletin of the Oxford 
University Institute of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 34, 1972, pp. 
281-94. 
This argument is advanced by A. Rees, Industrial Conflict and Business 
Fluctuations', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 60, 1952, pp. 371-82. 
Despite differences in their theoretical underpinnings many subsequent 
models have employed operational specifications broadly analogous to 
Ashenfelter and Johnson. These include Hunter (1973) and Shorey (1977). 
The contribution of both authors is reviewedin greater detail below. 
In the Canadian context reference should be made to Smith (1972) and 
Walsh (1975)~ while in a more broadly comparative context to the work 
of Snyder (1974, 1975 and 1977) and Hibbs (1976). 
This is not to imply that strikes do not occur during the term of 
collective agreements in the U.S., but simply that such strikes as 
do occur are illegal. 
In view of the significant decline in the frequency of mining stoppages 
occuring over the period (associated with the shift to centralized 
bargaining), mining stoppages are conventionally omitted to avoid 
biasing the overall trend. 
The use of this variable is suggested by Pencavel (1970) following 
Hines (1964). 
Annual data is used in place of quarterly data given the unavailability 
of either M or A on a quarterly basis. 
t-l t 
Hunter justifies this result on the grounds that harder phases of 
incomes policy, representing greater government intrusion in collective 
bargaining, have been associated with increased union hostility. This 
issue is discussed in greater detail in Chapters6 and 7. 
In practice this may not be a very realistic assumption, particularly 
in the context of large firms who, according to the survey evidence 
of Daniel (1977), do make systematic cost/benefit calculations in 
relation to strikes. 
This variable is included as an index of ability to pay. 
This variable acts as a local labour market proxy, such that when local 
productive activity is high, the demand for labour and hence worker's 
wage demands (and bargaining power) will also be high. 
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14. The wage bill provides a potential index of the opportunity costs of 
striking for workers. 
15. The lagged strike variable is also interpreted as proxying the effects 
of external militancy on workers, a factor assumed to further reinforce 
the hypothesized positive relationship with current strike 
probability. In practice, however, this result is far from obvious. 
External militancy will also influence employers, and may make them 
more willing to concede without a strike. Equally,previous strikes 
within the bargaining unit may have had the effect of reducing 
workers' financial capacity to pursue a strike in support of current 
negotiations, implying an inverse relationship between SS 1 and 
current strike probability. t-
16. Strike probability is transformed into strike frequency by assuming 
that strike probability for each bargaining unit is approximated by 
the ratio of the total number of strikes to the total number of 
bargaining units. Then, if the number of bargaining units is more 
or less constant through time, strike probability will vary with 
the number of strikes. 
17. In the operational specification of the model the distinction between 
product and consumer prices is dropped. 
18. For the problems associated with the inclusion of a lagged independent 
variable in the estimating equation see Pind~~and Rubinfeld (197b). 
19. It is interesting to note that Pencavel (1970) also estimates the 
Ashenfelter and Johnson model at the industry level, but fails to 
obtain satisfactory results. 
20. Similar problems afflicted the Phillips relation around this time. 
Chapter 3 
Comparative Studies of Strike Activity 
Compared with the effort that has been expended on time series analyses 
of strike activity at the national level, the area of international compara-
tive research has been the objective of profound neglect. In practice, most 
studies adopting an international perspective have been much more concerned 
with the explanation of secular rather than cyclical developments. 1 Fortu-
nately there are exceptions, and recent years have witnessed several important 
Contributions by both econo1nists and sociologists. Indeed, the major 
ernpir ical and theoretical challenge to the hegelt\ony of orthodox economic 
eXplanations of short-run strike fluctuations has corne in the area of inter-
national comparative research. The main purpose of this chapter is to 
Critically assess three of these contributions: namely, those of Hibbs 
(1976), Shorter and Tilly (1974), and Snyder (1974, 1975 and 1977). 
~AnalYSis of Hibbs 
Though not the first international comparative study of strikes, the work 
Of Hibbs (1976) nevertheless provides a useful starting point, partly because 
it forms . 1 . d d i Ch 2 a natural bridge with the econom~c ana yses cons~ ere n apter , 
and also because it is in many respects the most ambitious study to date. 
The primary aim of Hibbs' analysis is the development and testing of a 
Stat· . 1 lostical model capable of explaining short-run f uctuations in post-war 
aggregate strike activity across a ten-country s~nple. The countries in ques-
t· 
loon are Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, 
S"'ed en, the United Kingdom and the united St_ates. 
." ., .... : ......... ·1-• .,· >.,., '. ·tI\ ........... , "':1 W. ';*":\" , ..... "'..,...~ .... ,., 
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From the outset, Hibbs' approach contrasts in several important respects 
with those of previous authors. First, he chooses strike volume (i.e. working 
days lost) rather than strike frequency as the dependent variable. One advan-
tage of this substitution is that strike volume is generally assumed to be 
less prone to measurement error. For example, as Clegg (1972) has argued in 
the British context, while strike frequency is prone to distortion because 
many small strikes are never reported, the fact that these strikes make only a 
small contribution to total working days lost means that this variable is 
likely to present a rather more accurate and comprehensive picture. 
This view is shared by Vanderkamp (1970), who employs working days lost 
as the relevant dependent variable in his analysis of canadian strike data. 
According to Vanderkamp, this composite measure most clearly approximates the 
economic costs which constitute the output foregone as a result of strikes, 
not least because it takes into aCCO\l!lt the relevant dimensions of strike 
activity - their length and size as well as their frequency. This view is 
also clearly shared by Hibbs, who justifies his use of working days lost on 
the grounds that it more nearly approximates the net damage caused by strikes. 
Such reasoning is open to criticism on the grounds that strike volume 
makes no allowance for time lost by workers indirectly involved at plants 
other than the one in dispute. Indeed, such are the vagaries of international 
, 
Ineasurement that some countries - including Belgium, canada, Italy and Japan -
do not even include workers indirectly involved at the plant actually in 
dispute (Fisher 1973). This clearly introduces important questions (both of 
definition and of measurement variation across countries) which Hibbs does not 
,,', r·"t ........ ," 
.. 
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address. This is a serious omission, since the second unique feature of 
Hibbs' approach, namely his use of pooled time-series and cross-section datal, 
would seem to raise some questions about the validity of combining strike 
figures measured on different bases in different countries. 
In further contrast with previous studies, in formulating his statistical 
mOdel, Hibbs explicitly rejects the narrow parochialism of purely economic 
bargaining models in favour of a broader politico-economic approach. Thus he 
identifies two broad categories of factors· that are likely to affect inter-
temporal and international variations in strike activity. The first category 
reflects the conventional economic wisdom by including such variables as move-
ments in real wages, the degree of excess demand for labour, and changes in 
the profits ratio. However, the second category extends the analysis by 
introducing as additional variables the prevailing configuration of parties in 
the political arena - including the competitive position of labour-oriented 
parties on the non-communist left and the extent of corrununist party 
i.nfluence. 
Though not derived from a formal analysis of the bargaining process, 
Hibbs' specification of the economic components of his model bears a strong 
f~nily resemblance to that of Ashenfelter and Johnson. Formally it is 
eXpressed as follows: 
SV 
t 
m 
b + b ~ 
o 1 i=1 
m 
d l§J.. . + bZ U + b3 A; + E 
i t-~ t t t 
where SV is strike volume; E d ~R is a polynomial-lag specification 
t i=1 t t-l 
"',' ;: 
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representing the long-run expectations - achievement gap in real wages; Utis 
the unemployment rate; and Lx:t changes in the ratio of aggregate profits to 
total a~ployee compensation, included as a proxy for changes in the relative 
shares of labour and capital in national income. 
The interpretation given to these variables is analogous to that of 
Ashenfelter and Johnson. Specif ically, large increases in real wages are 
associated with a low expectations-achievement gap, and hence lower strike 
activity. On the other hand, low unemployment is assumed to offer strategic 
advantages to an aggressive labour force, including good prospects for alter-
native employment, abundant temporary or part-time job opportunities to sup-
plement in-strike income, and a reduced ability on the part of employers to 
replace potential strikers. All these factors are assumed to produce an 
inverse relationship between strike activity and unemployment. Finally, since 
profits are likely to promote both greater delnands by labour, but also greater 
in-strike opportunity costs for enployers, their effect on strike volume is 
Considered indetennina te. 
Apart from the use of strike volume in place of strike frequency as the 
dependent variable, the Inain difference between Hibbs' formulation and that of 
AShenfelter and Johnson lies in the specification of the profits term as a 
rate of change rather than as a level. In addition, Hibbs also experiments 
With se~eral alternative specifications of the real wage variable.As well as 
the Almon lag formulation 3 of the expectations-achievement gap, Hibbs also 
Specifies two alternative formulations, one based upon extrapolative 
eXpectations, 4 the other on adaptive expectations plus a trend. 5 
..... 
";r .".'-' 
Utilizing these alternative specifications, Hibbs estimates three differ-
ent versions of the above model using pooled annual data froin the ten coun-
tries over the 20-year period 1950-1969. In the fitted equations, all param-
eters except the intercept terms, which are allowed to take a unique value for 
each country, are assumed to be invariant both across time and between coun-
tries. 'By specifying the model in this form, Hibbs implicitly assumes that 
different institutional arrangements affect only the underlying levels of 
strike activity, but have no significant impact on the causes of fluctuations 
around these levels. In this sense, his work is clearly an extension of the 
findings of Ashenfelter and Johnson, Pencavel, and Smith. 
Hibbs' best fitting equation turns out to be that containing the poly-
nomial distributed lag specification originally used by Ashenfelter and 
Johnson. This equation, which accounts for 53 percent of the variance in 
& 
strike volume, indicates a significant inverse relationship between strikes 
and both real wage changes (in the form of an expectations-achievement gap) 
and unemployment; while the coefficient on the rate of change of profits vari-
able appears insignificant. The precise details are reproduced in equation 1 
Of Table 3.1, on p. 3.7. 
In considering these results, Hibbs emphasizes that all his fitted equa-
tions embody the assumption that strike activity responds to real as opposed 
to money wage changes. That is, that workers do not suffer from money illu-
sion • In order to test this proposition, the real wage variable is divided 
into its money wage and price components. Re-estimation produces the expected 
negative coefficient on the money wage variable and positive coefficient on 
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the price change variable, however in the latter case it is insignificant. 
Nevertheless, Hibbs, somewhat surprisingly, still concludes that the two 
Coefficients are statistically equivalent (see equation 2, Table 3.1). 
The overall validity of these results is clearly heavily dependent upon 
Hibbs' basic assumption of parameter equivalence across countries - an assump-
tion which a priori might seem somewhat implausible given both the diversity 
Of national institutional arrangements and strike recording procedures encom-
passed by his sample. Hibbs does recognize this, and in an attempt to allow 
for the effects of institutional variation he singles out for consideration 
one important aspect of the institutional environment frequently associated 
With a low level of industrial conflict: namely, the degree of centralization 
.., 
of collective bargaining. 
"". 
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.!i!ble 3.1 
Significance of Estimated Regression Coefficients for Economic and Political 
Determinants of Strike Volume. Ten Industrial Countries, Belgium, canada, France, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, U.S., and U.K., 1950-1969. Pooled 
time-series, cross-section data. 
* * 5 5 5 
Equation U tx:; L fiR L ~ L ~ LI LG CP LI E LG E R2 
t t i=1 t-i i=1 t-i i=1 t-i t t t t t t t 
-
-** + -* 0.53 
2 
-** -* + 0.53 
3 
-** -** + +** 0.58 
4 
-** -** +** + ~ 0.58 
5 
-** -** +** 0.58 
-
~: Hibbs (1976) 
EConomic Variables: Political Variables: 
TJt :: unemployment LIt = Labour/Socialist Party Incentive Index 
AR 
~ 
4> 
.. 
.... 
:: 
:: 
:: 
lagged real wage variable 
lagged money wage variable 
lagged price variable 
significant at 0.5% level 
significant at 0.1% level 
LGt = Labour/Socialist Goverrunent dummy 
Et = Election year dummy 
CP = Communist party variable 
The precise definition of the political vari-
ables is discussed in the text • 
In support of this selection, llibbs relies heavily on the classic 
comparative study of Ross and Hartman (1960). However, it needs to be 
emphasized that in practice Ross and Hartman attributed observed declines in 
Strike activity a - or in their famous phrase, 'the withering away of the 
• 
strike' - to a variety of factors in addition to simply the degree of cen-
tralization of collective bargaining. These included employer policies, 
improved dispute settlement techniques, increased goverrunent activity in the 
economy and trade union progrcillunes, as well as such secular movements as the 
. . :.' ~ 
'. 
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growth of white collar employment, steady ~nprov~nents in living standards and 
a general decline in ideoloyy. Y Hore systematically, four key aspects of the 
prevailiny industrial relations environment were singled out for particular 
attention. First, the organisational stability of the labour movement. 
Second, the extent of leadership conflict. Third, the status of labour man-
agement relations - by which was meant the degree of acceptance of both unions 
and collective bargaining by employers. And fourth, the existence or 
otherwise of state-imposed dispute settlement procedures. 
In addition to these purely institutional factors, Fbss and Harbuan also 
painted to the importance of certain aspects of the political context. Thus, 
the existence of worker based political parties, and more especially of 
leftist governments, was also seen as a major force in allowing the labour 
movement to "fore sake the strike in favour of broad political endeavours" 
(Ross and Hartman p. 42). 
Combining these el~11ents, Fbss and Hartman concluded that older, stable 
and unified union movements with a large measure of employer acceptance, cen-
tralized and consolidated collective bargaininy, and effective working class 
Political representation were conducive to a withering away of the strike. By 
Contrast, where these contextual factors were absent, the strike remained, 'a 
technique of massive demonstration and protest rather than a phase ill the 
Collective bargaining process.' 
The essential features of this argwnent and the countries to which it was 
Considered to apply are summarized in Table 3.2. In interpreting this table, 
it is important to bear in mind that in applying the various aspects of the 
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Tab.1.e 3.2 
S~rike Pa~~erns and ~he Ins~icu~ionaI Environmenc 
The Classification of Ross and Hartman 
STRIKE MEASURE ORGANIZATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL COLLECTIVE LEFTIST 
COUNTRY STABILITY UNITY BARGAINING INFLUENCE 
Member- 1 Dura- 2 Employer Bargain- Participa-
ship In- tion Age Member- Factions Communist Accept- ing Party tion in 
volvement ship Influence ance Structure Government 
ratio 
Sweden low long old stable/ subdued weak wide- Highly Yes Common 
high spread central-
ized 
Germany low 1 ow/ old stable/ subdued weak wide- Highly Yes Common 
Netherlands moderate high spread central-
UK ized 
USA Medium/ long fairly fairly subdued weak wide- decen- No No 
Canada high young stable/ spread tralized 
low 
Japan High low young/ unsta- marked strong Un com- Limited Not- No 
France reor- ble/ mon consoli- Unified 
Italy ganized low dation 
-
- - - ----- ------ ------------ ----- ---- - ---
Source: Eldridge (1968), p. 29 
Notes: These classifications are to be viewed more as 'tendencies' than absolutes (Eldridge 1968). 
1 Total working days lost divided by the number of union members. 
2 Total working days lost divided by the number of strikes. 
ROLE OF STATE 
Regulu- Role in 
tion of Collect-
Employ- tive 
ment Bargain-
ing 
Limited Passive 
Limited Active 
Limited Mixed 
Marked Passive 
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institutional and political context to an explanation of comparative strike 
patterns, Ross and Hartman went to some lengths to emphasize that their 
effects were not to be assessed independently, but only as a part of an appro-
priate overall configuration.!U In singling out the degree of centralization 
of collective bargaining as the crucial distinguishing variable, therefore, 
Hibbs totally ignores the host of other factors that industrial relations 
writers in 11 general and Ross and Hartman in particular have specified as 
relevant in accounting for international differences in industrial conflict. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of this single criterion, Hibbs proceeds to 
distinguish three basic types of collective bargaining system as appropriate 
to the task of testing for the effects of institutional variation: namely I 
decentralized, centralized, and highly centralized. Under the heading of 
decentralized are included countries characterised by either plant or company 
bargaining (Canada, the United States, Japan), or by what are termed "anarchic 
labour-management relations' (France and Italy). Centralized systems are then 
aSsumed to be typified by industry-wide or multi-employer bargaining with 
industry-wide constraints (Belgium prior to 1959, the Netherlands after 1963, 
and the United Kingdom). Finally, the highly centralized systeU\S comprise 
those countries where economy-wide or industry-wide bargaining with economy-
wide constraints prevail (Belgium after 1959, Netherlands before 1964, Norway 
and Sweden). These classifications are s~~marized in Table 3.3. 
.''\ : .... '~ . ' ...... ,~.' ',: ~'" \ 
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Table 3.3 
Hibbs' Classification of Industrial Relations systems 
-
Decentralized Centralized Highly-Centralized 
US Belgium Belgium (post 1959) 
(pre-1959) 
Canada Netherlands (pre-1963) 
Japan Netherlands Norway 
(post-1963) 
France UK Sweden 
Italy 
Source: Hibbs (1976) 
On the basis of these classifications, Hibbs re-specifies his basic esti-
mating equation to allow for the possibility of parameter variation across 
different industrial relations systems, although his asswnption of equivalence 
through t~ne is maintained. To accomplish this two dummy variables are intro-
duced: the first takes the value of unity for centralized collective bargain-
ing systems, and zero otherwise; the second takes the value of unity for 
highly centralized systems, and zero otherwise. Decentralized systems then 
Comprise the null case. Inclusion of these dummy variables in the original 
estimating equation produces an expanded equation of the following form: 
sv = 
t • 
5 5 5 
a +a E~LR + b E 1T (LR • *1> ) + c L 
o 1 i=1 i t- i 1 i=1 i t-l 1 1 i=1 
+ a t.:,c 
3 t 
b (U *0 ) + C (U *02 ) 2 t 1 2 t 
+ b (tc *D ) + c (tc *D ) 
3 t 1 3 t 2 
+ E 
t 
w ([;R *0) 
i t-i 2 
Where the additional terms in D J. and D'L. are the adjustments for centralized 
and highly centralized systems respectively. 
. , 
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Estimation of this unconstrained model produces insignificant coeffi-
cients on all of the adjustment terms, leading Hibbs to conclude that his 
initial assumption of parameter equivalence on real wages, unemployment and 
profits across diverse industrial relations systems was broadly correct. That 
this is a totally inadequate test of such a proposition, however, is revealed 
by a closer examination of Table 3.3. 
The inadequacy of the procedure of selecting one aspect of the industrial 
relations environment as a classification device has already been noted. This 
inadequacy becomes readily apparent when viewed in relation to the strange bed 
fellows produced in Table 3.3. Thus, under the heading of 'decentralized' are 
to be found both France and Italy, and the United States and canada - systems 
which other writers (including, of course, Ross and Hartman) have gone to con-
siderable lengths to demonstrate as institutionally distinct.!L This miscate-
gorization is carried even further by the inclusion of the U.K. under the 
heading of l ' d.Lj centra l.ze , thereby totally ignoring the pronounced shift 
towards decentralized plant level bargaining that has occurred in the private 
sector since the war. 
Also under the heading of centralized, Hibbs includes Belgium prior to 
1959, and the Netherlands after 1963; however, in neither case is any attempt 
made to justify the historical periodicity employed. In the case of Belgium, 
Hibbs' 'division does, in fact, coincide with the introduction of the economy-
wide social progrruruning accord, and the growth of interindustry and interpro-
fessional agreements at the national level (Blanpain 1973, l-blitor 1978). 
However, as Weber (1964) has argued, the increased centralization of formal 
.\'.:\: ........ ~; .. ~ ~~. ~ .. ~~. 
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negotiations in larger units does not necessarily reduce the operational auto-
nomy of lower levels.!~ Thus, in the case of Belgium, it has been argued that 
while the period of the 1960' s was undoubtedly characterised by increasing 
official emphasis on centralized bargaining structures, it also witnessed an 
important de facto shift towards increased bargaining activity at industry and 
plant level ( Molitor 1978) • In view of this, Hibbs' selection of 1960 as 
marking a dividing line between 'centralized' and 'highly-centralized' systems 
appears sOlllewhat dubious. 
In the case of the Netherlands, the period from 1958 to 1963 has 
frequently been cited as one during which the highly structured system of 
centralized wage determination finally broke down, giving way to a more 
decentralized system of bargaining, (de Wolff 1967, Ullnan and Flanagan 1971, 
Pepper 1975). Given this, the introduction of an historical dividing line in 
1963 would appear much more reasonable. However, by introducing the 
possibility of such an institutional shift, Hibbs effectively begs another 
important question in relation to the adequacy of his specification and the 
use of the pooling technique: namely, the possibility of parameter variation 
across time as well as across countries.!~ Nowhere does Hibbs attempt to test 
for this possibility. 
In view of these criticisms it is difficult to give any statistical 
credibility to Hibbs' finding of parameter equivalence on economic variables 
across diverse systems of industrial relations. Moreover, even if he had 
sUccessfully established parameter equivalence for economic variables, it 
Would still not necessarily follow that this equivalence could be generalised 
I'." 
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to cross-country responses to political variables. However, Hibbs proceeds on 
the basis of just such an assumption in testing an equation supplemented with 
a variety of political indicators. 
As indicated above, the political factors singled out for particular 
attention by Hibbs are the relative status of labour-oriented parties on the 
non-communist left; the presence or otherwise of governments controlled 
outright by socialist, social democratic or labour parties; and the extent of 
communist party influence. Again drawing upon the work of Ross and Hartman, 
Hibbs suggests that where labour oriented parties are serious contenders for 
political power, the use of the strike weapon is likely to be restrained. A 
Similar argument applies in the case of the existence of labour oriented 
governments. Here, as well as the desire of organized labour not to do any-
thing to prejudice the performance of its own party, there is the added 
possibility of furthering the collective demands of workers by legislative 
lb 
enactment. Finally, with respect to communist party influence, Hibbs 
argues that insofar as these act as, 'important agencies for th~ mobilization 
of discontent and the crystalization of labour-management cleavages', their 
presence will be associated with an escalation in conflict. 
Incorporating these hypotheses into Hibbs' basic estimating equation 
produces the following operational specification: 
5 * * SV = a + a Z 
t 0 1 i=1 
~ 4R . + a U + a LI E + a LG E 
i t-l 2 t 3 t 4 t 
+ as CPt + Et 
with a , a , a ,a < 0; a > O. 
1 234 S 
3.15 
All economic variables are as previously defined. In terms of the poli-
tical variables: LI *E is a labour-socialist party incentive index, 
t t 
operating during election years (Et ), and measuring the extent to which such 
parties are successful in dampening industrial conflict. This incentive is in 
turn defined to depend non-linearly on the difference between the labour-
socialist vote share and the largest 'tendence' in the system, so that for 
large share distances the index is assumed to asymptotically approach zero; 
while as the share distance narrows the index approaches the value of one. 
LG*Et is a simple labour-socialist government dummy, taking the value of one 
during periods when such parties are in power, and zero otherwise. Again, the 
variable is constrained to operate only during election years (Et ). 
Finally, CPt is a variable representing the influence of communist parties. 
The actual specification takes a fairly complex exponential form, and is 
designed to capture the effects of the existence of a lower threshold member-
ship below which influence is negligible, as well as an upper bound - or 
'grievance exhaustion point' - beyond which incremental increases in member-
Ship have little or no additional impact on strike activity. 
Empirical tests of the above equation (see Table 3.1, page 3.7) reveal a 
negligible influence on strike volume for either the incentive index, or the 
labour-socialist government d~~y. Moreover, these findings are unchanged 
even when their effects are not constrained to election years. \'h th respect 
to the effects of communist party influence, while Hibbs finds little empiri-
cal support for his original threshold/grievance exhaustion formulation, an 
alternative unbounded specification does produce significant positive esti-
.. 
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mates for the effects of communist parties, leading Hibbs to conclude that the 
latter are indeed associated with levels of strike activity beyond those 
'f .L7 attributable to purely econom~c actors. 
To summarize, on the basis of his' estimations, Hibbs concludes that 
workers in advanced capitalist countries appear to exercise considerable 
sophistication in the use of the strike weapon. Thus, his findings are 
interpreted as indicating that strikes are largely immune from money illusion 
- Cic...:..u.n,,')ClS 0 response to real rather than nominal magnitudes';' and are timed so 
as to exploit the strategic advantages of tight labour markets. Moreover, he 
contends that such rational calculative behaviour underlies fluctuations in 
strike action irrespective of the prevailing institutional environment.' 
Unfortunately, given the serious inadequacies both in the specification 
and the testing of Hibbs' model, these conclusions cannot be sustained solely 
on the basis of the evidence he presents. The most appropriate conclusion 
would therefore appear to be one of 'not proven'. Indeed, this verdict is 
further justified in the light of the work of Shorter and Tilly (1974) and 
Snyder (1974, 1975 and 1977), who present both theoretical and empirical 
evidence which fund~nentally contradicts many aspects of Hibbs' work. 
~he Analysis of Shorter and Tilly 
An important contrast between the work of Shorter and Tilly and that of 
all of the authors considered previously (both in this chapter and in Chapter 
2) is the former's view that the strike is an instrument of collective working 
Class action, rather than simply an adjunct to the collective bargaining pro-
Cess. In this connection, and based upon their exhaustive analysis of strikes 
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in France, Shorter and Tilly argue that the primary purposes of the strike are 
political rather than economic. Thus, in the short run strike action is seen 
as intended not to pressure the individual employer, against whom it is osten-
sively directed, but rather the political authorities, with the aim of pro-
moting state intervention on the side of the workers. In the longer run, on 
the other hand, while the prospective audience is the same, the primary aim, 
according to Shorter and Tilly, is to 'forge a path for labour into the 
decision making apparatus of the state'. 
A second major strand of Shorter and Tilly's argument is the notion that 
the ability to engage in strikes or collective action is limited by the extent 
of prior organization among workers. However, in contrast to the common 
assumption by both economists and institutionalist writersl~, this is treated 
as neither inevitable nor spontaneous, but rather as problematic (Olson 1965). 
Combining these two strands of argument leads Shorter and Tilly to 
Suggest that, 
"major accumulations of strikes and disturbances eventuate when it 
becomes apparent to the working classes as a whole that a point of 
critical importance for their own interests is at hand in the 
nation's political life, and when the latticework or organization 
suffices to transform these individual perceptions of opportunity 
into collective action." 
(Shorter and Tilly, p. 345) 
This leads them to formulate a model in which strikes depend positively 
on labour's organizational strength, or collective control over resource~ (as 
proxied by union density), while labour's willingness to mobilize these 
. . I • ..., . 
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J 
resources depends positively on the occurrence of a broadly favourable poli-
tical climate. Most notable in the latter connection are considered to be 
events such as cabinet crises and significant accumulations of collective 
violence. 
One obvious potential problem with this model is that while it may appear 
fairly plausible in the context of French industrial relations, it is less 
clear that its relevance extends to countries that do not share France's 
rather idiosyncratic institutional environment (ie. countries whose industrial 
relations systems are not characterized by historically unstable union member-
ship, poorly institutionalized collective bargaining, and active state inter-
ve'ntion in the employment relationship). 1 ~ Nevertheless, Shorter and Tilly 
seek to claim a wider relevance for their analysis. By viewing the strike as 
a largely political weapon, and politics as the truly strategic variable, lU 
they effectively relegate the details of the instit~bo."'\a' envirorunent to a con-
II 
sequential rather than causal role. The significance of this emphasis is 
that it enables then to discount the effects of 'French exceptionalism' - at 
least as far as the occurrence of strikes and the applicability of a 
political action approach is concerned-and thereby justify the explanation of 
inter-country differences in strike patterns purely on the basis of variations 
in the political representation of their working classes. 
In constrllcting this comparative argument, Shorter and Tilly employ post-
War data on the three dimensions of strike activity - relative frequency, 
average duration and average size to delineate three distinct country 
groupings, each of which is hypothesized to correspond to a different rela-
tionship between workers and the polity. In the first group are placed France 
'. ;.' I " 
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and Italy. In these countries the predolninant pattern of short, large and 
frequent strikes, contributing to a substantial overall volume of time lost, 
is seen as deriving from the actions of a newly organized and politically 
impotent working class, forced in the absence of effective politicdl represen-
tation to use protest strikes as a means of pressing its political demands. 
At the other end of the spectrum are placed Germany, Sweden and the 
Netherlands. In these countries, Shorter and Tilly argue, labour's entry into 
the polity has effectively produced the diminution of strike activity to vir-
tual insignificance 'making the strike a rarity in the average worker's exper-
ience'. Two reasons are advanced to account for these developments. First, 
workers are able to use parliamentary suasion rather than strikes as a means 
of pressing political demands; and second, worker-based parties have given 
organized labour direct power to intervene in the industrial arena to safe-
guard workers' interests. LL 
The third group of countries comprises the United b'tates and canada. 
Here the predominant strike pattern of intermediate size and frequency, but 
considerable duration, is associated with the existence of business 
unionism,Lj 'where the strike has a fundamental role to play within the 
Collective bargaining process, yet few political functions'. 
In addition to these three groups, two ambiguous cases are also noted. 
In the! case of Belgium, though strikes occur only very infrequently, as in 
Sweden and the Netherlands, L'+ their large size and short duration is seen as 
Consistent with a continuing role for political protest. This is attributed 
in part to the instablility of worker political representation in the central 
, ", 
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polity. In the other case, namely that of Britain, the occurrence of 
frequent, brief and fairly small 'wildcat-quickie' strikes is seen as reflec-
ting shop-floor protest over plant-level authority relationships, which 
though 'seemingly over wages and hours ... are fundamentally localized pro-
tests over the distribution of power'. Once again, therefore, Shorter and 
Tilly emphasize the essentially political rather than economic nature of the 
strike (at least outside the context of North America), albeit in this case at 
the local level. 
The implications of this analysis for the likely determinants of 
short-run fluctations in strike activity may be swnmarised as follows: 
Table 3.4 
Hypothesized Determinants of Short-Term Variation in Strike Activity: 
The Implication of Shorter and Tilly's Political Action Approach 
Strikes prllnarily 
responsive to: 
Country 
Political/ 
Organizational 
Variables 
France 
Italy 
Economic 
Variables 
canada 
U.S. 
(U.K.) 
No Syste!natic 
relationship 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
(Belgium) 
In France and Italy, labuur's effective exclusion from the polity, as 
well as unstable unioniffin, implies that political and organizational variables 
are likely to be the prime determinants of strike fluctuations. By contrast, 
in the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and also (though tu a lesser extent) in 
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Belgium, where 'the strike has ceased to be of any practical relevance either 
as a fonn of political protest, or as a means of shop-floor collective bar-
/ 
gaining pressure', the logical implication would seem to be the absence of any 
systematic relationship with either political or economic variables. As far 
as Britain is concerned, despite the presumed micro-political orientation of 
the strike, consistency with available empirical evidence Z!> would seem to 
require that their timing, at least, must be considered as subject to 
prevailing economic conditions. 
It is, therefore, only in the case of the United States and Canada that 
the strike is seen as an unambiguously economic phenomenon. To explain this, 
Shorter and Tilly suggest that it is only in these two countries that labour 
has effectively come to reconcile itself to "a watertight division between job 
action, where the mechanisms of free collective bargaining ••• function unob-
structed by government intervention, and political action ••• executed through 
interest-coalition political parties" (p. 330). It is this effective 
'institutional isolation' of industrial conflict (Dahrendorf 1959), based in 
large part on historic traditions of government non-intervention, which is 
seen as giving modern North American strikes their uniquely economic 
character. 
As Shorter and Tilly emphasize, however, this has not always been so. 
They argue that, "lon contradistinction to the dominant doctrine of 
'economism', before the Great Depression collective action was as much poli-
tical as economic, intended equally to build political organization and press 
political demands" (p. 329). Entry in to the polity is, therefore, seen as 
. , ~"" .~ .',,' " ' . 
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having transformed this situation to produce a unique politico-economic con-
figuration - an interpretation which, as we shall see, has been utilized in 
subsequent work. 
To sununarize, Shorter and Tilly's analysis fundamentally questions the 
universal application of a prlinarily economic calculus to the explanation of 
international fluctuations in strike activity. In particular, it is strongly 
implied that its relevance is confined mainly to North America and, though for 
somewhat different reasons, also Britain. Thus, while Shorter and Tilly's 
work does not specifically challenge the findings of any of the single country 
studies considered above, it does fund&nentally question their universal 
generalization as in the work of Hibbs. Moreover, in further contrast to 
Hibbs, the crucial distinguishing characteristic of industrial relations 
systems is drawn not in terms of institutional factors such as the central-
ization of collective bargaining, but rather in terms of the nature of 
labour's relationship to the polity. As is evident from a comparison of 
Tables 3.3. and 3.4, these criteria produce significantly different country 
groupings. 
In assessing the seriousness of this challenge to the universal appli-
cation of economic models in general, and to Hibbs' work in particular, 
several significant weaknesses in Shorter and Tilly's analysis must be kept in 
mind. "First, their assumption that strikes prlinarily serve labour as a means 
of political action is highly debatable, and is just as unsatisfactory as the 
economist's preoccupation with purely monetary issues. Second, as Shalev 
.',\' ' 
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( 1980) has emphasised, Shorter and Tilly fail to explain convincingly why 
union leaders, or their members, might be willin<J to sacrifice the strike 
weapon just because the labour movement has acquired politcal legitimacy. 
Shorter and Tilly simply assume that this altt:!rs class power to an extent 
sufficient to make political action a genuine alternative to industrial 
action. However, the substantial differences in conflict experience within 
countries where labour has supposedly entered the political arena, as well as 
the recent upsurges in conflict that these countries have experienced, 
suggests that worker acquisition of political power and its effects on strikes 
is a much more complex and differentiated phenomena than Shorter and Tilly 
imply. Finally, on a purely practical level, no systematic empirical evidence 
is provided to support the validity of their hypotheses outside of the histor-
ical context of French industrial relations. Their interpretation, in short, 
is simply asserted. For a more quantitative evaluation of their hypotheses it 
is necessary to turn to the work of S!'y.der (1974, 1974 and 1977). 
The Analysis of Snyder 
The basic feature of S~'i.der· s analysis is his argument that the determin-
ants of temporal fluctuations in industrial conflict will vary on the basis of 
three factors: first, the extent and stability of union membership; second, 
the national political position of labour; and third, the degree of institu-
t " 1" i f 11 " b "" 26 l.ona l.zat on 0 co ectl.ve argal.nl.ng. To establish this argument he 
starts froln the pr~~ise that the hypotheses advanced by economists in orthodox 
bargaining models to link strikes with changes in economic activity are based 
.,,' .. 
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upon a number of highly specific, yet unstated, assumptions about the nature 
of the institutional context. However, he suggests that these economic hypo-
thesis will only prove satisfactory to the extent that the unstated assump-
tions actually hold. Thus, S~~er argues that it is only where union member-
ship is large and relatively stable, where the political position of labour is 
firmly established, and where collective bargaining is well institutionalized, 
with both parties prepared to negotiate, that unions will be in a position to 
make the type of short-run economic cost calculations envisaged in economic 
models of the bargaining process. By contrast, where neither unions nor col-
lective bargaining are accepted, union mem.bership is unstable, and labour is 
denied political access through more discrete and routinized channels, such 
calculations are unlikely to be Inade. Under these circumstances, he suggests, 
longer-run political goals such as polity membership are more salient to 
labour, with the consequence that an organizational/political model of the 
type suggested by Shorter and Tilly will be more relevant. 
These basic hypotheses and their implications for the short-run determin-
ants of strike fluctuations are summarised in Table 3.5. 
,..'., .~" .. , . :-, 
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Table 3.5 
Ideal Types of Institutional Setting and Their Consequences for Models of 
Strike Fluctuations 
Institutional 
Characteristics 
Collective-
bargaining 
Tr ade Unions 
Political Posi-
tion of labour 
Consequences 
Type A 
well-institutionalized 
large, stable membership 
legitimate interest-
group; routine 
participation 
economic strength secure 
economic ends prLnary 
focus of attention 
Strikes fluctuate in 
response to changes in 
economic conditions 
Source: Snyder 1975 (p. 267) 
Type B 
poorly institutionalized 
small, unstable membership 
illegitimate interest-
group 
economic strength 
problematic 
political ends primary 
focus of attention 
strikes fluctuate in 
response to organizational 
strength and political 
change 
Two serious weaknesses in Synder's analysis are llrunediately apparent from 
this table. First, labour's organizational power is estimated, following 
Shorter and Tilly, solely by union membership. However, this is to ignore the 
fact that power is not merely a function of the relative size of the union 
lnovement. In addition to simple membership figures, attention must also be 
paid to such factors as the unions' occupational base, and the presence or 
otherwise of political, religious cultural or linguistic divisions. 27 l-iore-
OVer, in the political arena, organizational power will further depend upon 
-.' 
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such factors as the extent of working class voting, and the electoral str~ngth 
of left parties, as well as the degree of unity both within and between the 
industrial wings of the labour movement (Shalev and Korpi 1979). 
The second weakness revolves around Snyder's rigid dichotomy between well 
institutionalized and poorly institutionalized systems of collective bar-
gaining. In addition to being an excessively simplistic division, it is also 
based upon a definition of institutionalization which totally ignores the pre-
vailing structure of bargaining. Thus, while this is obviously not the only 
relevant factor in distinguishing among industrial relations systems, as is 
implied for example by Hibbs, it is certainly too important a factor to 
totally ignore. Nevertheless, it is on the basis of the factors outlined in 
Table 3.5 that Snyder proceeds to a classification of the four cOWltries 
included in his study. Thus he proceeds to classify the industrial relations 
systems of the four cOWltries chosen for his analysis - n~nely, France, Italy, 
Canada and the United States - Wlder one or other of his suggested 'ideal 
types', as a preliminary to his ex~nination of the detenninants of variations 
in their respective strike incidence. 
Specifically, Snyder suggests that the 'Type A' institutional arrange-
ments depicted in Table 3.5 - and hence the assumptions of economic bargaining 
models - are most appropriate to the post-war experience of the two North 
American countries, as well as of the cOWltries of Northern Europe. Coinci-
dentally, therefore, these asswnptions are seen as having held to a signi-
ficant, if differentiated, extent for the recent experience of two of the 
'. \, . ;: .. " 
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countries on which most quantitive work has been based. 'Type B' arrange-
ments are then seen as appropriate to the experience of France and Italy, 
where, it is argued, the entire framework of assumptions essential to the 
performance of an economic model clearly breaks down. In addi tion to 
France and Italy, Snyder. draws upon the earlier analysis of Shorter and Tilly 
to suggest that the pre-war institutional contexts of both the United States 
and canada were also largely characterised by 'Type B' arrangements. 
On the basis of these classifications, Snyder formulates two empirically 
testable hypotheses. First, that economic variables will have little explana-
tory power in any of the four countries prior to World War II, and that strike 
frequency will respond primarily to organizational and political variables. 
Second, that for the United States and Canada this situation will be reversed 
for the post-war period, with strike frequency responding prlinarily to econo-
roic conditions; while in France and Italy the pre-war pattern will be 
maintained. 
S~~der attempts to test the validity of these propositions in two 
studies; the first using time series data for France (1876 - 1937; 1946 -
1966), Italy (1901 - 1924; 1947 - 1970) 30 and the United States (1900 - 1948; 
1949 - 1970) (Snyder 1975); and the second using data for canada (1912 - 1948; 
1949 -1971) and the United States (1900 - 1948; 1949 - 1971) (Snyder 1977). 
In both studies the operational specification of his regression equations 
is broadly the same: 
.' 
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~ ~R + a M + a P + a P 
i t-i 3 t 4 lt 5 2t 
+ a T + E 6 t 
Where St is strike frequency (expressed in logarithmic form in the 
earlier ::11 study) ; ~ is either the unemployment rate, or I in the case of 
Italy and France, the level of national income::l2 as an indicator of labour 
61: 
market tightness; and. ~=1 
111 t:R 
t-i 
is a six year lagged moving average of the 
percentage change in real w:lges, proxying the effect of the expectation-
aChievement gap. This economic component of the model is broadly analogous to 
that of Ashenfelter and Johnson {1969}jj, and embodies the conventional econo-
mic assumptions that strike rates rise when real wages lag and fall when 
declining labour market tightness reduces labour's bargaining advantage. 
With respect to the organizational/political component of the model, Mt 
is union membership, expressed as a percentage of the civilian labour force, 
proxying labour's organizational resources and capacity for collective 
action. This variable is interpreted as follows: since organization is a 
fundamental prerequisite to strike action, where this is problematical as in 
France and Italy over the entire period, and in ~.e United States and Canada 
for the pre-war period, fluctuations in unionization will be positively asso-
Ciated with fluctuations in strikes. On the other hand, where organization is 
secure, there will be no necessary relation with the occurrence of strikes. 
Turning to the political variables, while supposedly proxying similar 
phenomena, they are in fact given country-specific definitions. In the case 
of It 1 a y and France, they represent the number of cabinet changes (P.I.), and 
- . \ '~, 
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the existence of election years (Pi), with predicted positive coefficients for 
bot~ pre-war and post-war periods. The rationale for this interpretation is 
that these events mark propitious times for the strategic exercise of collec-
tive action. By contrast, for the United States they represent the percentage 
of Democrats in Congress (P 1), and the Party of the President (P i). Here it 
is assumed that the existence of a political constellation favourable to 
labour (i.e. Democrat) will, in the absence of labour's acceptance into the 
polity, cause escalations in strike activity. Once entry is achieved, how-
ever, as in the post-war period, this relationship is assumed to be atten-
uated, since political demands are routinely expressed via such activities as 
~ 
lobbying. Finally, in the case of Canada, only one political variable is 
included, namely the percentage of Liberals in Parliament, although for the 
earlier period a dummy variable for the \'lar years is also included. The first 
of these variables is assumed to be associated with increased strike activity 
during the pre-war years, for reasons analogous to those presented in the con-
text of the United States, while the War dummy is assumed to depress strike 
activity. The two remaining variables in the estimating equation represent 
the trend term T, and the disturbance term Et. 
Snyder's results are summarised in Table 3.6. It is immediately clear 
from this table that, except in the case of the United States, none of his 
r~gressions is overwhelmingly supportive of his predictions. In the case of 
France, for example, while wlionization and the presence of an election year 
are both significant and positively Signed for the pre-war period, no variable 
- organizational, political or economic - even approaches signficance during 
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the post-war period. on the basis of Snyder's findings, therefore, Shorter 
and Tilly's organizational/political model appears inconsistent with post-war 
strike experience even in the country for which it was specifically 
formulated. 
Turning to the case of Italy, while the unionization variable is signifi-
cant in both pre and post-war periods, apparently lending support to the 
organizational component of the model, neither political variable is signifi-
cant. Consequently, all that these equations indicate is that workers strike 
When they have the capacity to do so. They offer no clue as to whether the 
strategic factors motivating this action are political or economic. 
In the case of canada, while neither organizational, political, nor eco-
nomic factors are significant for the pre-war period, two factors severely 
limit the usefulness of this result. First, there is the exclusion of any 
measure of labour market tightness because of data limitations. Second, and 
undoubtedly related to this omission, is the presence of an unacceptably high 
degree of autocorrelation in the equation, despite the substitution of a gen-
eralized least squares estilnation procedure for that of ordinary least 
squares.:S:> Turning to the post-war period, both the real wage variable and 
unionization are significant, while unemployment and the percentage of 
Liberals in Parliament are not. Once again these findings are inconsistent 
with Snyder's predictions. Further, they are also inconsistent with the 
findings of other studies (Smith 1972, 1976; Walsh 1975; Cousineau and Lacroix 
1976) all of which report the successful performance of a purely economic 
model in Canada during the post-war period. 
..'.;.' ' 
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'fable 3.6 
Significance of Estimated Regression Coefficients for Economic, Organizational and 
Political Determinants of 5'trike Frequency: France 1876-1937 and 1946-1966; Italy 
1901-1924 and 1947-1970; the US 1900-1948 and 1949-1971 and Canada 1912-1948 and 
1949-1971. 
,... 
6 
U I: 'R 
t i=1 t-i 
France (log) (OLS) 
1867-1947 -t 
-
1946-1966 +t + 
Italy (log) (OLS) 
1901-1924 +t 
-
1947-1970 -t 
-
United States 
OLS 1900-1948 - + 
INVA 1900-1948 -* +** 
OLS 1949-1971 -** -* 
INVA 1949-1971 -** +* 
Canada 
GLS 1912-1948 0 
-
OLS 1949-1971 
-
-* 
Source: Snyder (1975, 1977) 
= Ordinary Least Squares OLS 
INVA 
GLS 
= Instrwnental Variables Technique 
= Generalised Least Squares 
M 
t 
+** 
+ 
+** 
+** 
+** 
+** 
-
+ 
+ 
+* 
P P T 
lt 2t 
.1. l 
+.1. +~ +** 
+ 
- -
.I. l 
+.1. +l -** 
- - -
;j 4 
+* +* -** ;j 4 
+;j +t. -** 
- - -;j 4 
- -
+ 
0 b 
-0 - + 
+ 0 +** 
* significant at 0.05 level 
** significant at 0.01 level 
o not entered in regression 
2 
R 
0.4358 
0.2011 
0.7061 
0.8587 
0.754 
0.755 
0.693 
0.685 
0.155 
0.949 
t national income; 1. cabinet changes; 2. election years; 3. % Democrats in Congress; 
4. Party of President (1 = Democrat; 0 = Republican); 5. % Liberals in Parliament; 
6. War years. 
To explain these unexpected results, Snyder points to the existence of a 
highly significant positive trend term to suggest, following Walsh (1975), 
that Canadian labour-management relations are still not well institution-
ali zed. He then argues that until more widespread institutionalization 
occurs, both economic and organizational variables will have a strong impact 
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on strike fluctuations. In the absence of concrete supporting evidence that 
is independent of the findings of his regression equation, however, such post 
hoc rationalizations are hardly convincing. Moreover, there is an al ter-
native explanation for Snyder's results which is equally plausible. Namely, 
that the unionization term is simply passing on the effects of economic condi-
tions, since it is well established that Canadian union density is itself a 
function of several key components of the business cycle (Swidinsky 1974; Bain 
and Elsheikh 1976). 
In the final analysis, it appears that it is only in the case of the 
United States that Snyder's results are at all supportive of his thesis. 
Thus, during the pre-war period, Ordinary Least Squares estimation reveals 
that unionization, the percentage of DeInocrats in Congress, and the Party of 
the President are all significant and carry the expected positive signsl while 
neither unemployment nor real wage changes are signifiCantly related to strike 
fluctuations. From this Snyder argues that the standard economic interpre-
tation of pre-war U. S. strike activity is seriously mispecified, and that 
Shorter and Tilly's organizational/political model is more relevant given the 
prevailing institutional arrangements. One fundamental problem that arises in 
connection with these findings, however, as with those reported previously, is 
the possibility that the causal relationship between unionization and strike 
activity is actually the reverse of that suggested by Snyder. Tnat is, rather 
than union membership preceding strike activity, strikes (especially success-
ful ones) may actually serve to draw workers into unions.,b 
, 
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In an attempt to tackle this problem, Snyder re-estimates his equations 
for the U. S. using the technique of instrumental variables. j I Specifically, 
drawing on Ashenfelter and Pencavel's model of union growth (1969), he con-
structs an instrument for union membership based upon the consumer price 
index, current and lagged levels of employment in the unionizable sectors of 
the economy, the civilian unemployment rate at the most recent business cycle 
trough, and the percentage of Democrats in Congress. However, in addition to 
being a totally irrelevant test of the direction of causality between unioni-
zation and strikes, construction of this instrument merely serves to re-empha-
size the possibility that the estimated relationship between strikes and 
unionization derives not from a direct relationship, but from the latter 
variable's mutual dependence on economic conditions. This being the case, 
Snyder's findings cannot be taken as disproving the relevance of these 
conditions. 
Turning to the post-war period, Snyder obtains significant and correctly 
signed coefficients on both unemployment and real wage variables, thus 
matching the findings of other studies (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969, Skeels 
1971). Moreover, in line with his predictions, neither unionization nor poli-
jtj 
tical indicators are significant. 
Snyder interprets these findings as strongly supportive of his a priori 
predictions about the respective determinants of 'early' and 'recent' strikes 
in the United States. In addition to the specification problems already 
cited, however, others may be raised. First, as Smith (1979) has argued, 
Snyder makes no attempt to justify the historical periodicity he adopts in 
drawing a dividing line between 'institutionalized' and 
'pre-institutionalized' systems, or in locating organized labour's entry into 
the polity. 
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Problems also arise if institutionalization in Snyder's terms and entry into 
the polity are not temporally coincident. j~ Indeed, this possibility further 
emphasizes the fact that any attempt to introduce a rigid dichotomy between 
institutionalized and pre-institutionalized systems, whether inter-temporal or 
international, is likely to be a hazardous procedure. The process of 
institutionalization is far too complex and diverse a phenomenon for this kind 
of sunple categorization to be meaningful. 
A useful illustration of the latter point is provided in the context of 
the United States by Edwards (1978). Edwards specifies not two, but three 
distinct sub-periods: early (1890-1910), transitional (1900-1939), and modern 
(1946-1972). The last two periods broadly replicate those analysed by Snyder, 
while the earlier period is included to examine whether or not the period 
prior to 'institutionalization' is actually as homogeneous as Snyder Unplies. 
Using a modified economic and organizational/political model, Edwards fits 
several different specifications to obtain independent estimates of its 
economic, economic plus organizational, and political components. On the 
basis of his findings, Edwards concludes that econolnic variables in the form 
of an unemployment-based business cycle trough indicator 4U and the real wage 
41 level have played a significant role in each of the three periods, although 
their effects have not always been in the same direction. 
With respect to the influence of worker organization - as proxied by 
union density - Edwards finds a significant influence only for the earlier 
period 1881-1899. Thereafter, the variable is consistently insignificant, and 
for the transitional period 1900-1939 also wrongly signed. 42 Finally, esti-
.~. ~.'" 
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mates for the political components of Edwards' model produce significant 
positive coefficients for only the Party of the President in the earlier 
periods, while for the most recent periods the percentage of Democrats in 
Congress actually appears significant in reducing strikes. The latter possi-
bility, namely that the institutionalization of collective bargaining and 
labour's entry into the polity will not so much eliminate the relevance of 
political variables, as change the nature of their Significance toward the 
suppression rather than the aggravation of conflict, is not considered by 
4.:l Snyder. 
To summarise, Edwards' findings cast considerable doubt over the 
relevance of Snyder's rigid distinction between institutionalized and pre-
institutionalized settings in terms of their impact on the determinants. of 
strike activity in the United states - the country whose strike experience on 
the face of it appeared to be most supportive of Snyder's interpretation. 44 
Moreover, given the ambiguous nature of Snyder's results in relation to the 
other countries in his study, this conclusion would appear to be capable of 
generalization to an international context. In addition, Edwards' results 
alsq call into question the relevance of union density as an 'additional' 
explanatory variable in relation to strike fluctuations. Given the 
considerable conceptual and empirical problelns associated with the use of this 
variable, this result is not surprising. 
In general, the overall assesslnent on Snyder's work must be one of not-
proven. However, despite the many criticisms that can be made of both the 
specification of Snyder's model and his empirical findings, his work neverthe-
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less represents an ambitious attempt to go beyond the narrow confines of a 
purely economic approach to the explanation of strike fluctuations. It also 
represents one of the few attempts, apart from the work of Hibbs, to apply 
quantitative techniques within a comparative fr~nework. Thus, in contrast to 
the contributions of Ross and Hartman and Shorter and Tilly in this area, 
Snyder has attempted to go beyond a simple reliance on ad hoc explanations 
based upon the plausibility of supportive examples and towards the use of 
predictive - and hence falsifiable - models which seek to provide quantitative 
evidence on both the regularity and magnitude of hypothesized relationships. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has critically ex~nined two major econometric studies of 
comparative strike fluctuations: n~nely, those of Hibbs and Snyder. While 
both studies seek to look beyond a narrowly economic perspective by incorpo-
rating a variety of political variables, and in the case of Snyder also organ-
izational 'variables, they adopt markedly different perspectives on the unpor-
tance of the institutional environment. In the context of riibbs' analysis, 
drawing selectively on the work of Ross and Hartman, the prevailing bargaining 
structure - and specifically the degree of centralization or decentralization 
of collective bargaining - is singled out as the sole potential institutional 
source of variation underlying comparative strike fluctuations. In practice, 
however, its influence is rejected in favour of the hypothesis of parameter 
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equivalence across industrial relations systems based upon a predominantly 
economic calculus. Political variables, with the notable exception of the 
presence of communist parties in mobilizing increased industrial confict, are 
similarly dismissed. 
Snyder l s analysis, on the other hand, drawing on the work of both Foss 
and Hartman and Shorter and Tilly, postulates three features of the institu-
tional enviornment as crucial to the process underlying strike fluctuations: 
namely, the organizational strength of the unions; labour I s relationship to 
the polity; and the degree of institutionalization of collective bargaining. 
These are then used to produce intertemporal and international distinctions 
between pre- insti tutionalized and institutionalized labour relations systems. 
Empirical tests appear to confirm in general, though not in detail, at least 
Some relevance for institutional differences. This confirmation is, however, 
essentially negative in character, suggesting the absence of any major 
significant economic influence on strike fluctuations in pre-institutionalized 
Systems such as those of France and Italy and the pre-war United States and 
Canada, rather than the specific relevance of organizational and political 
factors. 
These contradictory findings make the drawing of any firm conclusions 
difficult, the more so since theoretical, methodological and statistical weak-
nesses in both studies cast grave doubts over both the reliability of their 
empirical results and the conclusions they derive frOln them. Moreover, com-
parative evaluation is further complicated by their use of markedly different 
estimating techniques and country samples. Thus, Hibbs l results derive from 
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an 'average' relationship prevailing across a ten-country sample, while 
Snyder's results are based upon individual studies of a subset of ony four of 
these countries. Highly institutionalized systems such as those of SWeden, 
the Netherlands, Gennany and Belgiun are totally ignored by Snyder.4~ 
In view of these difficulties, the drawing of firm conclusions on such 
matters as the importance of variations in the institutional enviorrunent, and 
the universal applicability of a primarily econOinic decision calculus to 
explaining strike fluctuations, is best postponed - at least pending the con-
sideration of the additional evidence presented in Chapter 4, and the specifi-
cation and testing of a more comprehensive comparative strike model in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 3 
1. The classic study in this genre is the work of Ross and Hartman (1960). 
Subsequent contributions include: Shorter and Tilly(1974); Clegg (1976); 
Hibbs (1978); Ingham (1974) and Kassalow (1977). 
2. The problems inherent in the pooling technique are discussed in 
A. Koutsoyiannis, Theory of Econometrics, Macmillan, London, 1977. 
3. See S. Almon, 'The Distributed Lag Between Capital Appro~iations and 
Expenditures', Econometrica, vol. 33, 1965, pp. 178-96. Hibbs 
specifies a second degree polynomial with the estimated coefficients· 
tapering to zero after 5 years. 
4. The extrapolative expectations specification implies a strike 
equation of the following form: 
= 
Sl < 0, 0 < y < 1, S2 < 0, S3 < 0 . 
5. The adaptive expectations plus trend specification implies a strike 
equation as follows: 
= 
- (A + o)S3~Ct 1 + (e -(A + o)e ) 
- t ~l 
o < (A + 0) < 1, Sl < 0, 0 < 0 < 1 , S2 < 0 , S3 < 0 • 
6. Equations in strike volume typically have lower explanatory power 
than those in strike frequency. This derives from the fact that 
strike volume is a composite strike measure made up of three 
components: frequency, size and duration i.e. 
= 
number of 
strikes 
(frequency) 
Workers involved 
x x 
number of strikes 
(size) 
Volume 
workers involved 
(duration) 
Since strike size, and to a significant though lesser extent also 
strike duration are dependent on institutional factors,they are 
much less responsive to business cycle fluctuations than frequency. 
7. See for example, Ross and Hartman (1960); Ingham (1974); and Clegg (1976). 
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8. Subsequent writers have argued that this finding is/in any event, 
largely a statistical artifact based upon a narrow and misleading 
set of strike indicators. See Hibbs (1976) and Ingham (1974). 
9. These developments have been referred to collectively as a process 
of embourgeoisement (Goldthorpe and Lockwood et al 1968). 
10. To quote Ross and Hartman, 'When we say that a certain factor is 
conducive to industrial peace or industrial conflict, we mean that 
it has this effect in combination with other influences with which 
it is characteristically conjoined. The context is crucially 
important.' (Ross and Hartman, 1960, p. 175). 
11. See for example Clegg (1977) and Kassalow (1977). 
12. See also: Shorter and Tilly (1974); Snyder (1975); and Korpi and 
Shalev (1979). 
13. This error is also committed by Ross and Hartman. 
14. This notion also underlies the findings of the Donovan Commission 
Report in Britain. 
15. It is interesting, in this connection, that Hibbs' study ends in 1969, 
the year before the strike explosion in Britain that effectively 
undermined the predictive power of the basic Ashenfelter and Johnson 
model. 
16. An additional possibility, emphasized elsewhere by Hibbs, is a shift 
in the locus of distribution from the industrial to the political 
arena. See Hibbs, D.A. 'On the Political Economy of Long-run Trends 
in Strike Activity', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8, No.2, 
1978, pp. 153-75. 
17. It is not intuitively obvious that this result necessarily derives 
from a direct causal relationship running from the communist party 
variable to strikes. 
18. This issue has received very little attention from economists. In 
all the economic models referred to above, for example, a sufficient 
capacity for collective action is simply assumed. 
19. See Table 3.2 on page 3.9. 
20. Shorter and Tilly (1974), page 396, para. 1. 
21. In this sense their work contrasts strongly with that of Ross and 
Hartman (1960). 
22. These arguments are directly analogous to those advanced and tested 
by Hibbs (1978). 
23. As Bell (1961) defined the term, 'unions whose aspirations do not 
transcend the maximization of their members' incomes through 
aggressive collective bargaining'. 
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24. Germany, it should be recalled, does not record strike frequency. 
25. See Chapter 2, and in particular the findings of Pencavel (1970); 
Hunter (1973); and Shorey (1977). 
26. The choice of these factors clearly indicates Snyder's debt to the 
earlier analyses of Ross and Hartman (1960) and Shorter and Tilly 
(1974) • 
27. For example, reference might be made to the existence of cultural, 
linguistic/political and religious divisionsin Belgium; cultural 
and linguistic divisions in Canada; political and religious 
divisions in France, Italy and Japani' craft divisions in Britain 
and the U.S. (before 1956); and to religious divisions in the 
Netherlands. 
28. Thus, in Snyder's terms/one explanation for the poor performance 
of the economic model in Britain after 1967 might be the breakdown 
of some of the underlying assumptions. 
30. The large break in the series (1925-1946) corresponds to the absence 
of reliable strike information and unionization data for the Fascist 
period, during which strikes were illegal and systematically suppressed. 
31. The logarithmic transformation is justified on the grounds of the 
existence of substantial skewness in the strike measures in France 
and Italy. Snyder ·does, however, suggest that the substantive con-
clusions derived from his estimation are insensitive to the functional 
form employed. 
32. Use is made of this variable in the absence of reliable unemployment 
data for France and Italy before 1920 and 1922 respectively. No 
justification is given for the substitution in later periods. 
33. Except for the omission of a profits variable. 
34. This, and the preceding argument, runs counter to that advanced by 
Hibbs (1976), which suggest that pro-labour parties and governments 
will cause a reduction in conflict. 
35. For a discussion of the generalised least squares procedure (G.L.S.) 
see A. Koutsoyiannis Theory of Econometrics, Macmillan, London, 
1977 pp. 218-20 and 471-3. 
36. This possibility is suggested by Olson (1965), p. 80. 
37. For a discussion and critique of the instrumental variables 
technique see A. Koutsoyiannis (1977). 
38. It is interesting to note that though insignificant,the estimated 
coefficients on the political variables are consistent with a 
depressive effect on strikes. 
39. This issue is also considered in Edwards (1978). 
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40. Though not identical, this formulation is similar to that employed 
by Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969) in their study of trade union 
growth in the United States. 
41. The real wage level is used as an indicator of worker prosperity. 
42. The issue of multicollinearity clearly arises, the unemployment variable 
and union density are likely to be closely related. 
43. This possibility is, as we have seen, considered by Hibbs. Moreover, 
the" occurrence of a significant positive coefficient on the percentage 
of Democrats variable may be seen as a cyclical manifestation of the 
type of secular development in strike patterns envisaged by both 
Ross and Hartman (1960) and Shorter and Tilly (1974) in relation to 
the accession to power of working class parties. 
44. It should, however, be noted that Edwards' results also suggest ,that 
the effects of economic variables on strikes has been far from 
consistent over time. 
45. Germany is also (curiously) excluded from the analysis of Hibbs. 
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Chapter 4 
Comparative Theories of Strikes and the Pattern of Wage Inflation: 
A Preliminary Historical Evaluation 
AS a useful preliminary to the construction of a theoretically more com-
prehensive comparative theory of strikes, the present chapter introduces a new 
element into the analysis; namely, that of international experience of wage 
inflation. Thus, while both strike activity and wage settlements are major 
outputs of the process of collective bargaining, all of the bargaining models 
considered in Chapter 2 were concerned primarily with examining both 
theoretically and empirically the proximate determinants of the former 
variable. Consequently, little attention was paid to the precise nature of 
the wage settlements actually arrived at during bargaining, or to the matter 
of whether or to what extent their magnitude might have been affected by the 
occurrence of strike action. Indeed, within the context of the Ashenfelter 
and Johnson model this issue was effectively assumed away by treating the 
strike purely as an equilibrating mechanism for bringing rank and file expec-
tations into line with management's ability to pay. 
It is a fact of historic record, however, that recent increases in strike 
activity have been closely associated with significant escalations in wage 
inflation. This fact further emphasizes that, without prejudice to causality, 
these ev~nts might usefully be considered together. The purpose of the 
present chapter, therefore, is to consider several broadly contrasting histor-
ical accounts of recent international trends in strikes and wage inflation. 
This is a useful exercise for at least three reasons. First, it helps place 
,., ..... ~ 
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recent international experiences in historical perspective. Second, it serves 
to make explicit contrasting views on the existence and relationships of 
causality between these variables. And third, it provides useful additional 
evidence relevant to the task of evaluating the empirical validity of the 
comparative approaches outlined in Chapter 3. 
I. 'Cost-Push' Theories 
Two distinct schools of thought may be identified in terms of their pre-
dominant view on the causes of recent international experiences of wage infla-
tion, and the associated role of strikes in this process. First, there are 
those who view world inflation as the aggregate of a series of separate 
national problems, the causes of which are to be sought at the level of the 
individual economy. Second, there are those who view inflation as an inter-
national monetary phenomenon to be explained primarily by developments at the 
supra-national or world level. 
Proponents of the former view, frequently associated with a cost-push 
interpretation of inflation, tend to place primary emphasis on trade unions as 
key agents in the inflation process. In particular, these organizations are 
often viewed as 'aggressive monopolies' capable of substantially affecting 
their members' pay and conditions independent of the state of demand in the 
labour market. 
On a practical level, this analysis is seen as bl.'oadly consistent both 
with the apparent breakdown of the Phillips relationship between unemployment 
and money wages (Phillips, 1958), evident in several countries in the late 
1960s, as well as with the simultaneous escalation of industrial unrest. 
,. 
\ ... ': .. 
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These developments are also seen by a number of (notably British) economists 
as symptomatic of the essentially sociological character of recent inflation-
ary experience. 1 That is, the interpretation of inflation as the consequence 
of distributional dissent within the national economy, expressed through the 
medium of increased trade union militancy. Thus, a dominant line of causality 
is traced from domestic distributional conflict, through increased trade union 
aggressiveness, .to strikes, and ultimately to escalating wage inflation. 
Moreover, in line with the essentially 'sociological' character of this 
explanation, it is further assumed that the first link in this causal 
sequence, namely the determination of industrial unrest, is no longer fully 
comprehensible in conventional economic terms. 
As an example of this line of reasoning, Wiles (1973) has attributed 
inflation to the effects of 'leap frogging' wage claims and settlements based 
upon inter-union 'rivalry' or 'jealousy'; while Mishan (1974) has pointed to 
2 
the role of union 'hypersensitivity' over pay differentials leading to the 
aggressive pursuit of wage demands without any regard to their longer-run 
economic consequences. In a similar vein, Marris (1972) has emphasized the 
effects of 'anger' over existing inequalities in income distribution, and 
'frustration' over slow rates of real income growth, as relevant to the expla-
nation of increased conflict. These factors, combined with the effects of a 
strong government commitment to full employment (on the one hand in tempering 
union concern over the employment consequences of their actions, and on the 
other in promoting employer willingness to grant concessions), are then seen 
as contributing to escalating wage inflation. 
c. ,_ :. ~ '.~ : ... : :. ....'1 .. :.. 
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On a more solidly empirical level, evidence has been advanced by a number 
of authors in support of a chain of reasoning which posits a line of causality 
from distributional conflict to increased industrial unrest and greater mili-
taney, and then to escalating wage settlements. In terms of the first link in 
the chain, implicit support for the essentially sociological character of 
recent upsurges in conflict is derived - at least in the British context -
from the breakdown of conventional strike models (Hunter, 1973; Shorey, 1974), 
as well as from the simultaneous occurrence of such social conflicts as 
student unrest (Harrod, 1972). 
In terms of the second link in t~e chain, namely that between industrial 
conflict and wage inflation, Hines (1964, 1969, 1971), in a now famous series 
of articles, has amassed a considerable amount of evidence in support of a 
significant positive relationship between the rate of change of union member-
\ 
ship, used as an index of trade union militancy, and the rate of change of 
money wages in the United Kingdom. At the same time this work has 
demonstrated the absence of any significant relationship between wage changes 
and unemployment.This is interpreted as prima facie evidence that trade unions 
are able to exert- upward pressure on wages independent of the state of the 
labour market. Similar conclusions have also emerged from the work of Godfrey 
(1971), who, while rejecting Hines' choice of a union membership-based index 
of milit~ncy, has reported a significant positive relationship between money 
wage changes and strike frequency in the UK over the period 1956-1969, while 
once again confirming the apparent irrelevance of unemployment. Further 
confirmation of these findings has also been presented by Taylor (1972). 
-' 
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In an international context, Ashenfelter, Johnson and Pencavel (1970) 
have provided empirical support for a significant positive relationship be-
tween changes in money wage rates and both the rate of change of union mem-
bership and strike activity using US data; while Sylos-Labini (1974) in Italy, 
and SWidinsky (1972) in Canada, have similarly reported significant positive 
coefficients on a strike variable in money wage equations. Finally, in a com-
parative study of the performance of 'unionized' Phillips curves in seven 
industrialized economies, Thomas (1977) found support for the hypothesis that 
increasing unionization has affected both the position and slope of the 
Phillips curve to varying degrees in the United Kingdom, Japan, Austria, 
Norway, Denmark and Sweden. 3 
These studies are not without their detractors, however. Indeed, most 
studies providing empirical support for a trade union militancy role in infla-
tion can be matched at least one-to~one by those reporting negative findings. 
Hines' work in particular has been subject to extensive criticism by a number 
of authors. These include: Thomas and Stoney (1970), who have highlighted 
specification problems; Burrows and Hitiris (1970) and Godfrey (1971), who 
have questioned the consistency of union membership as a proxy for militancy, 
and Purdy and Zis (1974), who have waged a crusade on both empirical and 
theoretical grounds against the use of the change in unionization variable, 
finally, on an internacional level, Ward and Zis (1974) have found the 
variable to be insignificant in the Netherlands and incorrectly signed in 
Germany. 
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In the context of the use of strike variables, Johnson and Timbrell 
(1973), in one of the few tests of a bargaining theory of wage determination,4 
report no significant relationship between wage inflation and contemporaneous 
strike activity in Britain over the period 1959-1971. In addition, on a com-
parative basis, Ward and Zis (1974) report largely negative findings for the 
UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Italy and Germany over the period 1956-
1971 using Phillips curves including a price expectation variable, and supple-
mented with several alternative measures of strikes. 5 Of these alternative 
6 
measures, only contemporaneous strike frequency appears to have any general 
significance, and even this is not significant in all the countries sampled, 
leading Ward and Zis to conclude that trade union militancy, as proxied by 
strikes, appears relevant only to the wage inflation experience of Italy and 
possibly, though to a somewhat more ambiguous extent, also of France. 7 
In addition to these empirical criticisms of the significance of strike 
based militancy indices, objections have also been raised on a theoretical 
level. Thus it is argued that even where a significant positive relationship 
is established between strikes and wage inflation, it does not follow that 
this necessarily derives from a causal link running from the former variable 
to the latter, since in practice the direction of causality could also run the 
other way. This highlights the major difficulty with all cost-push explana-
tions,1 namely, that of unambiguously attributing causality in the absence of 
any well-developed theoretical framework for analysing the microeconomics of 
union employer bargaining relationships, and hence by implication, of the 
behavioural mechanics of cost-push inflation. In view of this, cost-push 
analyses have proved highly vulnerable to attack from the rival - and theoret-
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ically more secure - excess demand school; partly because of their theoretical 
inadequacies, but also because of their apparent inability to account for the 
international character of inflation and industrial unrest. 
I I. The International Monetarist Explanation of Inflation and Industrial 
Conflict 
Proponents of the 'international monetarist' 8 variant of the excess 
demand approach argue that to be convincing a potential explanation of inflat-
ion must be broadly consistent with at least five important aspects of recent 
international inflationary experience. First, it must explain its chronic 
nature, or more particularly, the fact that inflation rates have been positive 
in all member nations of the Group of Ten since 1956, and have generally been 
getting progressively worse. Second, a satisfactory explanation must account 
for the simultaneous acceleration of rates of wage increase across countries 
since the mid-1960s. Thus, while their precise timing varies from country to 
country, accelerations are evident in all member nations of the Group of Ten 
from the late 1960s and into the 1970s. Third, some explanation must be given 
for the broad similarity in inflation rates in different countries during the 
1960s,9 and their divergence since 1972. 10 Fourth, a satisfactory account 
must be given for the persistence of higher rates of inflation in recent 
. 
years, even in the face of growing unemployment; in short, for the apparent 
break-down of the Phillips relationship. Finally, the explanation must also 
be consistent with the emergence in the late 1960s of industrial unrest of a 
type and intensity out of step with recent historical experience. 
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Part of the rationale behind the construction of these requirements is, 
of course, to demonstrate the inadequacy of country-specific cost-push views 
of inflation, and by implication, also the inadequacy of country-specific 
'sociological' explanations of the recent international escalations in aggre-
gate strike activity. Thus, the international monetarist explanation strongly 
emphasizes that single-country cost-push approaches are totally unable to 
account convincingly for either the simultaneous escalation in strikes and 
inflation at the international level, or for the observed similarity of infla-
tion rates across countries. Indeed, even if evidence could be adduced for 
some form of international demonstration effect linking industrial confict 
both across countries and with the simultaneous acceleration of inflation 
rates - the events of May/June 1968 in France, the Hot Autumn of 1969 in 
Italy, the rank and file militancy in Germany and Sweden, for example - a 
cost-push account would still fall foul of the need to explain why the 
accelerations were all of a broadly similar magnitude (Zis, 1975). 
In contrast to the inadequacies of the cost-push explanation, an 
international monetarist analysis is able to perform adequately on all 
counts. The basic monetarist argument is that the level of domestic wage 
inflation is ultimately determined by the level of excess demand prevailing in 
the labour market. At a national level this will depend largely on the 
monetary policies pursued by domestic governments, and in particular on 
the pace of domestic monetary expansion relative to the growth of real 
output. At an international level, however, under a system of fixed exchange 
rates, and where there is considerable interdependence through free trade, the 
. .',.,. ,~ .. ~ ... ,.: .... ~ ··~·· .. t:.".~ :·· ..... \:···'· .. I~.'r ~.,...' 
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domestic monetary authorities of smaller open economies are seen to lose a 
significant degree of control over their domestic money supplies. The 
argument supporting this contention is easily stated. Suppose a small 
country, heavily involved in international trade and inflating at the 'world 
rate', decides to reduce its domestic money supply in an attempt to bring its 
rate of inflation down below the world level. In the first instance, the 
impact of such a move would be to reduce domestic aggregate demand, and 
thereby reduce the demand for both domestically produced goods and imports. 
One consequence of this (assuming an initial position of external balance), 
would be the emergence of a surplus on international trading account, which 
would be further enhanced as declines in the demand for domestically produced 
goods led to moderation in the rate of change of both domestic wages and 
prices, and further increaes in international competitiveness. The emergence 
of this balance of payments surplus would then imply an excess foreign demand 
for the domestic currency, and associated upward pressure on its external 
value. Since, under a system of fixed exchange rates, currency appreciation 
would be largely ruled out, the domestic monetary authorities would be left 
with little choice but to enter the foreign exchange market in order to 
purchase the excess supply of foreign currency. Through this action the 
domestic money supply would once again be increased, pushing the domestic 
inflation rate back toward the world level. 
Applying this analysis to the inflationary experience of the Group of 
Ten, it is argued that following the post-war agreement at Bretton Woods, mem-
ber nations effectively operated a system of broadly fixed exchange rates 
" 
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until 1971. Also during the period, their interdependence was reinforced both 
by the rapid reduction in tariffs under the auspices of G.A.T.T., and the 
formation of the Common I>1arket, as well as by the dramatic growth of the 
Eurodollar market. These developments are seen as having had three major 
consequences. First, national economies became linked to form, in effect, a 
world market in both manufactured goods and a number of primary commodities. 
Second, prices came to be effectively determined on a world rather than a 
national basis. Third, domestic inflation rates became tied to a world rate, 
determined by the growth of the world money supply. 
Within this 'world' system, since all member nations, with one exception, 
broadly fit the description of 'small open economies with fixed exchange 
rates', it is suggested that none was in a position to affect appreciably the 
world money supply by unilateral action. The one exception, of course, is the 
United States, whose role in the system is seen as exceptional for two rea-
sons. First, its significant size relative to the world economy has meant 
that its domestic monetary policies have been able to exert a significant 
influence over the course of world money supply. Second, and of crucial sig-
nificance, the dollar has functioned as a major reserve currency - a currency, 
that is, which other countries are prepared to hold as a cushion against fluc-
tuations in their external balance. This has historically placed the United 
States under much less pressure than non-reserve currency countries to correct 
its balance of payments deficits. 
This exceptionalism is seen as giving the United States a key role in the 
international emergence of inflation. It is argued that during the 1950s, as 
~'I"~"'"' • ..,. '~'~, ,I; , 
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the demand for reserve assets grew along with the rapid expansion in world 
trade, US dollars were willingly held as a substitute for gold into which they 
were, in any event, potentially convertible. This allowed the United 
States to run balance of payments deficits with relative impunity; although 
during this period the United States Government was generally concerned to 
follow a fairly cautions monetary policy, a fact which ensured a moderate rate 
of world money supply growth, and hence a moderate rate of world inflation. 
In the early 1960s, the situation changed as increased emphasis was 
placed by the US authorities on the task of reducing the level of domestic 
unemployment. As Table 4.1 illustrates, the annual average rate of monetary 
expansion over the period 1961 to 1964 was more than twice that for 1957 to 
1960. The situation was further intensified after 1965 as the United States 
sought to finance both its increasing involvement in the Vietnam War, and a 
variety of domestic social programmes, by means of money supply expansion 
rather than increased taxation. One consequence of this policy stance was the 
progressive deterioration of the United States' external payments position - a 
deterioration which, it is argued, other countries were now only prepared to 
countenance in view of their fears for the stability of the world monetary 
system. 
4.12 
Table 4.1 Annual Average Rates of Growth of Money Supply 1957-1972 
r-
1957-60 1961-64 1965-68 1969-72 
U.S.A. 3.2 6.6 8.3 9.4 
Group of Ten 5.1 9.4 9.9 13.9 
Source: zis (1975), p. 115 
These events are taken to account, in large measure, for the growth of 
world money supply until 1968. In terms of post 1968 experience, it is 
emphasized that while the United States is the only country capable of exert-
ing a significant unilateral influence on the system, the overall world money 
supply is still fundamentally dependent upon the collective thrust of the 
monetary policies pursued by other countries. Thus, the moderate increase in 
money supply growth over the period 1965-1968 (from 9.4 to 9.9 per cent) 
illustrated in Table 4.1, is seen as due to the cautious monetary policies 
11 
pursued by other members of the Group of Ten. After 1969, however, this 
collective caution was rapidly dissipated as several other members of the 
Group pursued expansionary monetary policies predicated either on a desire to 
reduce balance of payments surpluses (Zis, 1975, p. 117), or in pursuit of the 
objective of maximum domestic expansion consistent with external balance 12 
(Soskice 1978, p. 229). As a result, for the period 1969-1972 the 
acceleration in world monetary expansion to 13.9 percent derived largely from 
the pclicies pursued by countries other than the United States, whose money 
supply growth had, in fact, dropped back to only 4.3% by 1970 (Zis, 1975). 
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To summarize, on the basis of the above analysis it is argued that the 
simultaneous acceleration in rates of wage inflation among the Group of Ten in 
the mid-1960s may be traced initially to the overheating of the American econ-
omy. The similarity in levels of inflation is then seen to derive from these 
countries' collective subjection to world money supply as a result of a common 
commitment to fixed exchange rates within a closely integrated world economy. 
When this fixed exchange rate system came to an end in August 1971, however, 
individual countries regained the ability to pursue divergent monetary 
policies - a development which, according to the monetarists, accounts for the 
emergence of significantly different rates of inflation among the members of 
the Group of Ten since 1972. 
The last element in the monetarist argument is the explanation of the 
observed coexistence of higher rates of wage inflation together with rising 
unemployment (i. e. the apparent breakdown of the Phillips curve), and the 
simultaneous emergence of industrial unrest. ~o\Tith respect to the former, it 
is argued that while excess demand generated by an expansionary monetary 
policy is the main source of inflationary pressure, as inflation emerges, both 
trade unions and firms will seek to bargain over money wage increases which 
incorporate their expectations concerning future rates of price increase. 
Thus, the actual rate of wage inflation (Wt ) will be determined by excess 
demand (Xt) (both domestic and international), and the expected rate of 
• e 
price inflation (P t ). Formally: . 
W = 
t 
.e 
f (X , P ), 
t t 
where substitution of the unemployment rate, Ut, for Xt, gives an expecta-
. ,. 
,I~. 
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tions-augmented Phillips curve. This construct is clearly consistent with the 
coexistence of rising unemployment and accelerating inflation, since at any 
given level of unemployment the rate of wage inflation could be shifted upward 
by an increase in price expectations. 
As far as the emergence of industrial unrest is concerned, it is argued 
that only if the actual rate of inflation is correctly anticipated will real 
incomes rise in line with expectations. In periods of rising inflation, how-
ever, this state of affairs is unlikely, with the consequence that income 
earners will find their real incomes being eroded by increasing prices at a 
rate faster than anticipated. The predicted result is progressive attempts to 
recoup real income increases denied by inflation, the consequent emergence of 
catch-up claims and union demands for cost-of-living allowances, and an 
inevitable escalation in the level of industrial unrest. 
On the basis of the monetarist analysis, therefore, strikes and indus-
trial unrest are seen as a consequence of world-wide inflation, rather than as 
a cause. Their analysis is thus based upon an implicit model of strike deter-
mination which includes the expected rate of inflation as one of its key vari-
abIes. Formally, this may be expressed in terms of either prices or real 
wages. Specifically in terms of the latter variable, this may be expressed as 
follows: 
e 
S = a + a (!:lR - ~ ) with a 1 < 0 
t 0 1 t t 
( 1 ) 
where St is an index of strike activity; !:lRt is the actual rate of real 
wage growth over recent periods; and !:lRte its expected rate, so that 
!:lRt' Mte indicates the extent to which real wage expectations are 
: '" ..... 
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actually realized. . II e . However, s~nce Rt is unobservable, some assumptions are 
necessary concerning how expectations are actually formed. In practice, this 
is a contentious issue, although a common assumption is that long-run 
expectations are formed as the weighted sum of a constant long-run increase 
parameter (T), and a finite moving average of previous real wage changes. 
Formally: 
{l.R 
t 
e 
= 
n 
( 1 - '¥)T + '¥ I: 
i=1 
<li 
i 
M 
t-i 
wi th L ~i = 1 and 0 < 1f < 1. 
Now, since recent actual changes are given by: 
M' 
t 
= 
with 
m 
I: a llR 
i=1 i t-i 
Lui = 1. 
... 
Substitution into (1) gives: 
This in turn reduces to: 
S 
t 
S 
t 
= 
= a + a 
o 1 
n 
- {( 1 - '¥) T + '¥ I: 
a ' + a ' 
o 1 
L 
I: jl 
i=1 i 
i=1 
M 
t-i 
... 
with a I == a - a (1 - '¥)T 
o 0 1 
and jl = (a - n ). 
iii 
... (2 ) 
(3 ) 
(4 ) 
(5 ) 
The latter real wage formulation is, in fact, identical to the expecta-
tions-achievement gap formulation originally postulated by Ashenfelter and 
4.16 
Johnson, and subsequently employed by Pencavel, Hunter, Hibbs and Snyder using 
an Almon lag estimating technique. 
This clearly has important implications in the present context. First, 
it suggests that Ashenfelter and Johnson's model is broadly consistent with 
the international monetarist analysis, and thus constitutes a potential test 
of one of its key elements: namely, its explanation of industrial conflict. 
This in turn brings us back to the results presented in Chapters 2 and 3. As 
we have seen, while the reported findings of Ashenfelter and Johnson (USA, 
1952-1967), Pencavel (UK, 1950-1967), Smith (Canada, 1953-1968) and Hibbs 
(Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK 
and USA, 1950-1969), all confirm the empirical significance of the expecta-
tions-achievement gap construct in explaining variations in strike action over 
time,13 doubts have been raised about its ability to account for the extent of 
the escalations in strike frequency occurring in Britain after 1967 (Hunter, 
1973); and for its relevance in France and Italy (Snyder, 1975). 
An alternative implication is that if the monetarist analysis can, in 
fact, be shown to be broadly correct for all members of the Group of Ten (i.e. 
Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 'UK 
and USA), then Snyder's contention that economic factors are largely irrele-
vant to the process of strike determination in 'non-institutionalized' systems 
such as those of France and Italy is untenable. 14 Further, contrary to 
Shorter and Tilly's contention, it also implies a continuing role for economic 
factors in determining strike frequency in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Sweden, where 'labour's entry into the polity' had supposedly insulated 
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the strike from the effects of economic factors. Evidently, therefore, a 
considerable amount hinges upon the overall validity of the international 
monetarist explanation. 
III. The International Monetarist Argument: An Assessment 
While the logic of the international monetarist argument is certainly 
compelling, it is not without its detractors. In particular, it has been sug-
gested that on a number of points its validity rests on a fairly casual form 
of empiricism. Complete acceptance must therefore depend upon its passing 
somewhat more rigorous empirical tests. Strictly, this should involve 
detailed empirical verification of each of its four principle components: 
first, the theory of domestic inflation embodied in the expectations Phillips 
Curve: 
. 
W = 
t 
• e 
a(U ,p } 
t t 
wi th a 1 < 0; a 2 > O. 
Second, the assumed theory of price expectations: 
= 
~ n-1 
(1 - 1jJ) 'L '!' p 
n=1 t-n 
• e 
( 1 ) 
••• 
(2 ) 
Third, the possibility of the emergence of unanticipated inflation leading to 
attempts to realize fr~strated real income increases, and the consequent 
emergence of industrial unrest: 
S 
t 
= a( P - (1 - '¥ 1 
t n=1 
with a > o. 
n-1 • 
'!' p ) ••• (3 ) 
t-n 
d~ ,,~,". 
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And finally, the validity of the hypothesized 'international transmission 
mechanism' linking domestic excess demand for which unemployment is 
considered a satisfactory proxy - to the world money supply. 
In practice, of course, this chain of reasoning is only as strong as its 
weakest link. For example, if it could be demonstrated that the expected rate 
of inflation relevant to collective bargaining decisions is determined on the 
basis of rational expectations (i.e. the rate that would be predicted by a 
forecaster employing an econometric model of the economy), rather than on the 
basis of adaptive expectations as in equation (2), then the notion that 
observed escalations in strikes could be attributed to the emergence of 
uf'I-
Aanticipated inflation would clearly be undermined. Given the current state of 
knowledge about expectations and their formation, as well as the absence of 
objective expectations data, however, this is not a particularly fruitful 
avenue of criticism of the monetarist argument. Consequently, detailed 
attention in this section will be concentrated on the first and third 
components of the argument outlined above: namely, the domestic theory of 
inflation and the implied theory of strikes. Consideration of the remaining 
component the validity of the hypothesized international transmission 
mechanism - is more conveniently postponed until the next section. 
With regard to the domestic theory of inflation, an expectations-aug-
mented Phillips curve was fitted to annual wage inflation data 15 for the mem-
ber nations of the Group of Ten over the period 1952-1977. The fitted. model 
was of the general form: 
. . '. ~ 
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W ao+alU-l+a2P +E. 
t t t-1/2 t 
This equation relies on a much simpler, but still plausible, price expec-
tations specification; namely, that current expectations are formed on the 
basis of the annual rate of price inflation experienced over the preceding six 
16 
months. In addition, in two countries, namely France and Japan, unfilled 
vacancies are substituted as a more reliable proxy for labour market excess 
17 demand. The results are presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. 
Generally, satisfactory results are obtained in eight out of the ten 
countries namely, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands and the United States - with both labour market and price coef-
ficients significant and correctly signed in all cases - although in Belgium, 
Italy and the Netherlands the price coefficients do appear implausibly high. IS 
However, as Table 4.3 illustrates, significant prediction errors are evident 
in several cases over the period 1968 to 1974, the period during which the 
major wage acceleration occurred. In particular, the model significantly 
underpredicts the escalations in wage inflation occurring in Belgium in 1970 
and 1972-73; in Canada in 1968, 1971 and 1974; in France 19 in 1974; in Germany 
in 1970 and 1973-74; in the Netherlands in 1971; and in the United States in 
1968 and 1971. In two cases these underpredictions are particulary acute: in 
Italy in 1970 and 1973; and in Japan in 1974. 
h 1 1 t ' f 20, T e resu ts are east sa LS actory for Sweden and the Un~ted Kingdom. 
In the former case the coefficient on the unemployment rate is insignificant, 
and serious underpredictions are recorded in 1970, 1972 and 1976. In the case 
• '.,.:. ::::: .. : "1-' ,- ,.~. ,: ", 
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of the United Kingdom, a significant positive relationship is established 
between wage changes and unemployment,21 and serious underpredictions are 
recorded in 1970 and 1973. 
~e 4.2 Expectations Phillips Curve Regression Results, Ten Countries 
COuntry 
-
Belgium 
Canada 
1 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
u.s. 
Period 
1953-1974 
1952-1975 
1956-1967 
1969-1976 
1953-1975 
1956-1975 
1956-1975 
1954-1975 
1953-1977 
1953-1974 
1952-1975 
aD 
-1.019 
(-0.522) 
8.50 
(1.254) 
3.66 
(3.721) 
3.348 
(2.302) 
-2.83 
(-0.735) 
-4.73 
(-2.54) 
0.0116 
(0.009) 
6.751 
(3.64) 
3.82 
(1.615) 
7.372 
(3.758 ) 
401.19 
(2.555) 
1283.6 
(3.205) 
0.0352t 
(4.726) 
927.0 
(3.501) 
5311.03 
(1.808) 
0.0373t 
(6.713) 
210.04 
(4.71) 
18.18* 
(0.594) 
1367.5 
(6.143) 
-1242.9 
(-2.208) 
P 
t-1/2 
1.678 
(7.355) 
0.359 
(3.048) 
0.585 
(4.010) 
0.562 
(2.106) 
1.235 
(4.895) 
0.478 
(3.806) 
1.133 
(7.47) 
0.309 * 
(4.456) 
0.220 
(1.970) 
0.642 
(5.29) 
bata Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators 
* inverse of unemployment rate 
1exc l uding 1968 
'" export prices 
~ ... ' ••• ,., , ,-I. " 
D.W. 
0.904 1.63 
0.768 1.78 
0.831 . 2.09 
0.613 2.04 
0.745 2.00 
0.854 2.00 
0.650 2.15 
0.389 2.06 
0.834 2.05 
0.788 1.72 
t unfilled vacancies 
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Table 4.3 Prediction Errors for Expectations Phillips Curve Regressions, 
Ten Countries, 1968-1974 
Country 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Belgium -1.3 0.1 0.9 0.1 2.2 1.3 0.0 
Canada 2.2 -0.6 -0.1 1.9 -0.5 -2.5 2.3 
France -0.2 -0.1 -1.6 -1.6 2.6 
Germany -1.6 0.9 2.5 -1.5 -1.1 0.9 1.5 
Italy -3.8 0.2 11.2 0.4 -1.1 9.1 -3.7 
Japan -0.5 0.4 1.3 0.3 -0.9 -2.1 6.6 
Netherlands 0.2 0.8 0.5 2.5 -0.6 0.0 -0.8 
Sweden -0.5 -0.2 3.2 -0.8 6.4 0.4 -4.0 
U.S.A. 1.6 -0.8 0.4 1.5 0.6 -0.3 0.6 
U.K. -0.6 1.2 4.2 -1.1 3.8 -1.6 1.1 
Source: Equations estimated in Table 4.2 
While these results are significantly more favourable to the basic excess 
demand expectations model than several previous international comparative 
21 
studies (Nordhaus, 19727 Perry, 1975), they nevertheless still cast some 
doubt over its adequacy as the sole explanation of recent escalations in wage 
inflation, particularly in the cases of Sweden, the United Kingdom, Italy and 
Japan. 
Scepticism about the adequacy of the international monetarist explanation 
is further reinforced when its implied theory of strikes is exposed to 
critical scrutiny. In particular, acceptance of the monetarist thesis that 
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the recent strike waves were the product of the union's response to the emer-
gence of unanticipated inflation requires that two conditions must be met 
(Soskice, 1978). First, that increases in price inflation predated the esca-
lations in strikes; and second, given that the latter were unprecedentedly 
large by post-war standards, that the increases in price inflation were also 
substantial. As Table 4.4 indicates, however, with the notable exception of 
Japan, where developments were broadly simultaneous, the major escalations in 
strikes actually predated those in price inflation. 
To summarise, it is clear that the major positive feature of the monetar-
ist argument, namely its ability to explain both the simultaneous emergence of 
industrial unrest across countries, and the simultaneous acceleration of 
unprecedentedly high rates of wage inflation, is negated by its empirical 
weakness. Moreover, as Soskice (1978) has argued, the monetarist analysis is 
also unable to account for a further important feature of the strike waves; 
namely, the precise form that they took. In particular, it provides no clue 
as to why in Europe the origins of worker protest were based firmly at plant 
level rather than in the more centralized structures of trade unionism; or why 
the protest was in several important instances out of step with recent 
historical experience in being largely unofficial. This feature was 
particularly evident in Sweden, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
, These weaknesses in the monetarist explanation have prompted the con-
. 
struction of an alternative international explanation of recent wage-strike 
,experience, representing, in effect, a 'cost-push' counter-attack. 
',. " 
,. ~ . , ' . . ~ 
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Table 4.4 Initial Timing of Major Escalations in Prices and Strike Activity: 
Ten Countries 
Country Prices 
Belgium 1972-73 
Canada 1973-74 
France 1969; 1974 
Germany 1971 
Italy 1973-74 
Japan 1970-74 
Netherlands 1969*; 1971-75 
Sweden 1970-71 
U.K 1971; 1974-75 
U.S.A. 1964 (gradual) 
1973-74 
Source: O.E.C.D. Main Economic Indicators 
Notes: * 
N/A 
Value-added tax increase 
= not available 
Strikes 
. Frequency Volume 
1969-72 1970-72 
1965 (gradual) 1966-69 
1974 
1968-71 1967-68 
N/A 1971 
1968-71 1969 
1970-74 1971 
1969-70 1970-73 
1968-70 1971 
1968-70 1970-72 
1968-70 1967; 1970 
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IV. International Strike and Wage Experience: An Alternative Explanation 
The key element in the "internationalization" of the monetarist theory is 
the specification of an 'international transmission mechanism' linking domes-
tic excess demand to the world money supply. The theoretical foundations of 
this mechanism are to be found in recent contributions to the monetary theory 
of the balance of payments (Mundell, 1971; Johnson, 1972; Parkin, 1972; 
Laidler and Nobay, 1974), while its practical manifestations are traced, as we 
have seen, to mounting US balance of payments deficits in the late 19605 and 
early 1970s. As with the other elements of the monetarist approach, however, 
this mechanism has not escaped criticism. Soskice (1978), for example, has 
:?Ointed to two weaknesses. The first is the theoretical problem that even 
Under fixed exchange' rates domestic monetary authorities still retain some 
Control over domestic money supply, and can move to neutralize or sterilize 
mOney inflows. The second is the empirical problem that the USA only came to 
rUn large balance of payments deficits against most European countries after 
1969/70, which is, as Table 4.4 indicates, too late for it to account success-
fUlly in any general way for the strike waves, or for the wage explosions 
which occurred more or less simultaneously. 
The monetary channel of international transmission is not, however, the 
only potential mechanism linking domestic economies. Salent (1977), for exam-
ple, has isolated four such mechanisms. 23 Thus, inflation, and hence the 
potential for conflict, may also be transmitted via the direct effect of 
foreign price changes, as under the so-called Scandinavian model (Aukrust, 
1970; Edgren, Faxen and Odner, 1969); or via changes in autonomous expenditure 
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- and in particular the balance of exports over imports as in the Keynesian 
model. In both cases, however, the theory is contradicted by empirical evi-
dence. Thus, the Keynesian mechanism is subject to the same criticisms as the 
monetarist mechanism, since both rely on the effects of the us external defi-
cit; while the Scandinavian theory is effectively contradicted by the work of 
Perry (1975), who finds no evidence for any unusual increase in price 
inflation preceding the wage explosions in Group of Ten countries, and hence, 
by implication, little scope for the international transmission of industrial 
Conflict via direct price effects. 
The fourth potential mechanism of transmission is the direct inter-
national linkage of wages (and strikes), either as a result of competition 
between international labour markets, or as a result of international trade 
union cooperation. However, while specific examples may be found for both of 
these linkages, 24- they do not really constitute a sufficiently extensive, a 
sufficiently consistent, or a sufficiently sustained mechanism of transmission 
across all ten countries. The mechanism is, in fact, simply an elaborated 
re-statement of the cost-push analysis presented earlier. In practice, there-
fore, there are important question marks against each of these transmission 
mechanisms as the sole source of the international character of the strike 
waves and wage explosions of the late 1960s. 
It is, however, important to emphasize that neither the simultaneous 
escalation in strikes, nor that in wages, need necessarily rely on the exist-
ence of a mechanism of international transmission. These developments could 
also be due to factors such as common institutional and structural changes 
. :. 
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across countries, or to common economic policy responses by national 
governments to common economIc problems (Salent, 1977). In terms of common 
institutional changes, attention might obviously be drawn to the increasingly 
interventionist role of the state as employer, consumer, fiscal authority, 
supplier of public goods and services, and formulator of economic policy. 25 
Moreover, intimately related to this increased state involvement has been the 
emergence of a substantialy reduced tolerance of unemployment, and a 
concomitant willingness by governments in a number of countries to use both 
monetary and fiscal policy to run the domestic economy at levels that are much 
closer to their full-employment potential. 2h This has inevitably made these 
economies more vulnerable to inflationary shocks. It has also had at least 
two other important consequences. First, insofar as bargaining power derives 
from the state of the labour market, full employment policies have been 
instrumental in increasing that power at plant level (Phelps-Brown, 1971; 
Marris, 1972). This, in turn, has undoubtedly helped facilitate the signifi-
cant secular shifts that have taken place in virtually every European member 
Of the Group of Ten toward increased decentralization in wage determination 
and collective bargaining (Schregle, 1974). 
Second, as Lehmbruch (1977) has argued, three decades of increasing state 
economic intervention have come to condition public expectations in a way that 
has ,led to policy makers being held increasingly responsible for the simul-
taneous achievement of a variety of economic goals, including full employment, 
stable prices, external balance and rapid growth. AS many governments have 
discovered to their cost, this loss of the quasi-natural justification for 
'" '. i~.1 
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market forces has emerged at broadly the same time as increasingly severe 
limitations have been placed upon domestic policy makers by international 
developments 11 which have made "both many targets and several policy 
instruments less susceptible to domestic national manipulation than earlier" 
(Lindbeck, 1975, p. 36). One consequence has been the emergence of what has 
been referred to as economic 'control deficits' (Lehmbruch, 1977), as a result 
of which governments have "increasingly turned to more direct attempts at 
influencing the economic behaviour of business and/or labour • • • by 'moral 
suasion', or by more or less 'dirigiste' measures, especially 'incomes 
policies "' (Lehmbruch, p. 98). Indeed, it is these incomes policies which 
have formed a core element in the area of common policy responses to common 
economic policy problems, and as such they have constituted an important 
potential linkage in the economic experience of different countries. 
It is the latter notion which forms the basis of the argument advanced by 
Soskice (1978) in his attempt to provide a satisfactory explanation for the 
strike waves and wage explosions that occurred in France, Italy, Germany and 
the United Kingdom between 1968 and 1970. The starting point for this analy-
sis, like that of the monetarists, is the behaviour of world money supply. 
However, rather than placing primary emphasis on the effects of the US mone-
tary expansion of the late 1960s, Soskice directs attention toward the 
Cautious policies pursued by the United States during the late 1950s and early 
19605. These policies, together with their restraining influence on world 
money supply and world prices, are seen as having provided an important con-
straint on the European boom that emerged following the economic downturn of 
." , c. ~. .• ,--: .' !:,'.;' 
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1958. In particular, it is argued that strengthening cost-push pressures in 
Europe in the early 1960s, combined with unusually strong competition in 
international markets and the moderate growth of world prices, conspired to 
create both balance of payments difficulties and a significant squeeze on 
profits. Thus, between 1963 and 1966 balance of payments deficits appeared in 
Italy (1963), France (1964-65) , Sweden (1964) , Germany ( 1965-66) , and the 
United Kingdom (1964, 1966); while from the mid to the late 1960s, the share 
of profits in national income declined in all member nations of the Group of 
Ten, except the United States and Canada. 
Given their commitment to fixed exchange rates, the response of European 
governments to these events was almost universally the same; namely, the 
introduction of restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, and the introduction 
or re-introduction of some form of wage/price policy.2S The response by 
employers was also broadly similar across countries. In particular, it is 
argued that from the mid to late 1960s, employers moved to take advantage of 
the ensuing recession - and in particular the higher levels of unemployment -
either to change inflationary plant level payments systems (as in the United 
Kingdom),29 to reduce plant level wage supplements (as in Germany), to achieve 
a general rationalization of business structure and work practices (as in 
France), or to make improvements in productivity performance via increases in 
the pace of work (as in Italy). According to Soskice's argument, however, the 
exact form that these responses took depended crucially on the prevailing 
institutional environment. 
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As Soskice goes on to argue, these policies began to have their major 
effect just at a time when US domestic policies became more expansionary. The 
result of the latter development was an increase in both the US and world 
inflation rates from the mid-1960s, a state of affairs which, it is argued, 
allowed European employers to seek to translate cost reductions into higher 
profit margins,30 rather than lower prices, at a time when real wages were 
being eroded both by moderation under national wage restraint policies, and 
erosion due to escalating world prices. 
These events, in providing the background to the strike waves of the late 
1960s, are seen as suggesting a number of important 'frustration' factors as 
relevant to an international explanation of strikes and wage inflation. 
First, increased employer pressure at shop floor level exercised during 
periods of labour market slack in the face of declining profitability. 
Second, the subsequent recovery of corporate profits at a time when real wages 
were being eroded by increasing world prices. And third the imposition at the 
national level of some form of income or wage restraint policy, often 
aCCompanied by restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. 31 However, Soskice 
also emphasises a fourth point: namely, that national unions were in many 
instances either co-opted or tied into long-term agreements they could not 
re-negotiate. This, together with the fact that employer rationalization 
Policies were carried on at plant level where national unions were either weak 
Or lacked authority over their memberships (Soskice, p. 221), is argued to 
aCCOunt for the predominantly unofficial nature of the observed· protest. 
Finally, on the basis of this analysis, it is emphasized that the broadly 
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simultaneous acceleration in wage settlements is to be seen as an essentially 
cost-push phenomenon, reflecting not only a perceived need by employers to 
compensate for the above frustration factors, but perhaps more importantly, 
also an attempt by employers to "buy off" a form of unofficial protest that 
threatened to undermine the established channels of collective bargaining. 
To summarize, Soskice's analysis seeks to emphasize the importance of 
domestic cost-push elements as important to an understanding of recent wage 
and strike experience, while at the same time providing an explanation that is 
broadly consistent with the fundamentally international character of the prob-
lem. The result is both a highly plausible, and a significantly more complex 
explanation of comparative strike and wage activity, based upon broadly 
similar behavioural responses to similar economic experiences by governments, 
employers, unions, and their members across institutionally diverse industrial 
relations systems. 
Despite their intuitive plausibility, in the final analysis acceptance or 
rejection of these hypotheses must be based upon considerably more rigorous 
specification and testing than Soskice provides. Moreover, in addition to the 
four European nations included in his study, other members of the Group of Ten 
- namely, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Japan, as well as the United 
States and Canada - all experienced significant escalations in wages and 
strike activity in the late 1960s and early 1970s. To be fully convincing, 
Soskice's hypotheses must also be broadly consistent with developments in 
these countries. 
. ....... 
, .. ...... . .,~ " . 
. ' ~, ~ 
.. ,' "'\-~'''::' '" ".'.' 
I 
-' 
4.31 
£onclusions 
The main purpose of this chapter has been to broaden the scope of the 
analysis of strikes to include the process of wage inflation. To this end, 
particular attention has been given to .two historico-analytic accounts of 
recent international wage-strike experience, the main elements of which are 
summarised in Figure 4.1. While both accounts, the monetarist as well as that 
of Soskice, are capable of providing plausible and logically consistent 
accounts of observed events, neither can be accepted as it stands. 
In the case of the monetarist analysis, these reservations stern from 
significant empirical weaknesses relating to three of its key components: its 
theory of strikes; its theory of domestic wage inflation; and its explanation 
of the international transmission mechanism. In the case of Soskice's analy-
sis, on the other hand, these reservations stern not from demonstrated empiri-
cal weaknesses, but rather from the absence of any formal specification or 
rigorous statistical tests of either his implied 'frustration' theory of 
strikes, or his theory of wage inflation. In addition, his analysis concen-
trates on only four member nations of the Group of Ten. 
All of these issues will be addressed in greater detail in Chapters 5, 6, 
and 7 in connection with the contruction, specification and testing of a 
formal model of comparative wage and strike behaviour. Before proceeding to 
this task, it is important to empn1ize one conclusion that emerges forcefully 
from both the monetarist analysis and that of Soskice; namely, that the recent 
international escalations in strikes have been a primarily economic phenome-
non, 32 derived from broadly similar behavioural responses across institution-
.', ~ ..... -,,, 
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ally diverse industrial relations systems. This is clearly in line with the 
findings of Hibbs (1976), but runs firmly counter to the comparative theories 
advanced by both Shorter and Tilly and Snyder. 
Figure 4.1 
Alternative Accounts of Recent Wage and Strike Explosions 
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Footnotes to Chapter 4 
1. The expression 'a sociological explanation of inflation' is often used 
in a derogatory fashion by monetarist economists as implying an 
unsystematic, ad hoc, or atheoretical approach to the problem. A 
useful theoretical sociological approach actually constructed by a 
sociologist rather than as a straw man by an economist is provided 
by Goldthorpe (1979). 
2. Most of these explanations may be traced back to the earlier work of 
Ross (1948). 
3. A 'unionized Phillips curve' in Thomas' terms is one which includes 
addtional variables in T, defined as the level of union density. This 
variable is not treated as a proxy for militancy/but merely as 
reflecting the extent to which the labour force is unionized. This 
is then assumed to influence the wage-change unemployment relationship. 
4. The bargaining theory subject to empirical tests is that developed 
by Johnson (1972). 
5. These measures include: strike frequency; working days lost through 
strikes; the number of workers involved in strikes; and a 'composite' 
strike index based upon the work of Evans and Galambos (1966). 
6. The use of contemporaneous aggregate strike frequency may be criticised 
on two grounds: first/the dependent variable is wage changes in 
manufacturing, hence manufacturing strikes is the appropriate explanatory 
variable; second/wage changes follow the process of negotiation with a 
lag, and this should be allowed for in the specification and testing of 
the wage equation. 
7. Ward and Zis nevertheless express scepticism about the relevance of 
a cost push explanation even in these countries. This is based upon 
their observation that neither the events of May 1968 in France nor 
those of the 'Hot Autumn' of 1969 in Italy led to acceleration in price 
inflation vis a vis the rest of the world. 
8. These include: Mundell (1971); Johnson (1972); Parkin (1972); Laidler 
and Nobay (1974) and Zis (1975). 
9. Evidence on this issue is provided by Genberg (1973) and Salent (1977). 
10. See for example:Trevithic and Mulvey (1975) p. 3, 8; and A.J.H. Dean 
(1980) p. 165. On the basis of calculations produced by the latter 
author the dispertion in price inflation among OECD nations varied 
over the period 1970-79 as follows: 
1970 
1.9 
1971 
1.9 
1972 
1.4 
1973 
1.8 
1974 
5.3 
1975 
4.8 
1976 
4.9 
1977 
6.3 
1978 
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11. Many of these countries were in the process of correcting balance of 
payments deficits. For example, deficits appeared in Italy in 1963; 
France (1964-5); Sweden (1964); Germany (1965-66) and the United 
Kingdom (1964 and 1966). See below p. 4.29. 
1979 
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12. These propositions are not uncontested. See, for example Soskice 
(1978) • 
13. These studies also confirm the empirical significance of unemployment. 
Although the latter finding is questioned by the more recent 
estimations of Hunter (1973), Shorey (1977) and Knight (1972) in the 
U.K. 
14. Clearly, even if it were argued that economic problems gave rise to 
both increases in union membership (via the threat effect) and pre-
cipitated political crises, which in turn caused the strike 
explosions, this would still imply the relevance of economic factors 
- albeit mediated by organisational and political considerations. 
15. For data sources, see Appendix 1. 
16. This assumption is equivalent to that adopted by Eckstein and Brinner 
(1972) • 
17. In the case of France/the substitution derives from the superior 
performance of the vacancy series. In Japan the substitution is made 
in the light of the fact that the operation of the permanent employment 
system (see Chapter 7) makes unemployment a less reliable indicator 
of labour market excess demand. 
18. Similar observations are made by Perry (1975) p. 417. 
19. 1968, the year of the strike and wage explosions, is excluded. 
20. The Swedish equation employed an export price variable. See Edgren, 
Faxen and Odner (1969). 
21. This result is highly sensitive to the period chosen for estimation. 
Thus, estimation over the period 1952-68 produces the expected inverse 
relationship with unemployment. As the estimation period is pro-
gressively extended beyond this point, however, the unemployment 
variable first drops from significance, and then changes sign. 
22. One possible explanation for this is their estimation over a shorter 
and economically less stable time period. 
23. Salent does, however, emphasise that in practice these mechanisms 
are likely to be interrelated. 
24. As an example of the first linkage, competition between German and 
Dutch labour markets is frequently suggested as one factor in the 
breakdown of the Dutch wage policy in 1963 Braun (1975). As an 
example of the second linkage, reference might be made to co-ordinated 
bargaining between Canadian and U.S. branches of international unions. 
25. The issue of the comparative growth in the size of the public economy 
and its causes is examined in detail in Cameron (1978). 
26. A particularly interesting contribution in this area is provided 
in Hibbs (1977), in which the pursuit of macro economic policies is 
related to the predominant class position of the ruling party's 
electoral base. 
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27. Included amongst these, of course, are such factors as increasing 
international integration under fixed exchange rates, and the growth 
in world trade, both of which were referred to in Section III. 
28. In Britain responses also included the crisis devaluation of 1967. 
29. Most notable in this respect was the British car industry where there 
was a significant shift from the use of piece work to a system of 
measured day work. 
30. During the mid to late 1960s the share of profits in national income 
increased in Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands 
and the U.K. 
31. As emphasized in the context of the monetarist analysis, and as Table 
4.1 illustrates, during the late 1960s members of the Group of Ten 
other than the U.S. were generally following cautious monetary 
policies. 
32. A similar conclusion emerges from the recent work of Sweet and 
Jackson (1979). 
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Chapter 5 
A Theoretical Model of Comparative Strike and Wage Behaviour 
Economists have devoted a good deal of attention to the formulation of 
theoretical models of the collective bargaining process • .L The task has not 
proved an easy one not least because the factors that determine the outcrnne of 
collective negotiations are so varied and complex that it is extremely 
difficult to devise models that are both realistic and manageable. In 
practice, therefore, the vast majority of researchers have found it necessary 
to make a series of highly restrictive assumptions about the parameters of the 
insti tutional setting. It has become common, for example, for bargaining 
models to abstract from the effects of uncertainty by making highly 
unrealistic assumptions about the information available to the various 
participants. Indeed, within the context of some models of strike causation 
the nature of these assumptions is such that the final outcome is conceptually 
knowable in advance, thus making recourse to strike action unnecessary and 
irrational. 'L. 
In addition, most models also find it convenient to abstract from the 
esSentially multi-dimensional character of collective bargaining, firstly by 
aSsuming that there are only two parties to the negotiations, that is, 
management and unions,;j and secondly by concentrating attention on only one 
aspect of the wide variety of matters at issue, namely that of wage rate 
deterrnina tion. Finally, the approach tends to be both firmly microeconomic 
and apolitical in orientation, being concerned primarily with the negotiations 
Of bUSiness unions operating at plant level. In an international context, 
however, where bargaining units may comprise an entire industry, region, or 
eVen the national economy; or where unions may possess macropolitical as well 
as m' 4 ~croeconomic objectives, such a preoccupation is clearly inappropriate. 
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As far as the model outlined in this chapter is concerned, a similar path 
of expediency is followed only to the extent of assuming that all disputes 
occur over wages, or over issues with easily quantifiable pecuniary 
implications. Apart from this initial assumption, an attempt is made to make 
more concessions to reality than is usual: first, by taking explicit account 
of the fact that collective bargaining is carried on under conditions of 
uncertainty, within an environment characterized by imperfect information; 
second, by acknowledging the existence of three distinct parties to the 
negotiating process - management, union leadership, and union rank and file; ~ 
and finally, by making allowance for the likely effects of bargaining at 
levels above that of the individual plant. 
In a subsequent chapter these assumptions will be relaxed even further, 
as allowance is made for the effects on collective bargaining of institutional 
variation across countries 1 including the possibility of state intervention 
through some form of inCOlnes policy, and the possibility that organized labour 
Will pursue macropolitical, as well as short-tenn economic objectives. 
I. The Formal l10del 
It is assumed in the first instance that negotiations are initiated in 
period t by the unions submitting a wage Claim( Yot which is countered by an 
employer offer Zot. These initial demands and offers serve to convey a 
certain amount of information concerning the bargaining attitudes of the 
parties, b and also to delineate the range within which the final bargain can 
be expected to fall. 
As bargaining proceeds, these initial positions will be modified, with 
conceSSions being made by both parties so long as the expected costs of such 
action are less than the costs of the alternative of refusing to give ground 
and thereby incurring a strike.' Figure 5.1 helps illustrate this. 
wage demands 
and offers 
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Possible wage increases are plotted on the vertical axis, while subjec-
tive estimates of the costs associated with incurring a strike or conceding on 
the opponent's terms are plotted on the horizontal axis. In panel (i) the 
schedule 0<.0·1) represents the employer's subjective estimate of the costs of 
agreeing on the union's terms for all possible wage increases in excess of its 
initial offer Zat. These costs will be largely composed of the anticipated 
increase in unit labour costs associated with granting a larger wage increase 
than Zat. However, in addition, the employer is also likely to impute a 
further cost element representing his estimate of the effects on his future 
bargaining position of giving in to union demands during the current round of 
negotiations. Indeed, as Hyman (1977) has argued, "the repeated concession of 
a slender margin may represent, over time, the surrender of substantial 
ground. In political terms, the fact that one side proves its refusal to com-
promise beyond a specific point may exert a profound influence on subsequent 
negotia tions. " ~ 
The downward-sloping schedule ~ (S) in panel (i) represents the antici-
pated costs of resisting union demands, and reflects the employer's subjective 
estimate of the strike costs that must be incurred to persuade the union to 
accept a wage increase below its initial demand Yot • In practice, of 
COurse, these costs cannot be known with any degree of certainty, and they are 
therefore likely to be subject to constant revision as negotiations proceed. 
Starting from the initial wage offer Zot, the assumption that the 
employer will be prepared to make concessions so long as the expected costs of 
SUch action, or more precisely the present value of these costs, are less than 
the expected costs of incurring a strike implies that the employer will be 
prepared to make concessions up to a maximum pre-strike offer of Z*. 
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Panel (ii) illustrates the situation facing the union. The downward-
Sloping curve ~(W) indicates the anticipated cost to the union, defined to 
include both leadership and rank and file, of accepting a wage offer below its 
initial demand Yot • By direct analogy with the case of the employer, these 
Costs will partly comprise lower earnings over the future of the wage con-
tract, as well as the imputed costs to the union of a weaker bargaining 
POsition in future negotiations. ~ In addition, however, acceptance by the 
union leadership of a wage increase significantly below its initial demand may 
Serve to undermine the basis of its rank and file support. Thus, the greater 
the concessions made to management during negotiations, the greater will be 
the likely costs to the leadership in terms of the achievement of goals such 
as political survival and popularity with the rank and file, and the promotion 
of the future growth of union membership. lU 
The upward-sloping 'cost of disagreement' schedule ¢(S) reflects the 
union's estimate of the strike costs associated with achieving any given wage 
increase in excess of the management's initial offer Zot. Again, these can-
not be known with any certainty, and will be subject to constant revision 
during the course of negotiations. 
Combining these two schedules determines the range over which the union 
is likely to be prepared to make concessions, as well as its minimum pre-
strike d~nand Y •• 
In the situation depicted in Figure 5.1, the employer's maximum pre-
strike offer Z. is in excess of the union's minimum demand Y., indicating 
thdt a compromise wage settlement is possible without the need for recourse to 
strike action. In reality, however, bargaining will always involve attempts 
by each party to conceal its true position and thereby create uncertainty, and 
this may well undermine the prospects for a peaceful settlement. 11 
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For example, the speed of concession of one party during negotiations may 
affect the other's evaluation of the likely costs of disagreement. In terms 
of Figure 5.1, if the employer were to concede Z. at an early stage in 
negotiations, the union might be led to suspect the validity of its claim that 
this was indeed its maximum 'pre-strike' offer. The union might therefore be 
led to make a downward revision in its expected costs of disagreement schedule 
to a position such as ¢l (S). The result is a shrinkage of the union's con-
cession range, an upward revision in its minimum acceptable pre-strike offer 
to yl 
*, and an increase in the probability of a strike. 
The implication of this analysis is that the probability of a strike in 
period t is dependent upon the relative sizes of the union's initial demand 
Yot, and the management's initial offer Zot, and on the bargaining 
attitudeS of the negotiating parties, as defined by the ratios of their 
respective strike costs to concession costs. Formally: 
P(S) 
t 
= O<l(Y 
ot 
- Z ), b , b , b ) 
ot et wt ut 
(1) 
Where bet is the bargaining attitude of the employer, bwt that of the rank 
and file, and but that of the union leadership. The sign of o(~ is expected 
to be positive since a large gap between union demands and employer offers is 
likely to be associatd with an increase in the probability of a strike; while 
and 0\ ' 
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are expected to be negative, since employers, union rank and 
file, and union leadership are all assumed to be less willing to precipitate a 
Strike when the costs of such action are high relative to the costs of making 
concessions. 
Within this framework, variations in strike probability can be related to 
a broader range of economic variables by specifying the respective determi-
nants of Yot , Zot, bet, bwt, and but and substituting into equation 
( 1) • 
• .,. ~., .. 
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It is assumed initially that union wage demands, Yot , are positively 
associated with the degree of excess demand in the labour market (Xt), the 
ex~ected "e 
ra e of price inflation (p t)' workers' . e) current wage expectations (Wt I and 
the level of profits (Dt). That is: 
where /3' 0' 0' 0' > O. l' 0>2' 0>3' 0>4 
.e .e 
Y = S(X, p ,W ,0 ) 
ot t t t t 
(2 ) 
The next stage in the development of. the model is the specification of 
the employer's wage equation. In practice, any variable that influences the 
union in formulating its demand Yot , is also likely to influence the 
employer in formulating its offer Zot. Hence, the specification of the two 
equations is likely to be virtually identical. For any given explanatory 
variable, therefore, the impact on strike probability can on y be 
Unambiguously determined if the union demand Yot, and the employer offer 
Zot, are affected in opposite directions. Unfortunately, this· is not always 
the case, a fact which provides the key to many of the ambiguities that have 
plagued the empirical estimation of previous strike models. 
Consider, for example, the state of the labour market. In the presence 
Of positive excess demand, unions are likely to seek to exploit labour's rela-
tive scarcity by increasing their wage demands, not least because the antici-
pated effects of such action on the overall level of employment will be small. 
However, labour market tightness also means that employers will have an incen-
tive to bid more aggressively for workers in order to fulfil their labour 
requirements. The effect on union demands and employer offers is thus in the 
same direction and the net impact on strike probability is ambiguous. 
Similar problems arise over the interpretation of the effects of slack 
labour markets, since these are likely to cause corresponding reductions in 
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both wage demands and wage offers. Under centralized bargaining, however, the 
situation is likely to be somewhat more complex. For example, when bargaining 
is typically carried on at the industry, regional or national level, negoti-
ated settlements frequently emerge as something of a lowest common denomina-
tor, tailored so as not to strain the financial position of more marginal 
employers. This procedure then allows some scope for less marginal firms to 
concede a variety of discretionary plant-level supplements, particularly dur-
ing periods of labour market tightness. This, of course, is the familiar 
phenomenon of wage drift. One important implication of this process is the 
possibility that employers may then use periods of labour market slack and 
higher unemployment to cut back on these 12 supplements - action that may 
provoke shop floor protest and an increase in strikes. Moreover, a positive 
association between strikes and employment from this source may be further 
reinforced by other factors. Specifically, the much larger size of bargaining 
units relative to the size of the national economy under more centralized 
Systems may serve to make strikes a more potent weapon of protest against high 
Unemployment. 
In addition to responding to the current level of the excess demand for 
labour, union and employer behaviour will also depend upon their expectations 
concerning its likely movement over time, (Xe t . Thus, even when unemployment 
is high, expectations that it will be falling over the life of the contract 
may encourage unions to increase their demands. This is particularly likely 
to be true where unions are convinced of a strong government commitment. to 
full employment. Again, however, employers will also be responding to the 
same signals, albeit with different perceptions, and may be equally prepared 
to make increased concessions on the basis of expectations of increasing 
labour market tightness. Much is likely to depend upon their perceived 
-,- •. ,~,~~ .\~.'i!(·";··":·:·:~'~l~" ~~ •. '''''·~,.:.-'''::'''"!I'''·r·;·::. ~~".":-'.~.'" .~'.t.'.;. ', •• "'. ~ .,. 
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flexibility to respond to changed conditions over the contract period - on the 
Possibilities, for example, for discretionary wage drift. In general, the 
greater this flexibility the greater the likelihood that e..nployers will 
exercise caution in granting concessions· when unelnployment is falling, and 
hence the greater the probability of a strike. This reasoning points to the 
existence of a positive relationship between increases in excess demand and 
strikes. An alternative interpretation is, however, possible. If, as Smith 
(1976) has argued, unions are basically historically oriented, referring to 
recent levels of excess demand when framing their wage demands, while 
employers are future oriented, acting on the basis of projections extrapolated 
from current changes in excess demand, it follows that the latter will be 
inversely related to strikes (i.e., that increasing unemployment will be 
POsitively associated with strike activity). On ~ priori grounds, therefore, 
it appears that the relationship between strikes and labour market changes is 
ambiguous. 
Turning to the question of inflation, this clearly provides an incentive 
for unions to increase their wage demands in order to safeguard their members' 
real incomes • .1j However, inflation also affects e!I\ployer behaviour, and 
provided there is no systelu of price restraint in operation ilf employers will 
find it easier to pass on higher wages as higher prices during inflationary 
Periods. 1-1oreover I there is some evidence to suggest that employers are 
generally prepared to accept arguments about the effect of inflation on 
workers' living standards as a legitimate bargaining issue.!~ The net effect 
On strike probability will therefore depend upon the extent to which the eval-
Uation of the two parties differs with respect to the expected rate of infla-
tion. During periods when inflation is fairly constant, the actual inflation 
rate and the expected inflation rate are likely to converge, making incorpora-
tion into current wage agreements less problematical. During periods when the 
,., '.,t •.•. '. 
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inflation rate is accelerating, however, the expected inflation rate and the 
actual inflation rate are likely to diverge, resulting in the emergence of 
'unanticipated' inflation. In addition to increasing the degree of uncer-
tainty surrounding collective negotiations, and thereby providing more room 
for disagreement, unanticipated inflation is also likely to cause increased 
rank and file dissatisfaction with existing wage agreements, and therefore 
produce increased pressure on the union leadership to reopen negotiations. 
Under such circumstances, the probability of a strike will almost certainly be 
increased. 
As far as the determination of workers' wage expectations, 
.e 
W is con .. 
t 
cerned, the existence of 'wage transfer mecn~nisms' has been recognized as an 
important feature of the collective bargaining system for some time. These 
mechanisms arise as a consequence of what has variously been described as 
'pattern' or 'comparability' bargaining; terms which essentially refer to the 
tendency for trade unions to pursue wage policies designed to establish or 
maintain relationships between the wages of different groups of workers, either 
within a given industry, or in relation to workers in other industries. As a 
result, for any wage claim formulated by a union, or union confederation, the 
size of settlements reached elsewhere will be of considerable importance in 
determining the appropriate 'going rate'. 
Workers' wage expectations are also likely to be strongly influenced by 
recent changes in their real wages, or more precisely, as Wilkinson and Turner 
have argued in the British context, by changes in their real wages net of 
I~ 
income tax. Thus, the greater the erosion of workers' net take-horne pay 
through the combined effects of inflation and a progressive tax system, the 
greater will be their current wage expectations. Formally: 
.. . " 
~ "', • .f " 
" . 
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= (3 ) 
.0 
where W is the 'going rate' of wage settlements; and Rt is the extent of 
t-j 
recent erosions in workers' net take-home pay. It is assumed that ¢1' and 
°2 , > 0, since increases in both variables are likely to cause unions to 
make upward revisions to their wage expectations. Moreover, these conclusions 
would appear to apply irrespective of the structure of bargaining, although it 
might be argued that under more centralized systems, settlements reached 
elsewhere would be somewhat more 'visible'. 17 
In practice, employers are just as likely to be interested in the wage 
increases agreed to by other employers, and particularly in those paid by 
their competitors, as are the trade unions. On the one hand they will want to 
ensure that their labour costs do not get out of line, while on the other they 
will want to avoid threatening their existing labour supply by paying 
Significantly below the going market rate. Consequently, in the absence of 
Peculiar extenuating circumstances, the employer has little incentive to hold 
Out against the 'going rate' of settlements, a fact which implies that the net 
.0 
effect of Wt-j on the probability of a strike is indeterminate. Such reason-
ing is clearly not applicable to the tax variable Rt, which is totally out-
side of the control of the individual employer. The impact of this variable 
on strike probability is therefore unambiguously positive. 
Finally, consider the case of the profits variable Dt • For the indi-
vidual employer, high profits imply an increased ability to pay, and are 
therefore likely to be associated with higher wage offers. On the other hand, 
even though management is more able to give concessions when profits are high, 
the union is also likely to increase its demands in order to obtain a bigger 
,:", \, :;, 
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share for its members. Hence, ~ priori, the net impact of the profits vari-
able on strike probability would also appear to be indeterminate. 
Under centralized bargaining the same arguments clearly apply, although 
the situation is again complicated by the tendency for employer concessions to 
be tied to the financial position of the marginal e,nployer. This may well 
lnake 'ability to pay' a somewhat more contentious issue, particularly at times 
when either aggregate profits, or the overall profit share is low, producing a 
more pronounced inverse relationship between strikes and profits under 
centralized bargaining arrangements. 
The last stage in the development of the model is the specification of 
the economic determinants of the respective bargaining attitudes of employers 
(bet), union leadership (but), and union rank and file (bwt). These 
have been defined for the various parties to negotiations as equal to the 
Costs of incurring a strike relative to the costs of conceding on the oppo-
nents' terms. From this it follows that increases in the costs of strike 
action, ceteris paribus, are likely to be associated with a greater willing-
ness to concede, and hence fewer strikes. 
For the employer a major element in strike costs will be foregone 
PrOfits, so that where these are high, employers will be more willing to make 
concessions to union delnands to avert a strike. For manufacturing firms, how-
eVer, 'this conclusion may not be invariant with respect to the level of accu-
mulated stocks. If these are high the firm may be able to withstand even a 
fairly lengthy stoppage 'Hithout significant loss. Indeed, it is not unheard 
Of for employers to seek actively to precipitate strike action at such times. 
Hence, one would expect a positive relationship between the level of stockt> 
held by a firm and the employer's strike propensity. 
,0; • 
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There are also a priori reasons for expecting that employers' strike 
Costs will be affected by conditions prevailing in the labour market. Rees 
(1952), for exrunple, has suggested that the ability to replace strikers with 
non-strikers diminishes as unemployment falls. Indeed, he used this as one 
eXplanation for the observed tendency for strikes to move pro-cyclically. 
Although one may question the validity of this proposition within the institu-
tional contexts prevailing in a number of Group of Ten countries, particularly 
in connection with legal prohibitions against the use of strike breakers, 18 
the general relationship might still' hold if, as Holt (1974) has suggested, 
tight labour market conditions are associated with a significant inrease in 
the quit rate experienced by a struck firm. According to Holt, the ready 
availability of alternative employment opportunities may persuade the 
individual worker to attempt to ~nprove his position via a relatively low cost 
job change, rather than through taking part in a potentially costly strike. 
SUch behaviour could clearly impose substantial replacement costs on an 
individual employer, particularly if he has made significant investments in 
training. An important caveat must, however, be entered in the context of 
Centralized bargaining. Under these circumstances the risk to individual 
employers would be substantially reduced, given the common involvement of 
fellow employers in any possible strike action. 
The above hypotheses may be summarised fonnally as follows: 
b = ).I(D, I , X ) 
et t t t 
(4 ) 
where Dt is the profit rate; It is an index of the level of stocks held by 
the firm; ~ is the degree of excess demand in the labour market; and where, 
on the basis of previous reasoning, it is expected that for both decentralized 
and centralized bargaining structures: 
).11 > 0, ).12 < 0, ).13 > o. 
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Turning to the union rank and file, a major element in strike costs will 
be foregone earnings, with the precise amount depending on both the avail-
ability of alternative income 
. 19 
and the length of the strl.ke. As Table 5.1 
indicates, this is subject to considerable international (as well as inter-
temporal) variation. 
Table 5.1 
Average Strike Duration: 
Ten Countries 1951-68; 1969-76 
1951-1968 1969-1976 
Belgium 7.6 10.7 
Canada 17.3 13.6 
France 1.6 1.6 
Germany 6.0 4.8 
Italy 3.4 3.2 
Japan 4.1 2.7 
Netherlands 4.5 5.7 
Sweden 19.1 9.9 
U.K. 3.3 7.9 
U.S.A. 15.2 16.5 
Source: I.L.O. Yearbook of Labour Statistics - various issues 
Notes: Duration calculated as annual average working days lost divided by the 
annual average number of workers involved. 
In the case of short stoppages, which in fact account for the lion's 
share of strikes in Britain, France, Italy and Japan, these costs are probably 
insignificant, and are therefore unlikely to be the subject of detailed 
calculation by strikers. With more protracted stoppages, however, the 
availability of alternative income will be crucial. In most countries, income 
from such institutional sources as strike pay and tax rebates will still 
:to 
reSult in a significant shortfall below normal income levels, so that if a 
reasonable level of consumption is to be maintained, additional sources such 
as casual work by strikers or their f~nilies, past savings, and debt financing 
must be called upon. Indeed, variation in these latter items is likely to be 
a major source of variation in rank and file bargaining attitlldes. 
, •••• ' "\ 'j'" "'0,';,',' 
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For a strike at the level of the individual plant, casual work is more 
likely to be available as a supplementary suurce of income for strikers and 
}.I 
their families during periods of labour market tightness. Considering this 
SOurce of alternative income in isolation, therefore, suggests that rank and 
file willingness to· strike will be increased by the presence of positive 
eXcess demand for labour. Under centralized bargaining, however, where all 
Workers in an industry are called out simultaneously, part-time work is 
unlikely to be a viable option, thus partially reducing the strategic value of 
tight labour markets, at least in relation to strike costs. 
In terms of the availability of savings and debt financing commitments, 
lTluch will depend upon workers' past income/consumption patterns. ·If, as 
Levitt (1953) has argued, workers are more prone to incur debt commitments 
that restrict their ability to finance a strike during periods of prosperity, 
22-
then variations in strike costs from this source will be pro-cyclical. If the 
state of the Labour market is then taken as a satisfactory general indicator 
Of economic prosperity, this implies a positive relationship between an 
important element of strike costs and the degree of positive excess demand. 
Combining all of the above arguments, it would appear that the overall 
relationship between strike costs (and hence willingness to strike) and the 
degree of positive excess demand for labour is likely to be ambiguous under 
both centralized and decentralized bargaining agreements. On balance, how-
eVer, an inverse relationship between strikes and unemployment (as a proxy for 
strike costs) would seem to be more likely under decentralized barga~ning 
arrangements and where there is a history of lengthy stoppages. 
An additional source of potential variation in rank and file bargaining 
attitudes will derive from the fact that strike costs will also vary in line 
" .-, .... ~ I. I .•. :., . " ....... :-~, ,':: ~ 
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with seasonal variations in workers' expenditure commitments. In particular, 
it seems likely that the probability of a strike occurring will be lower 
before the summer holidays, and at Christmas, when demands on household income 
are highest. 2?> 
FOrmally, the above hypotheses may be summarised as follows: 
b = '¥(X, Y ) 
wt t t 
(5 ) 
Where, as before, ~ represents the degree of excess demand in the labour 
market, and Yt is a seasonal variable proxying expenditure co~nitments, with 
'¥; ~ 0 and '¥i > o. 
For the union leadership a major el~nent in financial costs will be the 
Payment of strike benefits during official strikes. The precise amount 
involved will depend on the rate of benefits paid per striker, the proportion 
Of the membership called out (which will clearly depend upon the size of the 
bargaining unit), and the length of the strike. During large protracted stop-
pages these costs may be substantial, and may pose serious cash-flow problems, 
particularly since fixed costs such as staff and administration will still 
have to be met. The ability to pursue a lengthy official strike might thus 
appear to be related to the union's possession of sufficient financial 
resources, which in turn might be related to union size and organizational 
Strength. Some llnportant qualifications are necessary, however. In practice, 
the choice faCing the union leadership is unlikely to be a straightforward 
one between an expensive large-scale strike and no strike at all. Depending 
on the prevailing structure of bargaining,Z~ a variety of intermediate 
Positions are possible. For example, a series of token strikes, or a small 
strike in a key area, may be just as effective a device for pressuring 
elnployers as a large stoppage, yet will be much less costly. Equally, 
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systematic sanctions short of d strike (such as an overtime ban or work to 
rule) Inay prove even more cost-effective. Clearly, only in the case of the 
latter substitution will strike probability be affected, yet it is by no means 
Clear that such substitutions will necessarily be confined to unions with 
limited resources. On a priori grounds, therefore, the nature of the 
relationship between union organizational and financial strength and strike 
propensity is ambiguous. 
In addition to financial costs, the union leadership is also likely to 
Pay close attention to the political costs of strike action. These costs will 
tend to be relatively low (i.e. the political costs of conceding to employers 
relatively high), when rank and file militancy is high, or when rival factions 
Within the union or union federation are pressuring the leadership to push for 
larger concessions. 
SUllU,larising the above hypotheses formally gives: 
b = A(),2 M) 
ut t' t 
(6 ) 
Where Qt. is an indicator of union organisation and financial resources, and 
1-1c an index of rank and file militancy, with X
1 
~ 0 and \ < o. 
Substituting (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) into (1) yields: 
.e .e .0 
= o<.(X ,X,P ,W .,R ,D ,I ,Y ,Q ,M J 
t t t t-J t t t t t t 
(7 ) 
Where on the basis of previous reasoning it is expected that under decen-
tralized bargaining: 
Bearing in mind several bnportant caveats in relation to the effects of 
the state of the labour market and the impact of profits, similar relation-
Ships are also anticipated under more centralized bargaining. 
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If. An Operational Specification of the Model 
The transformation of the above model into a form suitable for estimation 
purposes involves the specification of preCise operational counterparts to the 
dependent and explanatory variables. Assuming that the probability of a 
strike occurring in any given period can be broadly approximated by the number 
L5 Of stoppages occurring in that period, an operational form of the model in 
qUarterly strike frequency may be specified as follows: 
Where: 
U, 'Ii = the aggregate level, and rate of change of unemployment, 
indicating the current and expected state of the laboLlr Inarket 
26 
respectively. 
tt . l~Ob,Pt_i = quarterly lagged values of the year-on-year change in the general 
index of retail prices, proxying price expectations. 'lot The 
variable is specified in expectational form to reflect the fact 
that, in the absence of money illusion, workers will try to 
anticipate future price increases to prevent their wages from 
continually falling behind changes in the cost of living. 
Moreover, the terms of the analysis of our model, it is the very 
fact that these expectations are likely to diverge among the 
negotiating parties that serves to reduce the prospects for 
reaching a peaceful settlement. 
R 
t 
D 
t 
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=quarterly lagged values of year on year changes in wage rates, 
as a proxy for the average rate of going wage settlements. 
=ratio of total disposable income to total personal income 
before tax, as a proxy for the impact of the erosion of after tax 
income. 2~ 
=an aggregate index of corporate profitability, expressed either 
as gross real trading profits or the ratio of gross profits to 
total employee compensation, jO proxying both ability to pay and 
employer's strike costs. 
,f y 
1.::: 1 it 
=seasonal dummy variables for the second, third, and fourth 
! 
t 
l' 
t 
e 
t 
quarters of the year, proxying variations in workers strike costs 
and/or periods of increased bargaining activity. 
=ratio of manufacturing stocks to the output of manufacturing 
industry, proxying one element of elnployer's anticipated strike 
costs. 
=trend term. 
=disturbance term. 
~he expected signs on the coefficients are: 
> > > > > 
a. 1 < 0" < 0, a. > 0, a 4 < 0 a < a < a a > a a < 0 ...... 0 , ab , I:l , ~ , 
and on the seasonal dummy variables a > a, a < a, a < O. 7.2 7.3 7.4 
Because of data limitations, the application of this quarterly model is 
confined to the United Kingdom. For the purposes of international 
comparisons, an annual model of the following form is substituted ~ 
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b R + b D + b I + b T + e 
5 t 6 t-k 7 t 8 t t 
All variables are as previously defined, except for the price and wage 
~ terms, which are expressed as simple rather (distributed-lag values. 31 The 
eXpected signs on the coefficients are identical to those assumed in the 
quarterly specification. 
It will be noted that both the indicator of union organizational and 
financial resources, and the index of union militancy Mt, have been 
dropped from the operational specifications of the model. This is largely 
because of the difficulties involved in finding satisfactory proxy measures 
for these variables. Thus, even though Hines (1964) has argued that the 
Change in the percentage of the labour force unionized is a suitable indicator 
Of trade union militancy, and while this indicator has been used with some 
SUCcess by Hunter (1973), there remain several difficulties associated with 
its use. First, the consistency of the measure as a proxy for militancy has 
been strongly questioned (Burrows and Hitiris 1970; Godfrey 1971; Purdy and 
Zis 1972, 1974). Second, it can be shown that the rate of change of 
unionization is itself a function of the rates of change of wages, prices, and 
unemployment, and of the level of union density (Bain and Elsheikh 1976). 
Thi~d, on a purely practical level, in the context of the U.K., union 
membership data is only available on an annual basis making it inappropriate 
for a study using quarterly data; while at the international level such data 
is either unavailable or notoriously unreliable. 32 
Similar problems arise with respect to the measurement of the unions I 
Organizational and financial resources, although here, there are also 
precedents for the use of proxy indicators. For example, both Snyder (1975, 
1977) and Shorter and Tilly (1974) have employed aggregate union density as a 
_,I",' ,. ,.., '.1 
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composite indicator of the extent of union organization, its potential control 
OVer resources, and its capacity for collective action. This practice is open 
to criticism on several counts. First, there is the obvious inability of an 
Single aggregate index to represent adequately such a broad and disparate 
complex of forces, especially as there is no guarantee that they will always 
necessarily move together. Doubt must therefore be cast over the 
inter-temporal consistency of such an indicator. Second, union density (like 
" ... ~ \:~ ;i . 
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its rate of change) is not independent of the influence of economic factors. 
Finally, establishing the causal significance of any observed relationship 
between union density and strikes, particularly when they are specified 
Contemporaneously, is liable to prove problematical; partly because of their 
jOint dependence on economic factors, but also because it is not clear which 
Variable is cause and which is effect. In particular, as has been argued 
preViously, strikes may actually be a forerunner to unionization, rather than 
\rice versa (Olson, 1965). 
Before we can proceed with the task of estimating the above equations for 
the ten countries in the present sample, they must be supplemented in at least 
one important respect, since no analysis of strike activity can be considered 
whOlly adequate unless it takes into full account the impact of the numerous 
attempts that have been ma.de to supplant free collective bargaining with some 
form of incomes policy. In addition, allowance must also be made for the 
Possible impact of variations in the institutional envirorunent on bargaining 
Outcomes, including, in particular, the pursuit of macropolitical objectives 
by Organized labour. These issues, together with that of the effects of 
incomes policy intervention on the process of wage determination, are 
considered in detail in Chapter 6. 
~Clusions 
The purpose of this chapter has been to construct an operational 
specification of a simple model of the collective bargaining process. The 
staT.ting pOint was the common proposition that the probability of a strike is 
POSitively related to the difference between the initial demand of the union 
on the one hand and the initial offer of the employer on the other. Bargain-
lng was then seen as involving both sides in granting concessions based upon 
) 
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their (uncertain) subjective estimates of the respective costs associated with 
this course of action relative to those of holding firm and thereby risking a 
strike. In considering the detenainants of these costs, in addition to the 
uSual econOlaic paraJaeters such as the state of the labour market and the level 
Of profits, considerable weight was also given on the side of the union to the 
likely internal political costs of any given course of action. 
The operational specification energing from this analysis suggests that 
strikes are likely to be more frequent during periods of rapid inflation and 
When elnployers are carrying large stocks. On the other hand, it suggests that 
they will be less frequent when the proportion of worker's take-home pay 
absorbed by the state in direct taxes is low, and when their expenditure com-
rnitments are high. Conditions prevailing in the labour market, both in terms 
Of the current level of unemployment, and in terms of changes in that level, 
the going rate of wage settlements, and the state of corporate profitability 
are also considered to have a crucial bearing on the frequency of strikes; 
however the direction of their effect is seen as ambiguous, at least on a 
~ grounds. 
An additional conclusion was that these predictions also appear broadly 
appropriate regardless of whether bargaining is undertaken on a decentralized 
baSis at plant level, or on a more centralized basis at the industry, 
regional, or national level. Two qualifications must, however, be added in 
the Context of more centralized bargaining. Namely, that low levels of unem-
Ployment may not offer the sa.'1le strategic advantages to labour in terms of 
lOwer potential strike costs, while high levels may appear less constraining. 
SeCondly, low aggregate corporate profitability is likely to have a stronger 
influence in limiting employers' offers because of the practice of tying wage 
Contracts to the performance of the most marginal firm. 
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Footnotes Chapter 5 
1. For example, Carl M. Stevens, "Regarding the Determinants of Union 
Wage Policy", Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 35, 1953, 
pp. 221-28; J. Pen, The Wage Rate under Collective Bargaining, Harvard 
University Press, 1959; Carl M. Stevens, Strategy of Collective 
Bargaining Negotiation, McGraw-Hill, 1963; Bevars DuPre Mabry, "The 
Pure Theory of Bargaining", Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 
Vol. 18, 1965, pp. 479-502. Reference should also be made to the 
classic study of Hicks, The Theory of Wages, Macmillan, London, 1963 
and Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969). 
2. This is true, for example, of the models developed by Ashenfelter and 
Johnson (1969) and J.R. Hicks, The Theory of Wages, Macmillan, London, 
1963. 
3. The model of Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) is an exception. 
4. Thus, as Streek (1979) has argued in the German context, where bargaining 
units are large relative to the national economy union actions will 
have more easily predictable macroeconomic consequences, allowing them 
to "calculate stategically that the cummulative effects of their 
bargaining could actually contradict their members' interests". See 
also Chapter 6, p.ll. 
5. A distinction could also be made between shareholders or senior manage-
ment on the one hand and management negotiators on the other, however, 
the implications of such a distinction are much less significant within 
the present context than is the case with the union. Under different 
circumstances, however, such as bargaining between a union and the local 
management of a multinational company with a high degree of centralized 
control, the distinction may be an important and necessary one. 
6. For example, an unusually large demand from the union could indicate 
a change in bargaining attitude, possibly implying greater intransi-
gence, or greater militancy. 
7. There is evidence to support the existence of rational financial cal-
culation over and above the usual justification on 'as if' grounds. 
According to Daniel, for example, 'The majority of management negotiators 
evaluated intuitively the risks associated with enduring any inter-
ruption to work against the benefits that they might gain through 
not conceding the point at issue. But there was a substantial 
minority of (usually large) establishments in which management sought 
to do more systematic cost/benefit analysis.' W.W. Daniel, 'Wage 
Determination in Industry' P.E.P. p. 62. These conclusions were based 
upon a survey of 254 representative manufacturing establishments. 
8. R. Hyman, Strikes, Fontana, London, 1974, p. 112. 
9. To quote Hicks, 'Weapons grow rusty, and a union which never strikes 
may lose the ability to organise a formidable strike, so that its 
threats become less effective'. Ibid., p. 146. 
10. See, for example, A.M. Ross, 'Trade Union Wage Policy' Berkley, 1948, 
Chs. 1-3. 
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11. In practice excessive gaming behaviour is likely to be ruled out since 
it is in the long-run interests of both parties to establish a high 
level of credibility with the other. Indeed, rational behaviour is 
likely to lead both parties to establish jointly agreed rules and 
procedures governing acceptable negotiating practices and defining 
legitimate bargaining issues, as these will serve to reduce 
uncertainty to the benefit of both of them. 
12. This is argued by Soskice (1978). 
13. Such a response may, however, be mediated if there is a system of 
automatic wage indexation in operation as in Italy and Belgium, or 
if contracts typically carry cost of living allowance (COLA) clauses. 
14. This was the case in France. 
15. See for example W.W. Daniel (1976). 
16. See F. Wilkinson and H.A. Turner, 'The Wage-Tax Spiral and Labour 
Militancy' in D. Jackson, H. Turner and F. Wilkinson, Do Trade Unions 
Cause Inflation?, Department of Applied Economics, Cambridge, 1975. 
17. Documentary evidence from countries with more centralised bargaining 
structures - such as Belgium, Sweden and Germany supports this 
contention. See S. Barkin (1975). 
18. Even in the absence of formal legal prohibitions, unions may prevent 
the use of strike breakers through picketing. Much clearly depends 
upon: the nature of the industry; the extent of union solidarity; 
and the extent of trade union membership. 
19. The critical determinant of worker behaviour is not so much actual 
strike costs as workers' perceptions of these costs. These perceptions 
are likely to be strongly influenced by past experiences of strike 
action. In particular, previous successes may lead workers to discount 
the expected costs of current or future strike action and thus 
increase the probability of its occurrence. 
20. Institutional arrangements differ. While strike benefits are paid 
by unions in support of official strikes in all member nations except 
Italy, the level of provision varies considerably, being highest in 
Sweden and Germany and lowest in France and the U.K. In the U.S. a 
survey conducted in 1972 revealed an average weekly benefit of $25 
(Sheldon M. Kline, "Strike Benefits of National Unions", Monthly Labour 
Review, vol. 98, 1975, pp. 17-23. For a detailed study of the 
British context see J. Gennard and R. Lasko, 'The Individual and the 
Strike', British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 13, 1975, pp. 
346-70. 
21. In the British context the validity of this assumption is, however, 
open to question in the light of recent research into how strikers 
manage financially during strikes. Gennard and Lasko, for example, 
have observed on the basis of their examination of two major British 
strikes that 'Little causal work was done by workers in either 
strike'. One reason for this was 'the continual expectation that 
the strike would end "tomorrow" so that it would have been pointless 
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to take a job'. The authors also observed that, 'There was a lack of 
information about the jobs that might be available,' while several 
people involved, 'found that neither public not private employment 
agencies would help unless they resigned their present employment'. 
J. Gennard and R. Lasko, 'The Individual and the Strike', British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 13, 1975, pp. 346-70. 
22. If, as Levitt implies, workers' expenditure patterns and debt commit-
ments are a major determinant of their strike propensity, then 
strikes would, according to this argument, vary counter-cyclically. 
This prediction is contradicted by most of the available empirical 
evidence which finds strikes increasing with economic prosperity. 
23. The timing of contract expirations or bargaining rounds will also 
have a bearing on strike probability, so that the estimated outcome 
will represent the net effect of strike costs and the extent of 
bargaining activity. 
24. The prevailing structure of collective bargaining may have a significant 
impact on the form that the strike takes. Under a highly centralised 
bargaining structure as in Sweden, an official stoppage to change an 
agreement may involve bringing out all the workers in an industry and 
will therefore be very costly. Under a highly decentralised system 
such as the U.S., by contrast, only one plant may be involved so 
that a union may call several dozen separate official strikes without 
bringing out all the workers in the industry. See H.A. Clegg, Trade 
Unions Under Collective Bargaining, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1976, 
pp. 75-82. 
25. If, at each point in time, the strike probability for each bargaining 
unit is approximated by the ratio of the total number of strikes to 
the total number of bargaining units, and the number of bargaining 
units is constant through time, then strike probability varies with 
the number of strikes. 
26. Previous studies have used the level of unemployment, U, as a proxy 
for the degree of excess demand in the labour market. However, it has 
been argued that when excess demand for labour is rising the unemployment 
rate alone will miss-state the true level of excess demand. In these 
cases the rate of change of unemployment, V, should be included along 
with U. See, for example, A.G. Hines, 'The Determination of the Rate 
of Change of Money Wage Rates and the Effectiveness of Incomes Policy' 
in Johnson and Nobay (eds) (1971), The Current Inflation, Macmillan, 
London. 
27. The empirical estimation of expectations is a contentious issue. The 
present specification is based upon adaptive expectations and specified 
empirically via the use of an Almon Lag,the length of which is 
empirically determined. 
28. The wage and price terms are defined and specified analogously. 
29. The inclusion of this variable may be viewed as a test of the Wilkinson-
Turner thesis that the 1969/70 strike wave was associated with the 
erosion of workers'net disposable income. The specification of the 
variable in unlagged form reflects the hypothesis that workers refer to 
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their current tax/income relationship in determining their current 
wage claims. 
30. For precise definitions of the profits variable and for information 
on data sources for the various countries in the sample, see 
Appendix 1. 
31. All lags are experimentally determined with no a priori judgement 
placed on their relative lengths in different countries. 
32. This is particularly true of France and Italy. For an extensive 
examination of trade union membership data see G.S. Bain and R.J. Price 
Profiles of Union Growth, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980. 
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.£!!apter 6 
Incomes Policy, Collective Bargaining, and the Nature of the Insitutional 
Environment 
It was suggested in Chapter 5 that no analysis of the collective 
bargaining process could be considered wholly adequate unless it took full 
accOunt of the impact of the numerous attempts that have been made to supplant 
free collective bargaining with some form of incomes policy. In practice this 
has been a fairly common phenomenon, with virtually every member nation of the 
Group of Ten having succumbed at some time or another to what Ulman (1973) has 
Called its 'catnip effect'. It is therefore necessary to broaden the discus-
Si.on to consider a number of important aspects of such policies. These 
i.nclude the form and purpose of incomes policies as well as the institutional 
and political circumstances under which they are most likely to stand some 
Chance of long term success. In this connection, attention is also directed 
towards a brief review of their overall performance in each of the member 
nations of the Group of Ten during the post war period. Finally, consider-
ation is given to a more formal analysis of the reasons for the emergence of 
different forms of incomes policy, and for their impact on both strikes and 
the process of wage inflation utilizing the framework of the bargaining model 
deVeloped in Chapter 5. 
~ Incomes Policy: A Simple Definition 
For the purposes of the present analysis the tenn incomes policy may be 
conveniently defined as the operation of some system for effectively res-
training the growth of money incomes in order to keep th~n from rising faster 
than the rate of growth of real national income. This simple definition is 
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preferred to more precise and detailed alternatives for several reasons. 
First, it has advantages over one which specifically emphasises the interven-
tionist role of the state in the process of restraint, since while not 
excluding the latter, it also allows for the possibility of a private sector 
policy operating without direct government intervention - as has been the 
case, for example, in Sweden. Second, the definition is broad enough to en-
Compass the wide variety of measures and degrees of compulsion that have been 
applied under the heading of 'incomes policy' in different countries.' Thus, 
it is capable of including the imposition of 'freezes' of differing lengths, 
the specification of mandatory or voluntary 'guidelines', as well as various 
types of 'exhortation' and 'moral suasion'. Similarly, it is broad enough to 
allow for the use of the policy as an essentially short-run device, aimed at 
breaking inflation expectations (as in canada and the United States); as well 
as its use as a more or less permanent feature of the operation of a co-ordi-
nated system of wage and salary determination (as in Sweden, and in the 
Netherlands until 1963). Finally, by not specifying the precise policy target 
employed in justifying the restraint of incomes, the definition allows for 
SUch diverse, though inter-related, motives as: the pursuit of balance of 
payments equilibrium (as in the Netherlands, SWeden, and the United Kingdom); 
attempts to ease the trade-off between inflation and unemployment, (as in 
Germany, the United States and canada); as well as the effective 'programming' 
, 
Of the growth of relative factor shares, (as in Germany and Belgium). 
~ Incomes Policy and the Nature of the Institutional Environment 
Beyond the question of definitions, the first substantive issue that must 
be Considered from a comparative perspective is that of the circumstances 
Under which incomes policies are likely to represent an institutionally and 
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poli tically viable option. Expressed another way, it is important to esta-
blish the circumstances under which organized labour, as the main group whose 
co-operation is needed, might be prepared to accept some durable system of 
effective wage restraint. This issue has dttracted the attention of a number 
of authors. For example, Heady (1970) has suggested two fundamental pre-
requisites for the emergence of a durable cooperative incomes policy. First, 
that the working class must be sufficiently united politically to elect a 
SOCialist government that will administer a wages policy in such a way that 
Workers, or their leaders, are convinced that the policy is not simply a way 
of depressing their incomes relative to others in the economy. And second, 
that workers must be sufficiently united to form a strong centralized union 
lllovement capable of administering the policy in a way that will avoid imposing 
excessive strain on the loyalty and cohesion of its membership. 
This argwnent has been further elaborated by Barbash (1972) in connection 
With the analysis of the operation of what he has termed 'economic policy 
Unionism'. Specifically, Barbash argues that the ability of the trade unions 
to participate in national economic policy in general, and incomes policy in 
particular, will depend upon the extent to which they share a core of conunon 
Values with other elements in society, as well as on the availability of mech-
anisms through which these common values can be converted into mutually 
acceptable policies and progrrunmes. This he terms 'union integration', a con-
Cept which is taken to include the pr.esence of institutions such as central-
iZed union federations, centralized bargaining, industrial unionism, union-
party allic.nces and professionalized union administration. Finally, Barbash 
emphaSises that integration also requires that involvement must in the long 
rUn be compatible with the union's protective functions vis a vis its member-
Ship. "Self denial", he suggests, "cannot be a permanent feature of the 
, .-
.' .,\'.' 
~',., . 
6.4 
economic policy in which unions are involved" (Barbash 1972, page 2). Even if 
this condition is effectively fulfilled, however, integration is still seen as 
likely to be in potential conflict with such goals as rank and file control, 
trade unionism as a revolutionary vehicle, and the decentralization of power. 
Thus, where such goals are parw~ount, an economic policy form of unionism is 
unlikely to develop. 
The issue of trade union involvement in the operation of incomes policy 
has also received extensive attention in the context of the recent literature 
on 'liberal corporatism'. As Lehmbruch (1977) has argued, a co-operative 
variety of incomes policy is conunon to virtually every system which carries 
this label. Moreover, the etnergence of a durable machinery for the corpor-
atist involvement of unions similarly presupposes certain basic structural 
Characteristics of traue union organization, including a high degree of 
centralization and concentration (as in Sweden), although co-operative incomes 
POlicies are still seen as possible (though more diffLcult to llnplement) where 
Unions are centralized bl.lt not concentrated in a powerful central confeder-
ation (as in Germany!). However, where both centralization and concentration 
dre lacking, and there is a large degree of rank and file autonomy, especially 
Whe'1. cOi-,lbi'1.ed with enterprise or plant level bargaining arrangements (as in 
Britain, the United States, Canada, Japan, and increasingly also Italy), the 
ability of union leaders to co-operate in corporatist incomes policies is 
seVerely constrained. This is also the case where value concensus is 
laCking. 'rhl.lS I '1111'3re th:-3re is a strong class conflict orientation wi thin the 
labour movement (as in France and, to a lesser extent, also Italy and Japan), 
Union cooperation in incomes policy is seen as becoming highly unlikely. 
......."".,. 
., ,., ... • 0"'-" 
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Closely related to the existence of value consensus is the question of 
the nature of the relationship between organized labour and government. In 
this connection, corporatist incomes policy are seen as most common in those 
COuntries where working class movements have obtained active participation in 
the machinery of government, and where by implication trade unions have gained 
privileged access to both governmental and administrative centres of power. 
Acceptance of incomes policy has also been associated in the corporatist 
literature with what may be termed 'exchange relationships', or the operation 
Of some syst~~ of government ~id pro quo for union acquiescence in the res-
traint of incomes. Thus, Crouch (1978), has argued that sufficient ideolo-
gical consensus is unlikely to persist indefinitely unless it is supported by 
the granting of material concessions, a course clearly made easier during 
Periods of sustained economic l growth. Even in the absence of increasing 
tna.terial prosperity, however, some degree of (albeit short-run) consensus may 
still be possible in a 'legislative exchange', which serves to enhance the 
legal rights of both unions and workers. Thus, in Britain, the Eluployment 
Protectioll Act of 1975 is argued to have been a partial quid pro quo for 
VOluntary restraint under the social contra·::t. Si.11ti.la.r.ly, in Italy, the 
~tuto dei Lavoratori, which gave unions a recogni:l:ed presence at shop floor 
l~vel, was introduced at a time when goverrultent was actively seeking to 
recruit the unions into tripartite discussions on the state of the economy 
'. 
(Crouch 1978, page 210). 
'1'0 summarize, the above contributions point to three necessary conditions 
for the emergence of an effective long term incomes policy. First, the exist-
ence of a strong centralized and/or concentrated labour mov~nent. Second, the 
eXistence of a centralized and/or well coordinated collective bargaining 
structure. And third, the existence of a politically united working class, 
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which has either elected a socialist government, or has gained regularized 
admission to the decision making apparatus of the state by some other means,3 
(a development which may also be seen as manifesting a high degree of value 
consensus). Where these three conditions are fulfilled, a fourth may be added 
as a sustaining characteristic of incomes policy: namely, the existence of an 
'exchange relationship' under which some form of material concession is 
granted in return for union restraint. 
These factors are given systematic expression in relation to the member 
nations of the Group of Ten in Table 6.1. As the table indicates, some form 
Of durable and cooperative incomes policy has emerged in only four of the ten 
COuntries: namely, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium; while in a 
fifth, namely Britain, though incomes policies of various types have been a 
COmmon feature of the industrial relations landscape for nearly fifteen years, 
Only the most recent social contract of 1975-77 could be realistically 
described as 'cooperative'. In the remaining countries, where policies have 
been used at all, they have generally been unilaterally imposed on unwilling 
labour movements. 
Before considering these contrasting developments on a more analytical· 
level, particularly in relation to their implications for the collective 
bargaining process, it will be useful to review briefly the historical 
eXperience of the ten nations with incomes policy. 
~. Incomes Policy: The Post-War Experience of the Group of Ten 
Sweden ~
To begin with the case of Sweden, it is clear that the existence of a 
highly organised working class (both industrially and politically), dominance 
by SoCial Democratic Governments, and a highly coordinated system of 
:.1 ...... 
Tabl~ b.1. ""The In!'k 'bv.-tt~D,a1..-£~lZfL9.u ~s \-bzs ~ .o.C~oc:..f ... -r~\ ve. ~c..o~ "0 \..ic...'j : Th~ S')ro .... f c.f- T A-V'\ , 
Cbtmtry Trade thion Structure and CbUective Ifirgaining Iaboor' s IOlitical Rwer " 
():'ganization 
Union thion O:mfederal prlmary Cbnoolidation party Iabalr's IncaresIOlicy 
menber- organiza- control over level of bargaining splits relationship 
ship tional bargaining stru::ture to policy 
tmity (concentration) , (centralization) ~ 
SNeden very tmified high ecornty~de highly central- tmified control Private sector t 
high ized egalitarian 
Wv.~ ~:!...u...y 
Nefu:!rlands ,nediun religirus high tmtil ecornty~de to highly central- !minor control until Mnini.steral 
rut joint 1963 1963; Indlstry/ ized until 1963 1959; inter- wage policy 
action crnpany-wide rupted there- until 1963 
thereafter after 
Genrany mediun tmified 1011 i.ndlstry-wide centralized tmified exclusion Cbncerted 
until 1966 k:tion (1967) 
Balgiun very FOlitical nedi.un i.ndlstry-wide centralized .ninor interrupted S:>cial Prograll-
high and religioos; participation roing 1960-19tfl 
joint front . 
I' since 1960 
. 
\0 
U.K. high tmified 1011 crnpany/plant decentralized unified interrupted social contract 
level in private control 1975-78; pre-
sector 1975 :inp:>se<l 
inc:ares policies I 
canada 1011/ tmified 1011 plant level decentralized unified pressure graJp :lltpOsed irux:t:es 
mediun access Federally policy 1975-1977 
U.S.A. 1011 tmified 1011 plant level decentralized - pressure group inposed inCX1l'leS 
access policies , 
France 1011 politica1/ 1011 indlstry lfurl.ted con- major exclusion since :irrposed public 
religioos level solidation 1958 sector <pidelines 
Italy mediun politica1/ 1011 ind.lstry lfurl. ted con- major intennittent extx:>rtation 
religi..ous level solidation coalition 
particip:1tion 
JJap:m J2CM p:Jlitical 2CM )=-1 decentralized jIrL3jor exclusion since exb:Jrtation Plant enb. 
unia 
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Notes and Sources: 
(a) low = < 30%; medium = > 30% < 40%; high > 40% < 60%; very high > 60% 
(b) derived from Korpi and Shalev (1979) p.178 
(e) derived froin Heady (1970); and Windmuller, "The Authority of National 
Trade Union Confedera.tions: A Comparative Analysis" 
(d) derived from review of compard.tive literature 
(e) derived from Korpi and Shalev (1979) p.178 
(f) derived from Heady (1970); Shorter and 'rilly (1974); and Korpi and Shalev 
( 1979) 
(g) derived froin Ulman and Flanagan (1971); Braun (1975). 
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economy-wide bargaining, have all been potentially compatible with the emer-
gence of an effective co-operative incomes policy. Nevertheless, the 
'solidarity' wage systelR that actually emerged has been described as something 
of a 'borderline case'. The principle reason for this is undoubtedly its 
unique 'private' character: a designation that derives from its bipartite 
administration by the Central Trade Union Federation (LO) I and the Central 
Employers' Association (SAF), without active government involvement. This has 
not been the only distinct feature of the policy, however. In addition, one 
Of the primary aims since its inception in the early 1950' s has been the 
creation of a more just and egalitarian wage structure, rather than merely the 
promotion of wage restraint. As a result, one important consequence of its 
Operation has been the progressive erosion of economy-wide differentials, a 
lUatter which has been of acute concern to the white collar unions (the Central 
Organization of Salaried Employees, TCO; and the Swedish Confederation of 
Professional Association, SACO). As these organizations have increased in 
Size and importance within the economy, considerable strains have been placed 
on both the solidarity wage policy and the prevailing system of coordinated 
private sector bargaining. 
~herlands 
In the case of the Netherlands, as Table 6.1 illustrates, the early post 
war years were characterised by an industrial relations envirorunent which in 
Objective terms was highly supportive of a cooperative incomes policy. A 
highly centralised bargaining structure; coordinated action among the separate 
Union confederations (Netherlands Catholic Trade Union Federation, NKV; 
Protestant National Trade, Union Federation, CNVi and the Socialist 
~etherlands Federation of Trade Unions, NVV); significant leftist partici-
Pation in ruling government coalitions; and the powerful motivating force of 
,\'" 
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post-war reconstruction all contributed to the successful operation of a 
highly centralised 'guided wage policy'. Towards the end of the 1950's, how-
ever, the policy's strong emphasis on wage restraint in the face of increasing 
national prosperity and progressively tightening labour markets began to take 
its toll. Growing strains wit!1in the labour movement over the trade union 
centers' rigid enforcement of the policy were further compounded by their 
relative isolation from the rank and file, and the absence of any firm union 
organizational structure at plant level capable of effectively defusing the 
Situation. Moreover, at the national level, the cooperative basis of the wage 
policy was further undermined by the departure, in 1958, of the Labour Party 
from the ruling coalition, signalling a change in the political climate 
tOwards greater conservatism. The net result was thdt by 1963 the wage policy 
had effectively disintegrated. The challenge to the system did not rest 
there, however. In the years since 1963, the Netherlands has witnessed a sig-
nificant degree of decentralisation in its collective bargaining structure, 
With a steady shift in the centre of gravity towards the industry and enter-
prise level. These developments, together with increasing union power on the 
Shop floor, have conspired to undermine the prospects for the re-establishment 
Of a coop~rative policy, with the result that recent interventions on the wage 
front have been reduced to the form of unilaterally imposed freezes in the 
face of union opposition. 
~rman:l 
In Germany, the emergence of a cooperative incomes policy in the form of 
'Concerted Action' also provides ample testimony to the need for an appro-
priate industrial relations environment. In the area of union structure, for 
eXample, while the influence of the central union federation (DGB) over the 
individual industrial unions is weak, the centralisation of power within the 
industrial unions themselves has nevertheless facilitated the emergence of a 
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cooperative approach to wage determination. Indeed, elements of an unoffic~l 
cooperative wage policy, geared to productivity, have been apparent from the 
mid-1950's (Bergman and Muller - Jentsch 197 S) • These developrnen ts, based 
Upon the unions' willingness to adapt their demands to the 'requirements of 
economic stability', were evidently supported initially by the need (as in the 
Netherlands) for rapid post-war reconstruction. However, they were also 
strongly facilitated by a bargaining structure in which union actions could be 
Seen as having direct and predictable macroeconomic consequences, allowing 
unions to "calculate strategically that the cummulative effects of their bar-
gaining could actually contradict their members' interests", (Streek 1979, 
page 208). This, of course, is much less likely where wage decisions are 
uncoordinated and typically made at a much more decentralized level. 
In the context of labour's political representation, a further important 
feature of the German experience is the fact that the 'unofficial' cooperative-
wage p~licy ultimately achieved its formal status as "Concerted Action" only 
after the Social Democratic Party (SPD) entered the Grand Coalition in 1967 -
a development which firmly underlines the bnportance of working class partici-
pation in government as a p::-econdition for overt union cooperation in wage 
restraint. Even with this participation, howeve-r, strains began to appear 
Within the policy after only two years, as rank and file opposition crysta-
lised in a series of wildcat strikes over the policy's evident failure to 
guarantee 'social symmetry' between wages and profits. Moreover, these 
Strikes also effectively served notice of a profound grass roots dissatis-
faction, both with leaderships' agreement to a cooperative policy of 
restraint, and with the existing systeln of internal union representation and 
deCiSion making. Subsequent responses to these developments have included a 
greater disposition to decentralise wage negotiations, as well as attempts to 
.". .~'.\". 
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consolidate and channel unofficial action into an official union bargaining 
strategy which pays more attention than hitherto to shop floor grievances. 
The net result has been a 'cooperative' incomes policy which has effectively 
functioned, at least in recent years, as more of an instrument of 'crisis 
management' (Lehmbruch, 1977, page 107), with its success in wage restraint 
Showing some degree of cyclical fluctuation. 
In the case of .Belgium, conditions would appear to have been· broadly 
appropriate to the emergence of~ooperative incomes policy since at least the 
early 1960's. At that time, the two major union federations (the 
Confederation of Christian Unions, CSC; and the General Federation of Belgian 
Labour, FGTB) formed an effective common front in their negotiations with 
employers. This development was in turn paralleled in the political arena by 
the more or less concurrent formation of the 'Grand Coalition' between the 
Christian Social Party (PSC) and the Socialist Party (PSB), which governed 
Belgiun for most of the period from 1961 to 1973. Of possibly even greater 
Significance has been the fact that since the end of the Second ~'lorld War 
organised labour has achieved a high and increasing level of involvement in a 
wide variety of national socio-economic institutions whose operation has 
effectively come to displace several of the conventional functions of 
Political parties. Thus, the private sector 'social partners' have frequently 
negotiated bilateral agreements involving "cheques drawn on the government for 
its signature, calling for legislation, or regulation or budgetary action", 
and producing "a form of institutionalization ••• (that) ••• has blurred the 
classic distinction between collective bargaining and government action" 
(Lorwin 1975, page 25). This phenomenon has been particularly true of the 
national bipartite agreements negotiated under • 'Social Programming. These 
6.13 
agreements, though not officially constituting a cooperative incomes policy in 
a formal sense, (indeed, Belgian labour has been consistently hostile to the 
idea), have nevertheless produced results not too far removed from one. As 
Pepper (1975) has argued, "pragmatically agreements have been tied into a 
rounded system of direct controls, subsidies, regulations and taxes to effect 
a largely regulated income system", (Pepper, pp.182-3). Indeed, further 
eVidence in favour of this contention may be derived from the significant 
escalation in unofficial strikes that ocurred in 1970. Many explanations have 
been advanced to account for these strikes, but one factor common to them all 
is the existence of a growing gap between union leadership and their rank and 
file over the former's rigid adherence to Social Progr~ning and its no-strike 
clauses, under which workers found themselves effectively tied into 
, 
agreements of poverty', (Molitor, 1978). 
~e United Kingdom 
In the context of the United Kingdom, it is clear that several of the 
institutional prerequisites for the elnergence of a durable cooperative incomes 
policy are lacking. The absence of either strong concentration or central i-
sation within the labour movement, a large measure of rank and file autonomy, 
and a predominantly plant level bargaining structure in the private sector 
have all conspired to limit severely its prospects for success. Nevertheless, 
incomes policies in some form have been a fact of life in British industrial 
i 
relations for over fifteen years. Given this, it is perhaps not surprising 
that their most dl.lrable and cooperative expression has come under Labour 
Governments. Thus, under Labour's incomes policy of 1964-70 the TUC esta-
blished its own machinery for vetting the wage claims of its members, at least 
Until the policy eventually broke down in the face of shop floor resistance 
i ." 
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in 1969. The next attelnpt at a cooperative incomes policy emerged from the 
defeat of the Conservative Government of 1970-74, following the miners' chal-
lenge to the statutory policy introduced in 1972. This emerging 'social 
Contract,' undoubtedly fostered by the prevailing atmosphere of economic 
crisis, rested more heavily on the special links between the TUC and the 
Labour Party than any previous policy, and was in many respects the most suc-
cessful - at least in terms of its achievement of wage restraint. However, 
once again the policy came to grief at the hands of mounting shop floor 
pressure, with the final demise coming in the 'winter of discontent' of 1978. 
~he remaining cases 
With regard to the five remaining countries, where incomes policies have 
been introduced at all, they have typically been imposed unilaterally by 
governments. In Canada, following the breakdown of tripartite negotiations 
oVer their voluntary introduction, statutory wage and price controls were 
imposed unilaterally between 1975 and 1977 as an anti-inflation measure. 
Similarly in the United States, wage-price guideposts were instituted by the 
Council of Economic Advisors in 1962, in an attempt to reconcile the fuller 
utilisation of manpower with price stability. These lasted until 1966, when 
they were abolished following the settlement of the airline machinist's 
strike. They then lay dormant until 1971 when they were re-instituted, initi-
ally in the form of a wage freeze, and thereafter in less stringent fonn until 
their remo'lal in 1973. 
In the cases of France, Italy and Japan, comprehensive incomes policy 
intervention has generally not been actively employed as a tool of macro 
economic policy. Thus, while income moderation via concertation was attempted 
in France in 1964, with the institutional preconditions lacking, recourse was 
, ' ... ~. . . 
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" instead made to the manipulation of the Toutee procedure which was used to 
restrain wages in the public sector between 1964 and 1967 (Reynaud 1975). In 
Italy and Japan, incomes policy intervention has been predominantly in the 
form of exhortation. However, this is not to suggest that it has been without 
effect. Indeed, in the case of Italy there are significant signs of wage 
moderation between 1965 and 1968 in response to government requests. 
~v Post-War Incomes Policies and the Institutional Environment: A Summary. 
Summarizing the findings of this brief historical review, it is possible 
to identify three broadly distinct forms of incomes policy intervention. 
First, what may be termed durable cooperative incomes policies; defined as 
those in which income restraint has been achieved on a fairly long term basis 
With the active cooperation of trade union leaders. Second, incomes policies 
that have been instituted primarily as a short-term measure, based upon formal 
unilateral intervention by government. And third, policies in which emphasis 
has been placed primarily on exhortation, rather than more formal interference 
With the collective bargaining process. In addition, reference to Table 6.1 
Suggests that each of these forms of incomes policy interventions has in turn 
been associated with a broadly similar configuration of institutional fac-
tors. The first, corresponding with the emergence of some form of durable 
cooperative incomes policy, consists of systems where unions are organization-
ally secure, collective bargaining is an accepted and well established method 
Of job regulation, the bargaining structure is centralized or well coordin-
ated, and the relationship between organized labour and government is a close 
one. Three countries froIn our ten country sample - namely, SWeden, Germany 
and Belgium - may be unambiguously characterized in this way; while a fourth -
• .... , .. "",f, 
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namely the Netherlands, may be given a marginal attachment as a transitional 
case, given the breakdown of its highly centralized system of wage determina-
tion in the early 1960's, and a subsequent shift towards decentralization in 
its bargaining structure. 
A second configuration, corresponding with a primary reliance on exhorta-
tion, lies at the opposite end of the institutional spectrum. Here union 
organization is rather less secure, collective bargaining - though still an 
important !neans of job regulation - is. relatively immature and hence fairly 
fragmented, and organized labour is largely excluded from the machinery of 
gOVernment. France and Italy are obvious candidates for inclusion under this 
Configuration, since both have been characterized as possessing poorly insti-
tutionalized bargaining structures, and both have unions that are organiza-
tionally weak (Synder 1975, Korpi and Shalev 1979). They are also countries 
in which strikes are viewed primary as vehicles of political protest, rather 
than as economically motivated sanctions against employers (Shorter and Tilly 
1974, Snyder 1975). The other member of this group, namely Japan, has also 
been characterized in this way, despite its now well established system of 
enterprise unionism (Korpi and Shalev 1979). 
A third institutional configuration, corresponding to predominantly 
short-run unilateral incomes policy intervention, takes up an intermediate 
POsition. In this case, while the labour movement is relatively secure, and 
Collective bargaining well established, the bargaining structure is predomin-
antly decentralized, and organized labour's influence over government is 
Confined largely to that of a pressure group. The United States, Canada and 
the United Kingdom all broadly approximate this pattern. Ivloreover, it is 
Worth noting that in each of these countries conventional economic strike 
mOdels have achieved a significant degree of empirical success. 
" . 
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These propositions are summarized in Table 6.2, which in turn provides 
a useful point of departure for the examination of the two closely inter-
related issues addressed in the remainder of the chapter. These are: first, 
the provision of a more formal explanation for the emergence of the different 
forms of incomes policy intervention that have been observed under different 
institutional arrangements; and second, an examination of the likely effects 
of these different forms of intervention on the cyclical pattern of strikes 
and wage inflation. 
Table 6.2 Institutional Configurations and Incomes Policy: The Group of Ten. 
'----------------------------------------------------------------~ Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
lnSti Cb tutional (i) organizationally 
~ract . . . er~st~cs: secure un~ons 
(i) organizationally (i) divided, less 
secure unions secure unions 
( ii) well established (ii) well established (ii) immature and 
centralized but decentralized fragmented 
bargaining bargaining bargaining 
(iii) politically (iii) union movement (iii) politically 
integrated labour afforded pressure excluded labour 
movements group access movements 
?'--------------------------------------------------------------------11 nCOtnes 
Ol.icy: 
durable short-run primarily 
cooperative unilateral exhortation 
policy intervention 
Sweden United States France 
Germany Canada Italy 
Belgiurn United Kingdom Japan 
Netherlands Netherlands 
(until 1962) (1963 onwards) 
'-----------------------------------------------------------
, ,~. 
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y. Incomes Policy, the Institutional Environment and Strikes: A Formal 
~nalysis. 
As an aid to understanding the reasons behind the emergence of the 
different forms of incomes policy intervention depicted in Table 6.2, as well 
as for their differential impact on the cyclical pattern of strikes and wage 
inflation, it will be useful to give more explicit consideration to the col-
lective bargaining goals that are likely to be pursued by the various parties 
to negotiation under different institutional arrangements. Each of the indus-
trial relations configurations depicted in Table 6.2 will be considered in 
turn. In the interests of continuity it will be convenient to start with a 
bargaining relationship of the type depicted in Chapter 5. That is, one based 
. upon decentralized bargaining and broadly corresponding to an institutional 
Configuration classified as Group 2 in Table 6.2. 
£roup 2 Countries 
Starting with employers, the bargaining goals held under Group 2 institu-
tional arrangements (i.e. the U.S., canada, the U.K. and the Netherlands after 
1963), are assumed to be expressed by a utility function of the following 
form: 
, , , 
f = f(r, q, p, s) f 1<0; f 2 >0; f 3 >0; f4 <0 
Where: f is the utility of the employer; r is the rate of growth of real 
wages over the contract period; q is an index of the firm's productive perfor-
mance; p is the extent of management's in-plant prerogatives 1 and s is the 
occurrence of a strike. 
Profit maximizing behaviour may be viewed as leading the firm to seek to 
minimize the growth in real wages, r, and maximize its in-plant prerogatives, 
p, subject to its need to maintain and motivate its labour force, and thereby 
. " 
", ' .. 
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satisfy its desire for on-going improvements in its productive performance q. 
Needless to say, one factor that could detract from the achievement of this 
goal is the occurrence of a strike, although under certain circumstances this 
may be seen as a necessary price for moderation in r. 
Next, consider the bargaining goals of the union. Here, as in Chapter 5, 
and following Ross (1948) and Ashenfelter and Johnson ('969), a distinction is 
made between union leaders and the rank and file. Thus, the former are seen 
as pursuing the survival and growth of the union as well as their own personal 
Political survival. However, since the achievement of these objectives 
depends largely upon leaderships' ability to satisfy rank and file bargaining 
goals, we have: 
where: h is the utility of the union leadership; m is the utility of the 
rank and file; and, as previously, s is the occurrence of a strike. 
The bargaining goals of the,rank ~nd fite are,assumed as follows: 
in = m(r, e, p, s) m,>O; m2 >O; m3 <O; m4 <O 
where: r is the rate of growth of real wages; e is the membership's. 
perception of equity, based upon their relative position in the overall wage 
hierarchy, and their income share vis ~ vis profits; p is the extent of man-
agement's in-plant prerogatives, and s is the occurrence of a strike. 
Rank and file utility is assumed to be maximized via the maximization of 
real wage growth, r, and their relative wage position, e; and minimization of 
the employer's in-plant prerogatives,. p. For both leadership and rank and 
file, the occurrence of a strike is viewed as a disbenefit, and hence consid-
ered only if it is likely to produce more than compensating increases in r or 
e, or reductions in p. 
•. ~.. . ..•. ~' ~1.""':1;'"' ,. 
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Against the background of these utility functions, collective bargaining 
may be viewed as an institutional process for resolving the conflicting goals 
of management and unions in order to reach a mutually acceptable balance of 
prerogatives, and a mutually acceptable level of wage growth over the contract 
period. In short, a bargaining outcome that is broadly consistent with both 
profitability and the maintenance of worker motivation. 
Thus far tile analysis is fully consistent with that presented in Chapter 
5, where the primary concern was the .specification of the likely economic 
determinants of the wage goals of unions and management, and the resolution of 
the gap between them. However, it is also important to consider how collec-
tive bargaining under Group 2 institutional arrangements might be affected by 
the intervention of government as a fourth party to negotiation. This intro-
duces an additional set of bargaining goals as follows: 
, , , , 
g = g(r, h, m, f, s) g,<O; g2>0; g3>0; g4>0; g5<0 
where, as previously, r is the rate of growth of real wages; h, m and f 
are the goals of the union leadership, the rank and file, and firms respect-
ively; and s is the occurrence of a strike. 
This function may be explained as follows: first, the government is 
assumed to be concerned over the achievement of a variety of potentially con-
flicting economic policy targets, including the so-called 'magic triangle' of 
full,employment, price stability and external balance. Since direct interven-
tion in the wage determination process in the form of incomes policy repre-
sents one possible solution to this conflict, it is assumed that an inverse 
relationship will exist between government utility and the rate of growth of 
real wages, r. In addition, the government is viewed as pursuing a variety of 
political objectives, foremost amongst which are its prospects for re-elec-
tion. The latter are, in turn, assumed to depend upon its ability to satisfy 
' ..... 
6.21 
satisfy the goals of its various constituents. Hence, government utility may 
be seen as depending positively on the respective utilities of union rank and 
file, union It leadership and employers • Finally, like the other parties to 
negotiation, the government is assumed to attach disutility to the occurrence 
of strike action. 
Examination of this utility function clearly reveals the nature of the 
dilemma facing government: achievement of its goal of real wage moderation, 
though potentially consistent with the bargaining goals of firms, will· detract 
from the utility of both union rank and file and union leadership. While one 
solution might be the pursuit of a voluntary policy, two aspects of the insti-
tutional environment are likely to work against this. The first is the lack 
Of any strong political bond between government and organized labour. The 
Second is the decentralized nature of the bargaining structure. Under such a 
structure any individual union leadership which moderates its wage demands has 
no grounds for anticipating that others will follow its lead. Indeed, given 
the public goods nature of the supposed benefits of wage restraint, there is a 
POWerful incentive for individual bargainers to 'cheat'. Any individual union 
leadership adhering to the policy therefore risks undermining its members' 
POsition in the wage hierarchy, with adverse consequences for the value of the 
equity index, e. It follows that where incomes policies are seen as neces-
sary, they are likely to be imposed unilaterally as short-run measures, 
USually during the early part of a government's term in office. 
To explore the effects of these policies on the cyclical pattern of 
strike activity, it is useful to return to the framework of the bargaining 
tnodel developed in Chapter 5. The relevant details are presented in Figure 
6.1. 
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Figure 6.1 illustrates a situation in which under free collective 
bargaining the union's minimum pre-strike demand y* is in excess of the 
employers' maximum pre-strike offer z*, implying that a compromise will only 
be reached after recourse has been made to strike action. SUppose, however, 
that an incomes policy with a wage ceiling of Y'max is unilaterally imposed. 
If this policy is accepted by both union leader.ship and rank and file, then 
the scope for disagreement over the acceptable wage increase is significantly 
reduced, partly because a major element of uncertainty is removed from the 
bargaining arena, but also because rank and file acceptance of the policy 
removes one important element of the political costs to the leadership associ-
ated with agreeing to a wage offer significantly below their initial demands. 
The result is a leftward shift in the cost of agreement schedule to a position 
sUch as ~1(W) where the probability of a strike over a wage related issue is 
Considerably reduced. 
Next consider the case where the policy receives official union acquies-
Cance but fails to secure rank and file support. Under. these circwnstances, 
growing rank and file resenbnent is likely to increase significantly the poli-
tical costs to the union leadership of acceding to the policy, particularly if 
it has been in place for some time, causing a steady rightward shift in the 
Costs of agreeing schedule to a position such as 112(W). Nevertheless, the 
probability of a strike may still be lower than under free collective bar-
gaining. This is pOS13ible because the imposition of a statutory maximum will 
also tend to increase the subjective strike costs associated with obtaining 
wage increases above this level, first because the strike will be more likely 
to have political overtones and [(IdY thus turn into a lengthy confrontation 
strike, and second because the political costs to the union as a whole in 
terms of the loss of public goodwill will also tend to be higher. In 
.:"":' .... "'"' . 
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practice, the combined effect of these factors might well make the costs 
associated with striking to obtain a settlement in excess of the specified 
limit appear prohibitive. In effect, this implies a cost of striking schedule 
that becomes infinitely elastic at the wage ceiling Ymax • EVen if perceived 
strike costs do not rise this far, however, the result will still be a right-
ward shift in the costs of striking schedule above Ymax , to a position such 
as ¢ll(S) where its intersection with lJ2(W) implies the possibility of a no-
strike settlement, albeit in excess of the specified wage ceiling. 
would, of course, imply the emergence of unofficial wage drift. 
This 
There is an additional possibility; namely, that leadership reluctance to 
Vigorously pursue wage increases because of the associated macro political 
costs will lead to the emergence of strains within the union itself, possibly 
even culminating in a rank and file revolt, and ultimate recourse to unoffi-
cial action. However, if this is considered a possibility by the leadership 
they may very well judge the internal political costs of acceding to the poli-
Cy to be greater than those of official opposition, so that the probability of 
official strike action may actually increaseS. In any event, it is clear that 
once the policy is disffiantled, or disintegrates, the increased political costs 
to the leadership of observance will no longer be counter-balanced by the 
increased political costs to the union as a whole of striking, and cumulative 
dissatisfactions are then likely to be voiced through a significant increase 
in strike activity, if only as a mean~ of restoring union solidarity6. 
This reasoning lends only qualified support to the common assumption of 
previous studies 7, that incomes poliCies (even when unilaterally imposed) will 
tend to be associated with a significant decline in strike activity during 
their operational phases. In short, this conclusion is not independent of the 
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degree of acceptance accorded to such policies by the union rank and file. 
In addition, it is also unlikely to be independent of the form that the 
restraint on wages takes - whether as a clearly specified statutory lbnit, or 
merely as a set of guidelines. For example, it could be argued that for any 
given level of acceptance by union rank and file, striking to gain increases 
in excess of a statutory maximum would be associated with higher subjective 
strike costs than those associated with breaching a set of guidelines, and 
hence with fewer strikes. Indeed, this.result might be further reinforced by 
the fact that more stringent policies will probably also be associated with 
greater reductions in the degree of uncertainty surrounding collective 
bargaining. In practice, however, the degree of acceptance a policy can 
cO~nand may not be independent of the type of restraint it employs. A clearly 
defined statutory maximum may, for example, be less acceptable to the rank and 
file than a set of guidelines. consequently, while in general it might be 
expected that an incomes policy will be associated with a reduction in strike 
activity, no a priori judgment is made as to the relative size of this effect 
with respect to its different forms. 
Formally, these arguments may be summarized as follows: 
u u 
• •• F tn * Atn ; F tm J 
f1; f 2<0 and f3>0 
Where s~ is the frequency of strikes occuring under a unilaterally 
... 
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imposed incomes policy; Ft 1 ••• Ftn represent the various forms of restraint 
u u 
employed during operational phases of the policy; At1 ••• Atn represent the 
degree of rank and file acceptance of the various operational phases of the 
l ' u po ~CYi and F 
tm 
represents the breakdown or re-entry phase following the 
demise of an incomes policy. 
£roup 1 Countries 
As outlined above, the institutional environment prevailing in Group 1 
countries (i.e. Sweden, Germany, Belgi~u and the Netherlands until 1962), has 
been associated with the emergence of some form of durable co-operative 
incomes policy. Dl terms of the impact on strikes, the first point that must 
be made is that the institutional and political prerequisites to the emergence 
of this form of policy--including organizationally secure unions, well 
established and centralized bargaining, and politically integrated union move-
ments--also bear a remarkable resemblance to those originally advanced by Ross 
and Hartman in connection with the withering away of the strike This, of 
course, implies that those factors that are conducive to the emergence of a 
durable and cooperative incomes policy are also likely to be consistent with a 
Significant secular decline in strike activity. However, this says nothing 
about the effects of cooperative incomes policies on cyclical fluctuations in 
strikes. To explore this issue, reference must be made to the emergence and 
operation of what has recently be referred to as 'political exchange relation-
ships' (Pizzorno 1978). These relationships involve a situation under which 
Union leaders are prepared to forego the full exploitation of their short-term 
.. ' 
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labour mark.et power on a regular basis in exchange for longer run concessions 
from the state in what amounts to a 'political market'. 8 
To understand the reasons for the emergence of this mark.et, reference 
must be made to the expanded bargaining possibilities open to the various 
negotiating parties under Group 1 institutional arrangements. First, the 
Political integration of union leadership with government may be assumed to 
have the effect of expanding the former's bargaining goals to include the lat-
ter's utility as an additional positive argument. That is: 
, , 
h = h(m, s, g) h 1>0; h 2 <0; h3>0 
Second, political integration may also be assumed to bring about the 
eXpansion of the utility function of the rank and file to include statebene-
fits acquired through the collective \ poli tical' bargaining of their leaders. 
That is: 
I I I I , 
m = m(r, e, p, s, b) m
1
>O; m2 >O; m3 <O; m4 <o; mS>O 
Where r, e, p and s are as defined previously, and b represents exchange 
benefits acquired fran the state as a result of the political bargaining acti-
Vity of union leaders 9• 
Third, the existence of a centralized and/or ~well coordinated bargaining 
structure makes the equity variable, e, potentially bargainable. That is, a 
mutually acceptable value of e may be collectively detennined by union 
leaders, rather than emer1ing as an external effect of the individual maximiz-
ation of real wage increases by a large number of small units, as is the case 
Under a decentralized bargaining structure. 
In combination with the utility function of the state, the expanded util-
i ty functions of leadership and rank and file create a bargaining system in 
WhiCh real wage moderation can potentially be achieved to the mutual benefit 
Of all parties. Specifically, this involves a collective commitment by 
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individual union leaders to forego maximizing behaviour in the labour market 
in pursuit of real wage gains (r), in exchange for compensating increases in 
state benefits (b).10 Such a transaction leaves rank and file utility 
Unchanged (assuming e is preserved), but increases the utility of government 
(by reducing r), and the union leadership (by increasing g while leaving m 
Unchanged), as well as employers (by reducing r). Three important labour 
market consequences follow from this: first, a reduction in the overall level 
Of wage settlements; 
Collective wage goals 
second, a reduction in the difference between the 
of unions and those of 11 management , and hence a 
reduction in strike activity (a development which increases the utility of all 
parties); and third, as a corollary of the above, the reduced responsiveness 
Of both wage changes and strikes to fluctuations in labour market conditions. 
The implications for cyclical strike and wage behaviour do not, however, 
end there, since one further issue that must be addressed is the stability of 
this political market relationship over time. In practice, there are several 
reasons for scepticism in this regard. First, political market exchange will 
be VUlnerable to changes in both the political complexion of government and/or 
any trend towards decentralization in the bargaining structure. 12 Second, it 
Will be potentially vulnerable to intertemporal shifts in rank and file per-
ceptions of the relative value of public versus private benefits (either in 
general or &nongst different factions within the union). Third, the exercise 
Of labour market restraint by union leadership will inevitably lead to the 
eVentual compression of differentials, and possibly also to an increase in the 
share of profits, both of which will have an adverse effect on rank and file 
perCeptions of ·equity.13 Finally, in a highly interdependent world econoluy, 
the ability of national goverrunents to guarantee fully their side of any 
. : .... , . 
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Political bargain is likely to be severely constrained by external events, 
particularly in connection with the delivery of economic benefits. Any or all 
of these developments could serve to reduce rank and file utility, and hence 
also their acceptance of the exchange relationship. Such a development would 
clearly place the union leadership in an awkward position since the macro 
Political costs of abandoning the restraint policy would be even greater than 
those under an imposed incomes policy--a consequence which follows from their 
mUch closer relationship with goverrunent. The presumption, therefore, is that 
the outbursts of protest against cooperative policies are likely to be of a 
predominantly unofficial nature. 
Formally, this implies a relationship which is qualitatively similar to 
that pertaining under imposed incomes policies: 
c F ~ F * A ~1 ••• tn Wi 
c 
Where St represents the frequency of strikes under a cooperative incomes 
POlicy; Ft1 ••• Ftn represent the various forms of restraint employed 
during its operational phases; 
AC c 
t1 ••• ~n represent the degree of rank and file acceptance of the various 
operational phases (which may be presumed to be greater than under an imposed 
POlicy, at least initially); and, finally, FC represents the breakdown or re-
tm 
entry phase of the policy. Under an imposed policy it is assumed that: 
f,1 f 2 <0 and f 3 >0; 
but Wl.·th f .. 1 1 ff" 1 . 3 comprl.sl.ng arge y uno l.Cl.a actl.on. 
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£roup 3 Countries 
In the case of Group 3 countries (France, Italy and Japan), it has been 
noted that both collective bargaining and strikes have been characterized as 
more of a political than an economic activity (Shorter and Tilly 1974; Snyder 
1975). However, this does not necessarily imply any significant modification 
in the utility functions or bargaining goals of rank and file workers in these 
COuntries. What it does imply is that union leaderships have sought to fulfil 
their members' economic goals by means of political action (i.e. a strike 
directed against goverrunent) rather than through more conventional collective 
bargaining backed by economic action (i.e. a strike directed against employ-
ers). The explanation for this is simple. First, union organization has 
historically been low, a fact which has made the staging of economically 
effective collective action problematical. Second, collective bargaining has 
been too poorly developed to provide an effective institutional means of 
PUrsuing labour's goals. 
From this viewpoint strike action is more likely to be responsive to 
organization and political variables than to econoluic ones, a fact which, as 
noted in Chapter 3, has led to the construction of models in which strike 
fluctuations are related to changes in labour's organizational capacity (as 
measured by union density), and to the political vulnerability of the state as 
Proxied by variables such as the number of cabinet changes per period, and the 
eXistence or otherwise of election years (Shorter and Tilly 1974). On a 
practical level, however, these models have achieved only limited empirical 
success in explaining post-war strike patterns in France and Italy (Snyder 
1975). One plausible explanation for this is that while the analyses of the 
institutional environment on which these models have been based is historic-
dlly accurate, they have failed to take account of more recent developments. 
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For example, since the mid 1950' s, conventional collective bargaining has 
become a much more widespread method of job regulation in each of the member 
nations of Group 3. This in turn implies the emergence of a more economically 
motivated strategy on the part of union leaderships in pursuit of their 
members' goals. Nevertheless these institutipnal developments have not been 
sufficient to make formal incomes policy intervention either politically or 
institutionally viable. The political alienation of labour remains too high, 
and bargaining remains too fragmented. Thus, in the context of incomes 
POlicy, reliance on exhortation rather than more formal intervention has left 
the evolving process of collective bargaining largely unencumbered, and the 
private parties more free to respond to market forces. No formal allowance is 
therefore made for an incomes policy effect in either France, Italy or Japan. 
~. Incomes Policy and the Process of Wage Determination 
The analysis of the effects of incomes policy on bargaining behaviour 
presented in the last section clearly has important implications for the wage 
determination process, and in particular for the likely role of trade unions 
in that process. In order to consider this in a systematic way it will be 
Useful to examine three conventional hypotheses relating to the effects of 
trade unions on the pace of wage inflation. 
The first is the conventional monetarist propositi<?n that trade unions 
have no significant effect on labour market pricing behaviour, so that wages 
are determined solely by the level of excess demand (X) and the expected rate 
of price inflation (pe). That is: 
W = ax + bpe ( 1 ) 
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The second hypothesis is the conventional cost-push view that unions are 
able to impart an inflationary bias to the wage determination process via the 
exercise of some form of market power, so that the expectations Phillips curve 
is displaced upwards at all levels of excess demand by a shift parameter M. 
That is: 
W = aX + bpe + M with M > 0 (2 ) 
Where M is some. index of trade union militancy reflecting the trade union's 
propensity to translate potential into realized power. 
The third hypothesis, which derives from the work of Friedman (1951) is 
that trade unions will impart a deflationary bias to the wage determination 
process by producing a downward displacement of the expectations Phillips 
Curve at all levels of labour market excess demand. This occurs, according to 
Friedman, because of the bureaucratic nature of unions and their need to 
operate through the periodic and time consuming process of collective bar-
gaining, both of which tend to reduce wage changes below the level that would 
pertain in an unconstrained market. That is: 
W = cX + bpe with c < a (3 ) 
While each of these hypotheses is theoretically possible, the third 
(i.e. that unions depress the pace of wage change at all levels of positive 
eXCess demand) is often seen as intuitively implausible. (Trevithic and 
MUlvey 1975). In fact, however, this is precisely the implication that fol-
lows from our analysis of the effects of a cooperative incomes policy. 
Narnely, that under certain types of industrial relations structure union 
leaders may be willing to forego the full exploitation of their short term 
labour market power by accepting an incomes policy which sets wages at a level 
below those that would have pertained under free collective bargaining. 
The situation is illustrated graphically in Figure 6.2. 
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The right hand quadrant in Figure 6.2 depicts the bargaining situation 
facing the union (or union federation ) with ¢ (S) representing the cost of 
striking schedule, and ~ (W) the cost of agreement schedule. The left hand 
quadrant depicts a conventional Phillips curve with wage changes on the verti-
cal axis and unemployment on the horizontal axis. 
Under free collective bargaining the union's minimum pre-strike demand is 
. 
given by W1, which is -related to the level of unemployment U via Phillips 
Curve I. Suppose, however, that the prevailing industrial relations structure 
is broadly compatible with the emergence of a cooperative incomes policy that 
is endorsed by both leadership and rank and file, and that a wage ceiling of ' 
. 
Wmax is agreed to under its auspices in an attempt to reduce the rate of 
inflation while still maintaining an acceptable level of unemployment. The 
result is a leftward shift in the union's cost of agreement schedule to ~'(W), 
implYing a willingness to forego the maximum pursuit of its bargaining 
. 
adVantage, and restraint in both its wage demands to Wmax ' and in its use of 
the strike. The net effect on the Phillips curve is its downward displacement 
to POSition II. 
As our discussion of the actual operation of cooperative incomes policies 
in Section III revealed, restraint has invariably been associated with growing 
rank and file resentment. Over time this will manifest itself as a rightward 
Shift in the union's cost of agreement schedule back towards ~ (W), and possi-
bly even beyond to a position such as ~2 (W). However, as argued in Section 
V, this may still not be expressed as official protest because of the politi-
Cal costs to the leadership of breaching the policy, a fact which effectively 
~ . " . 
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makes their strike cost schedule perfectly elastic at wmax • The most likely 
result is thus an outburst of unofficial rank and file action, directed as 
much against official unionism as the incomes policy itself. 
One important feature of this unofficial action is that it puts pressure 
on employers for increased wage settlements through channels that are largely 
separate from those of the conventional system of collective bargaining, and 
thereby constitutes a potential challenge to it. More'over, it occurs at a 
time, following the· effective restraint of wages, when ability to pay is 
likely to be enhanced. In combination, these factors will give employers a 
strong incentive to meet union demands in an attempt to defuse the unofficial 
Challenge before it can seriously undermine the established channels of 
Collective bargaining. The consequence of this action will be a leftward 
shift in the Phillips curve to position III. This argument is consistent with 
a wage equation of the following form: 
W = cX + bpe + S with c<a 
Where the shift parameter, S, is an indicator of the extent of rank and 
file protest over wage restraint. 
This analysis implies a crucial role for both union leadership and rank 
and file in the wage determination process under cooperative incomes 
Policies. Even where the institutional prerequisites to a fully fledged 
cOoperative policy are lacking, trade union behaviour may still be of crucial 
Significance. Thus, even under a unilaterally imposed policy, short term 
aCqUiescence on the part of the union, followed by official rejection will 
haVe the effect of imposing a similar time series profile on the pattern of 
wage changes. 
"L,' :.: .. ",: "¥ . 
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y"II. Incomes Policy and Wage and Strike Behaviour: An Operational 
.§pecification 
The production of an operational specification of the preceding analyses 
of the impact of incomes policy on strike and wage behaviour inevitably 
involves placing heavy reliance on proxy indicators. This is necessary simply 
because many of the variables employed in the theoretical specifications are 
not easily measured directly. For example, there exist no ready empirical 
counterparts to such variables as the degree of leadership cooperation in the 
intrOduction of an incomes policy, the degree of rank and file acceptance, or 
the extent of rank and file protest over wage restraint. Given this, in the 
operational specification of the strike equation, use is made of dummy 
Variables which, where appropriate, distinguish between both different types 
Of restraint, and between different phases of an incomes policy's life cycle. 
Thus in the former connection, where it is relevant, a distinction is made 
between 'hard' and 'soft' policy phases (Hunter 1973) reflecting different 
degrees of compulsion in the restraint of incomes; while in the latter 
connection use is made of a 'breakdown' or 're-entry' dummy variable, 
Specified for the period immediately following the demise or disintegration of 
an incomes policy. Expressed in terms of the formal model outlined in Section 
V, this variable serves to pick up the emergence of cumulative rank and file 
unrest expressed either unofficially, as a protest against leadership 
involvemen~ in restraint, or officially as the union leadership adjusts to the 
fact that the internal political costs of accession to the policy are no 
longer counterbalanced by the external political costs of striking in breach 
Of it. 
Incorporating these dummy variables into the strike model developed 1n 
Cha t P er 5 produces an operational equation of the following form: 
.. " ·.r , ~ '-: \.,~ ..... 
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St = a O + a,u t + a 2u t + 
a P . + 3 t-l a 4Wt_j + aSRt 
+ a D 6 t-k 
+ a I 
7 t + 
a T 
8 
+ a 9F 1t + a'OF 2t + a"F3t+ e t 
Where F't and F2t are dwruny variables representing qualitatively 
different operational phases of incomes policy, and F3t represents the 
breakdown or re-entry phase of the policy. It is asswne that: 
a9' a,O < 0 and a" > 0 
All other variables are as previously defined. 
Turning to the impact of incomes policy on the process of wage determina-
tion, use is also made of proxy variables. Thus, in the absence of any direct 
index of rank and file protest over wage restraint, recourse must be made to 
an indicator of the aggregate level of strike activity. Specifically, since 
total working days lost is by far the most comprehensive strike index avail-
able - reflecting both the length and size of disputes, in addition to their 
frequency - it might be assumed that it also constitutes the most appropriate 
proxy indicator for variations in the level of worker protest. While this may 
be true in general, in the context of cooperative incomes policies this con-
elusion is in need of some modification. In particular, because the emergence 
of Worker protest over cooperative incomes policies is likely to be in the 
form of strike action that is predominantly unofficial (a fact deriving from 
the high external political costs to union leaders of pursuing official action 
in breach of the policy) it is also likely to be associated with a significant 
Change in the overall shape of the strike. Thus, while the frequency of stop-
pages will undoubtedly rise, their size and/or length is likely to fall as a 
result of their unofficial character, a fact which will lessen significantly 
their impact on the overall working days lost figures. Moreover, in addition 
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to this efftlct, the value of the working days lost series as a proxy for rank 
and file protest is likely to be further undermined, if union leaders 
SUbsequently seek to alleviate the internal political strains resulting from 
their cooptation into wage restraint, by precipitating increases in official 
action in pursuit of non-monetary gains. 
Reflecting these considerations, two wage equations are therefore 
Specified as follows: 
~~ == bO t 
W 
t == C 
Where: 
V 
t-l 
S 
t-l 
a 
-1 . 
+ b 1U t + b2 Pt -1/2 + 
b
3
V
t
_
1 + et 
+ 
-1 . 
C 1U t + C2P + C S + t-l/2 3 t-l e t 
the rate of change of money wages in manufacturing defined as 
[(Wt -Wt-l)/Wt-l] .100; 
bhQ. ~~("OC-a\ c~ ~~Q \.Q~ ~\ ot- \.J..K\.U'(\~YV\.1..",-t; 
the rate of change of consumer prices lagged by half a period and 
defined as (J? t-l+ Pi:.. )./2, where P tiS defined analogously with the 
wage variable as [CPt - Pt-l)/Pt - 1] .100; 
working days lost in manufacturing industry lagged one period; and 
strike frequency in manufacturing industry lagged one period. 
The lags on the strike variables are included to reflect the fact that 
the collective bargaining process involves the negotiation of what is, in 
effect, a form of futures contract, with wage gains accuring over the life of 
the contract rather than contemporaneously. 
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Each of the above equations is fitted to data derived from the ten 
COuntries in the sample, with the a priori expectation that working days lost 
will be a less adequate predictor of wage change behaviour under cooperative 
incomes policies than strike frequency. 
Before proceeding to the estimation of the operational equations 
specified above, one further issue must be addressed. Nffinely, that the use of 
strike variables in wage equations has been the subject of a substantial 
amOunt of criticism. For example, while it is not disputed that strikes 
represent the ultimate sanction available to unions in pressing for higher 
wages, it is argued that use of the officially compiled aggregate statistics 
involves the introduction of too many ambiguities and potential errors to be 
at all illuminating. First, it is far from clear which of the published 
aggregate strike indices is the most appropriate, and, while most studies have 
concentrated on strike frequency, no justification has typically been given 
for such a choice. Equally, no account has generally been taken of the well 
dOcumented undar-recording of the actual number of stoppages in the officially 
PUblished frequency statistics, or for their failure to reflect such other 
crucial dimensions of strike activity as strike length and strike size - both 
Of which might be presumed to effect employer's behaviour in granting wage 
cOncessions. While the latter criticislU cannot be made of the present study 
Since both frequency and working days lost - employed, it remains vulnerable 
to the argument that neither strike index is an unambiguous indicator of 
Changes in the exercise of union power or worker discontent. Thus, strikes 
~ay increase as a result of employer action, and hence be a reflection of the 
eXercise of employer power rather than U11ion power. Alternatively, power may 
he exercised without resort to a strike at all, either because of an effective 
strike threat, or because of recourse to a variety of non-strike sanctions. 
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In addition, aggregate strike statistics clearly reflect disputes over a 
large number of issues other than simply wage increases, so that variations in 
strike indices reflect "far more than simple fluctuations in a number of 
homogeneous occurrences" (Purdy and Zis 1974). I4oreover, even if attention 
was confined to disputes over wages or wage related issues (assuming such data 
to be available), their use is still problematical given that many disputes 
involve multiple issues whose relative unportance may change during the course 
of a dispute. Finally, and in many ways most d&nning is the thorny issue of 
the argued lack of any clearly defined theory of wage determination under 
trade unions capable of un&ubiguously linking strike activity to wage changes 
in a causal sequence running from the former variable to the latter (a problem 
also touched on briefly in Chapter 4). In the light of this barrage of 
criticism, the use of official strike indices in the present study would 
Clearly se~n to warrant some justification. 
The first line of defence is purely practical. On the basis of previous 
studies (Nordhaus 1972; Perry 1975), and on the basis of the results presented 
in Chapter 4, considerable doubt exists over the adequacy of the basic excess 
demand/price expectations model as the sole explanation of recent wage 
inflation experience among the member nations of the Group of Ten. Second, 
the analysis of this chapter has pointed to the existence of a key role for 
trade unions - both leadership and rank and file - in detennining the pattern 
Of wage changes, particularly in relation to the macro economic and macro 
Political constraints unposed by incomes policy. Moreover, the analysis has 
fUrther established the necessity for supplementing the basic excess 
demand/price expectations equation with some indicator of rank and file wage 
eXpectations that is broadly responsive to the effects of incomes policy. 
Third, the preceding analysis has also established that the occurrence of 
".' .~.; :-' .\ ' ~, ... 1" t,.' 
. 
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strikes is likely to be significantly related to a variety of fc:lctors in 
addition to the level of excess demand and price expectations, including, most 
notably, the effects of incomes policy. 
It is against this. background that a strike index is advanced as a suit-
able proxy indicator. Moreover, given its status as a proxy, it is not neces-
sary that it bedefinitionally the same thing as worker acquiescence in, or 
hostility over, the current pace of wage changes; merely that it fluctuate 
broadly in line with the latter. Thus, the fact that not all strikes are over 
wages, or that not all strikes derive from changes in worker or union leader-
ship attitudes and behaviour, does not necessarily invalidate the use of an 
aggregate strike index. Finally, as regards those criticisms that are based 
Upon the proneness of strike statistics to measurement error (and notably 
under-recording), while such criticisms are undoubtedly of some validity, they 
Could equally well be applied to any officially compiled statistical series, 
including the unemployment statistics and consumer price index. Moreover, in 
the Context of the strike series, provided that recording practices are con-
Sistent over tune, these series may still be employed as a potentially valid 
proxy indicator. 
~lusions 
The aims of this Chapter were broadly twofold. First, to examine the 
reasons for the ~nergence of the variety of different forms of incomes policy 
intervention adopted by the membe::- nations of the Group of Ten during the 
POst-war period; and second, to examine the impact of these policies on the 
t' ~me series pattern of strike activity and wage inflation. In the context of 
strikes, it is argued that the institutional prerequisites to the introduction 
Of a cooperative incomes policy - including centralized bargaining and the 
eXistence of a government sympathetic to labour - are also broadly consistent 
)' I~ 
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with those factors commonly associated with a secular decline in strike 
activity. In addition to producing secular declines, however, it is argued 
that the high subjective costs to union leaderships of breaching a cooperative 
incomes policy will also be associated with cyclical declines in official 
strike action, at least during its operational phases. Following from this, 
it was suggested that, in the context of wage determination, leadership 
agreement to wage restraint under cooperative incomes policies will result in 
a pattern of settlements significantly· below those determined under a free 
market. An inevitable consequence is. predicted to be mounting rank and file 
dissent, which, given union leadership's unwillingness to act in the face of 
the perceived macro political costs, is likely to surface eventually as un-
Official strike action. This action, combined with a generally enhanced 
ability to pay on the part of employers, and a strong desire to defuse emerg-
ing grass roots protest before it could solidify into an effective longer-run 
Challenge within the plant, is then seen as instrumental in precipitating 
Significant wage concessions. On the basis of this reasoning it is hypothes-
iZed that a significant positive relationship will exist between the occur-
rence of unofficial strike d.ction and wage changes under cooperative incomes 
Policies. 
Where the institutional prerequisites for the emergence of a cooperative 
incomes policy are lacking, the situation is somewhat more ambiguous. While 
incomes policies are still possible, their introduction is of necessity 
likely to be based upon unilateral government imposition, rather than active 
Union co-operation. One important consequence of this is a much greater 
degree of uncertainty with respect to both the occurrence of reductions in 
strike activity, and the effectiveness of the wage restraint programs. 
However, even under these circumstances, the imposition of incomes policy is 
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still seen as raising the union leadership's subjective strike costs - in this 
case because of the risk of strikes turning into protracted confrontations -
and hence also leading to a reduction in strike activity during the opera-
tional phase of the policy. Once again, mounting rank and file protest is 
seen as an inevitable consequence, although here there is less of a presump-
tion that the eventual protest will be unofficial in nature. Further, given 
the unilateral character of their introduction, the life-cycle of incomes 
POlicy from introduction through to disolution and/or breakdown is presumed to 
be much shorter. 
Finally, in an operational context, the present Chapter has brought 
together a variety of hypotheses on the determinants of strike activity and 
wage inflation in the form of a simultaneous model of strike and wage determi-
nation. Within the framework of this model, the current level of strike 
activity is hypothesized to depend upon such conventional economic factors as 
the state of the labour market, wage and price expectations, profits, inven-
tories and the tax structure, as well as on the nature of incomes policy 
intervention. Current wage changes are in turn hypothesized to depend upon 
the state of the labour market, price expectations and lagged strike activ-
ity. The acid test of this model is its explanatory power. This is examined 
in relation to the ten countries in our sample in Chapter Seven. 
.". ,","'n" ,",iI l'~, ••.• ~.,:.. ,,"'.' \' , 
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Footnotes to Chapter 6 
1. In the case of Germany, while concentration is lacking because the 
federal power of the central union organisation (DGB) is weak, 
considerable power is nevertheless centralized in the large industrial 
unions. 
2. Economic growth performance among the members of the Group of Ten 
was largely supportive of incomes policy until the mid 1960s. 
3. The working class may also gain access via participation in governing 
coalitions as in Belgium and the Netherlands, or via active 
participation in national socio-economic institutions under what 
has been termed a 'consociational cartel'. 
4. The relative weight attached to these separate utilities will depend 
upon the political complexion of the government. For an interesting 
exploration of this issue, see Hibbs' (1977) study, "Poltical Parties 
and Macroeconomic Policy" ,AMe. ... ICt')t"\ Po\ibc..n\ SCI~ ~jJ\"W I veL "l \. 
5. One potential solution to the leadership dilemma would be to channel 
rank and file militancy into challenging managerial prerogatives 
rather than into the pursuit of wage gains. 
6. See for example R.E. Walton and R.B. McKersie, A Behavioural Theory 
of Labour Negotiations, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965. 
7. See for example Vanderkamp (1970) and Hunter (1973). 
8. This market analogy is developed in detail in Pizzorno (1978). 
9. As we have seen these concessions have included commitments to full 
employment and price stability, guarantees of social symmetry between 
wages and profits, improved social welfare benefits, and even 
supportive labour legislation. 
10. The importance of a high degree of unionization, as well as inter-
union coordination and/or centralized bargaining is evident here, 
since by their very nature public benefits will accrue to everyone -
union member and non-member alike - regardless of the fulfilment of 
a commitment to restraint. 
11. This does not, of course, imply that non-wage goals, and specifically 
management prerogatives (p), will be any less contentious. 
12. Thus, one factor contributing to the breakdown of a cooperative 
incomes policy in the Netherlands was undoubtedly the departure of 
the Labour Party from the ruling coalition in 1958, a move which 
signalled a shift in the government toward greater conservatism. 
13. One might therefore predict that concerns over the wage structure 
will be of heightened importance under Group 1 arrangements. 
7.1 
Chapter 7. 
Empirical Tests of the Strike-wage Model. 
The present Chapter presents and analyses the results obtained from sub-
jecting the simultaneous model outlined in Chapter 6 to empirical scrutiny 
Using post-war data from the Group of Ten. Before considering these results 
in detail, however, a number of general observations are in order about the 
estimation procedures adopted. First, in the context of the strike model, the 
results presented are for the best-fitting equations obtained on the basis of 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Variables whose 't values' fell 
below the value of one were generally dropped from the final estimating 
equations. Second, while all equations were initially estimated in linear 
~erMan 
form, in~e. cases - namely the strike equations for Canada an the Nether-
lands - semi-logarithmic transformations provided more satisfactory results. 
Finally, in order to correct for the possibility of auto correlation, all 
equations were transformed according to the autoregressive scheme devised by 
Cochrane and Orcutt (1949). 
In presenting the results, each of the ten countries is considered 
individually, though for convenience the order of their consideration is 
dictated by their prevailing institutional configuration as defined in Chapter 
6. Starting with those countries in which cooperative incomes policies have 
emerged, the order of consideration is as follows: Belgium, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, the United States and the 
United Kingdom • 
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~LGIUM 
~trike Behavior. 
The best fitting strike equation in the Belgian context took the follow-
ing form I : 
Two institutionally specific features of this equation should be noted at 
the outset. • The first is the inclusion of a squared price term, Pt2 , in 
place of the standard variable (which appeared insignificant in preliminary 
estimations). This substitution is made to take account of the operation of a 
System of cost of living escalator clauses, in place for most of the post-war 
period. The second specific feature is the definition of the incomes policy 
Variable F1t, which in the Belgian context represents the period of 'social 
programming' from 1960-69 2. 
As Table 7.B.1 illustrates, estimation of the above equation shows it to 
be consistent with 95% of the variation in aggregate strike frequency over the 
period 1953-1974. Reference to the 'actual' and 'fitted' values plotted in 
Graph 7.B.1 offers further confirmation of the equation's explanatory power, 
illustrating in particular its broad consistency with the strike escalations 
OCcurring in Belgium in the early 1970's. 
In terms of the performance of individual variables, all coefficients 
eXcept that on the wage variable are significant. More specifically, the 
level of unemployment, entered in reciprocal form, appears with a negative 
Sign, implying a positive relationship between unemployment and strike 
frequency. This is consistent with an interpretation of strikes as vehicles 
' .. 
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of protest, or as a primarily defensive rather than offensive measure. It is 
also consistent with the operation of a political exchange relationship under 
which union leaders are prepared to forego the full exploitation of their 
short-term strategic advantage in the labour market. As an interesting 
Contrast, however, and less obviously consistent with these interpretations is 
the fact that the rate of change of unemployment appears to be inversely 
related to strikes. Taken together, these findings that strikes are 
increased by both high unemployment and falling unemployment - might appear 
Contradictory. A consistent interpretation is, however, possible. As noted 
i.n Chapter 5, under centralized bargaining arrangements (such as those in 
Belgium), individual employers retain some scope for the concession of dis-
cretionary plant-level wage supplements during periods of labour market tight-
ness - an obvious potential sweetener to official restraint at the more macro 
level. Attempts to unilaterally remove these supplements during periods of 
labour market slack would then imply the possibility of increased strike 
action at such times if this protest, initially of a largely defensive 
character, were then carried over into a somewhat more offensive form of 
action in the early phase of the upswing, as part of an attempt to regain lost 
ground, the result would be a set of labour market relationships of the type 
depicted in equation 1. 
In terms of the relationship between strikes and inflation, the 
eXistence of a positive coefficient on the squared price term woulQ appear to 
cOnfirm documentary evidence pointing to increased worker militancy over 
recent escalations in the rate of inflation - escalations which apparently led 
to some questioning of the validity of the consumer price indices on which the 
COst of living escalators were based. In the context of the profits variable 
(expressed as the ratio of current aggregate profits to total compensation), 
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the existence of a highly significant inverse relationship with strikes 
Suggests the dominant influence of enhanced employer ability to pay and/or 
h' igh-opportunity costs of striking over the effects of higher union demands 
during periods of enhanced profitability - a finding consistent with union 
restraint. Turning to the last of the significant variables, it appears that 
as expected 'Social Programming' was associated with a significant decline in 
Strike frequency. The effects of entry to free collective bargaining are, 
however, adequately tracked without the need for recourse to a separate dummy 
"ariable. 
With respect to the impact of wage changes, their apparent insignificance 
cOuld be due to their contradictory behavioural implications. Thus, as was 
nOted in Chapter 5, a high 'going-rate' of settlements is likely to increase 
both . d . 
union demands and employer offers. In a dition, while as Ashenfelter and 
JOhnson 1969 have argued, large real wage increases in the recent past will be 
aSSOCiated with a smaller expectations-achievement gap, and hence fewer 
Strikes, a recent history of large increases could equally serve to stimulate 
eltpectations and hence make organized labour even more demanding. In the 
~l ' , gian context, however, the appearance of a positive (though insignificant) 
relationship between wage changes (in manufacturing) and strikes must also be 
i 
nterpreted in the light of the accutely sensitive nature of the issue of wage 
<'1' 
l..fferentials, particularly between the North and the South - a situation 
cons' iderably aggravated by marked changes in the economic performance of these 
regions. These tensions have emerged with particular significance in the 
~ining industry, where a declining labour force has used solidarity in 
i 
ndUstrial action to achieve wage gains comparable to those obtained by 
'tIorlters ~n .. 1 . 
_ the more prosperous industria sectors. This clearly illustrates 
that a 
high overall rate of wage increase in manufacturing might be associated 
'tIith 
widening differentials and hence increased strike activity based on 
C()n 
'-. cerns over 'wage - structure.' -~---------
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Re-estimation of the strike equation using strikes in manufacturing as 
the dependent variable would seem to offer some support for the latter 
interpretation. Thus, as equation 2 indicates, omission of non-manufacturing 
strikes - including perhaps most significantly those in mining - brings about 
a change in sign on the real wage term, which though still non-significant, is 
now inversely related to strike frequency. In addition, the relationship 
between the level of unemployment and strikes, though still positive, is no 
longer significant - a finding which may also be attributed to the omission of 
the economically declining mining sector. The only remaining contrast is the 
loss of significance of the squared price variable as a factor stimulating 
strikes in manufacturing. 
~age Behaviour 
In the context of the process of wage determination, as equation 3 in 
Table B.1 indicates, the basic price expectations Phillips curve is able to 
account for 90% of the variation in hourly wage changes in manufacturing over 
the period 1953-1974. However, while both unemployment and price terms are 
highly significant and correctly signed, the size of the coefficient on the 
price variable seems implausibly high. As equation 4 illustrates this problem 
is remedied by the inclusion of a lagged strike variable, which it may be 
noted, enters the equation with a significant positive sign. In addi tion to 
confirming the importance of the strike frequency term, equation 4 also 
produces a worthwhile increase in the equations plausibility and explanatory 
Power. Further confirmation is provided in Graph 7.B.2 which plots the actual 
against fitted values derived from equation 4. As the graph illustrates, the 
sUperior performance of the strike frequency augmented equation derives 
largely from its predicitive power in relation to the wage settlements 
generated over the period of 'Social Programming,' during which the standard 
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equation produces significant overpredictions of the actual values. 
As reference to equation 5 indicates the superiority of the augmented 
Phillips curve is not replicated when a lagged strike volume series is 
substituted for lagged strike frequency. This finding is consistent with the 
argument advanced in Chapter 6: namely that, under cooperative incomes 
policies, wage gains are more likely to be brought about by increases in 
unofficial action which are most adequately proxied by a strike frequency 
index. 
'Iable 7. B. 1 £et:erminant:s of St:.rike &equency and rtage InELation: Belgiun 
1953-1974 
Estimated O:>efficients on: 
Eqn. Dep. Variable 
1 strike Frequency 
2 strike Frequency 
(M3.nufacturing) 
Eqn. Dep. Variable 
3 Vbge Inflation 
(hourly rates in 
manufacturing) 
4 Vbge Inflation 
5 Vbge Inflation 
C 
t 
501.13 
(4.48) 
620.03 
(8.560) 
C 
t 
-1.02 
(-0.522) 
-2.92 
(-2.513) 
-0.654 
(-0.314) 
-1 
U 
t 
-4632.10 
(-2.214) 
-2795.70 
(-1.619) 
-1 
U 
t-1/2 
401.19 
(2.555) 
473.69 
(4.821) 
387.73 
(2.367) 
U 
t 
-1.17 
(-4.398) 
-1.07 
(-5.422) 
P 
t 
P 
t-1/2 
1.679 
(7.355) 
1.162 
(5.37) 
1.698 
(7.050) 
.2 
p 
t 
3.06 
(1.958) 
0.918 
• 
W 
t 
4.12 
(1.130) 
-0.43 
(0.768) (-0.140) 
S V 
t-1 t-1 
0.040 
(4.010) 
-0.005 
(-0.909) 
D 
t 
-8.78 
F 
t 
-61.95 
(-3.596) (-5.035) 
-12.44 -51.65 
(-2.87) (-5.621) 
I 
2 
R 
.952 
.959 
2 
R 
.904 
.939 
.908 
D-W 
2.08 
2.01 
D-W 
1.63 
1.87 
1.71 
'F' 
Stat 
45.91 
(6,14) 
54.79 
(6,14) 
'F' 
Stat 
84.64 
(2,18) 
87.39 
(3,17) 
56.06 
(3,17) 
S 
t 
100 
69 
W 
8.5 
8.5 
8.5 
Definitioos: <t is the ronstant term; all other variables a~ previously defined; _ ~ is _the unoorrected oorrelation ooefficient; D-W 
the DJrbin-Watoon statistic; 'F' stat is the 'F' statistic; and S and VI are the respective neans of the de.r;endent 
variables. '!he fi<pres in brackets are 't' statistics. 
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~rmany 
~trike Behaviour 
Consistent comparative analysis of strike activity is complicated in the 
case of Germany by the fact that official statistics on strike frequency are 
unavailable. Consequently, figures for working days lost (Vt ) must be used 
as a substitute. On the basis of this data the best fitting equation was of 
the following form: 3 
An important and novel feature of this equation is the inclusion of the 
rate of change of union density (Mt) as an additional explanatory variable. 
As - ov..tlined in more detail below, this variable is included in place of 
dummy variables proxying the effects of 'Concerted Action', which proved 
insignificant in earlier estimations. It A second feature of the equation is 
its estimation in semi-logarithmic form, a specification which produces 
results generally superior to those obtained using linear estimation • 
_" _".\,.,.0 • 
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As indicated in Table 7.G.1 this equation is able to account for 51% of 
the variation in strike volume over the period 1953-1975. Examination of the 
actual and fitted values plotted in Graph 7.G.1 also points to the equation's 
broad consistency with the strike escalations occurring in Germany in the late 
1960's and early 1970 s, although there are signs of underprediction in 1969 
and 1973. Significantly, both years follow periods during which there is some 
eVidence of wage restraint. 
In terms of the performance of individual variables, all coefficients 
eXcept that on the profits variable (expressed as a ratio of current aggregate 
profits to total compensation) appear significant. Specifically, the level of 
Unemployment, expressed as a reciprocal, enters the equation with a negative 
Sign, indicating a positive relationship between unemployment and strike 
Volume. This result, which is consistent with· that obtained in Belgium, 
implies that strikes have historically been used as more of a defensive than 
as an offensive measure, a conclusion which also gains support from document-
ary evidence (Bergman and Muller-Jentsch, 1975; p. 273). A positive relation-
ship is also established between strike volume and the real wage variable, a 
finding which suggests that far from closing the expectations-achievement gap, 
large past increases may, in the German context, have merely served to stimu-
late current demands. Re-estimation of the equation using separate wage and 
Price variables also produces a significant positive coefficient on lagged 
money wages, but produces a significant negative coefficient on the lagged 
Price term. While the latter result is clearly anomalous, it could 
conceivably be rationalized as consistent with the strong commitment to price 
stability that has undoubtedly pervaded the Federal Republic (including the 
Unions) during the post-war period - a possible legacy from the Weimar 
eXperience. Alternatively, it might be attributed to the low absolute level 
- ,- - .... ~.-. '. It", • J -l:'.' . ; •. 
, ... ' 
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of inflation that Germany has experienced over the post-war years. In either 
eVent there are strong reasons for doubting the stability of this relationship 
in the context of more recent strike action, where documentary evidence points 
to significant reductions in money illusion, and the disappearance of the 
fixation with price stability 'in favour of wage demands which include factual 
and prospective price increases as part of their strategy' (Muller-Jent~hand 
Sperling 1978; p.266). 
The last of the significant variables is the rate of change of union 
density, which enters with a positive sign. The rationale behind the 
inclusion of this variable is somewhat unusual. As noted above, inclusion of 
simple one/zero dummy variables representing the operational and breakdown 
phases of Concerted Action did nothing to improve the explanatory power of the 
fitted equation. At least on the basis of documentary evidence, however, it 
is clear that one consequence of Concerted Action was the emergence of 
Significant outbursts of unofficial strike action by a disgruntled rank and 
file, and declines in union membership in protest against the leaderships' 
cO-option into the policy. These increases in unofficial action were manifest 
primarily as a significant increase in the number of strikes, a magnitude 
Which, as we have noted, is not officially recorded in Germany. Moreover, 
given their unofficial nature these strikes were also typically of short 
duration. Thus, having a much diluted impact on total working days lost, they 
Were only partially reflected in the official strike statistics. 
Nevertheless, they did have a significant impact on the behaviour of union 
leaderships. Following the outbursts of unofficial action, union leaders 
SOught to re-restablish control over their rank and file by pursuing more 
~ilitant action on an offical level; action which was associated with 
increases in both working days lost and trade union membership. In short, a 
7.10 
POsitive cyclical relationship was generated between union membership and 
working days lost based in large part on union leadership' s acquiescence in 
cooperative incomes policies. The significant positive coefficient appearing 
in equation 1 may therefore be viewed as reflecting this incomes policy 
effect. S 
!Lage Behaviour 
Turning to. the area of wages, as noted in Chapter 4, a standard price 
eXpectations Phillips curve provides a reasonably good fit to data on changes 
in weekly wage rates in manufacturing over the period 1953-1975. As can be 
Seen from equation 3 in Table 7. G. 1, both unemployment and price terms are 
significant and corr~ctly signed and 60% of the variation in wage changes is 
aCCounted for. Examination of the pattern of residuals generated by equation 
3 (see Graph 7.G.2), does, however, reveal a tendency towards overprediction 
during the periods of wage restraint under Concerted Action (1966-68 
1971-72) ,aSWeIl~$dtendency towards underprediction during the wage escalations 
Of 1969-70 and 1973-74. Supplementing the equation with lagged strike volume 
in manufacturing does nothing to remedy this problem. As can be seen by 
reference to equation 4 in Table 7.G.1, the variable is both insignificant and 
incorrectly signed. In' practice, this result is not surprising, since as 
already noted, strike volume is an inade'l-\.Idte indicator of unofficial action 
OVer incomes policy in the German institutional context. In the absence of 
Official strike frequency figures, a third wage equation was the~ore 
speCified using contemporaneous changes in union density as a proxy for an 
incomes policy effect. Thus, in line with the reasoning given above, this 
variable is interpreted a·s a delayed militancy index, reflecting union 
leadership'S response to the unofficial protests of the previous period. As 
eqUation 5 in Table 7.G.1 indicates, the variable is highly significant and 
enters with the appropriate positive sign. Moreover, as can be seen from the 
7.11 
plot of the generated residuals (see graph 7.G.2), the union density augmented 
equation has significantly improved explanatory power over the period of 
Concerted Action beginning in 1966. Confirmation of the performance of 
equation 5 is also presented in Graph 7.G.3 which plots the actual and fitted 
values generated by this equation. 
1.ab1.e 7.G.1 Eet;er:minantsof Strike Vo1.une and I'Iage Inflation: G?rnany 
1953-1975 
EStimated O:>efficients on: 
-1 
Eqn. D::lp. variable C U U P W W D 
t t t t-1 t-1 P t-1 
t-1 
1 IDg Strike Volune 10.632 -412.68 0.5265 0.0007 
(Mmufacturing) (3.140) (-2.399) (3.404) (0.008) 
2 IDg Strike Volune 15.540 -459.20 -0.776 0.519 -0.112 
(Mmufacturing) (2.399) (-2.600) (-2.330) (3.328) (-0.715) 
-1 
Fqn. D::lp. variable C U P V 
t t t-1/2 t-1 
3 W3.ge Inflation 3.348 927.0 0.562 
(~ekly rates in (2.302) (3.501) (2.106) 
Manufacturing) 
4 W3.ge Inflation 2.635 1122.0 0.630 -0.002 
(1.415) (4.161) (2.265) (-0.844) 
5 W3.ge Inflation 2.590 1198.0 0.542 
( 1.239) (5.330) (2.299) 
2 'F' 
M R rrw stat V 
t t 
0.446 .506 1.78 4.61 12.14 
(2.04) (4,18) 
0.463 .526 1.84 3.77 12.14 
(2.051) (5,17) 
2 'F' 
M R rrw stat w 
t t 
.613 2.04 15.81 8.43 
(3,20) 
.635 2.13 11.03 8.43 
(3,19) 
0.533 .743 1.88 18.29 8.43 
(3.064) (3,19) 
Notes: F.i.gures in brackets are 't' statistics, <t is the cxnstant term; ~ the unoorrected rorrelation <Xlefficient; rrw the 
Olrbin-Watson statistic; 'F' stat the 'F' statistic; and V and * are the respective means of the dependent variables. 
Souroes: See Appendix 1 t t 
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!!ETHERLANDS 
Strike Behaviour 
In many respects the Netherlands represents one of the most interesting 
cases in the present sample: a fact which stems from the important changes 
that have occurred within the Dutch industrial relations systems during the 
post-war period. From the end of the Second World War until the early 1960's 
the Netherlands operated a highly centralized system of collective 
bargaining. Strains began to emerge in this system in the late 1950' s, 
however, and following the final disintegration of the policy in 1962-63, the 
industrial relations system experienced a significant shift towards more 
decentralized bargaining at both industry and enterprise levels. To reflect 
this important structual change, the estimating period for both the strike and 
wage equations is divided into two sub-periods: namely 1954-62 and 1963-75. 
For the earlier sub-period the best fitting strike equation took the 
follo',qing form: 6 
LogS 
t 
Given that guided wage policy covered the entire estimating period, no 
separate income policy term is included. 
As equation 1 in Table 7.N.1 indicates, while the above equation, 
Specified in semi-logarithmic form, accounts for 77% of the variation in 
aggregate strike frequency over the period 1954-1962, the val\:.e of the "F" 
statistic is unacceptably low. 7 Nevertheless, in terms of the performance of 
individual variables, all coefficients are significant with the exception of 
~ 0.' i: ... ,! ... .. 
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that on the lagged profits variable (expressed as the ratio of aggregate 
profits to total compensation). Specifically, the level of unemployment, 
expressed in reciprocal form, enters the equation with a significant negative 
Sign, implying a positive relationship between strikes and unemployment. By 
Contrast, the rate of change of unemployment appears inversely related to 
strike frequency, implying increased strike action as unemployment falls. 
Both findings are consistent with those obtained for Belgium, and may again be 
explained as deriving from the combined effects of a centralized bargaining 
structure (which allows employers to grant discretionary supplements at plant 
level during periods of labour market tightness, and remove them during 
periods of slack), and a central wage policy under which union leaders forego 
the full exploitation of their labour market power when unemployment is low. 
Finally, in terms of real wage changes, a negative coefficient is obtained, a 
finding broadly consistent with the conventional assumption that large real 
increases will serve to reduce the size of the expectations-achievement gap. 
For the later period, the best fitting strike equation took the following 
form: 8 
The additional variable, Ft , is a simple one/zero dummy proxying the 
effects of a breakdown in wages policy.9 Also specified in semi-logorithmic 
form, this equation (equation 2 in Table 7.N.1) accounts for 93% of the 
variation in aggregate strike frequency over the period 1963-1975; moreover, 
in this case, reference to the 'F' statistic shows this result to be highly 
significant. The equation's overall explanatory power is also confirmed by 
, ~ ~ I , ,. ~ • 
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reference to Graph 7.N.1 which contains plots of the actual and fitted values 
for log strike frequency over the period. 
In terms of the performance of individual variables, while all 
Coefficients are significant, several important contrasts are evident with the 
findings reported for the earlier period. The most significant of these is 
undoubtedly the relationship between strikes and the level of unemployment, 
which takes on a conventional inverse form in equation 2. Thus, it appears 
that the demise of the guided wage policy, and the shift towards more 
decentralized bargaining were also associated with a shift from a 
predominantly defensive form of strike action during periods of high 
unemployment, towards a more offensive form of action during periods of low 
unemployment. This development is clearly consistent with a greater 
willingness on the part of organized labour to exploit more fully its 
Collective bargaining advantage following the demise of guided wage policy. 
A second major contrast between the two sub-periods appears in relation 
to the profits variable, which while retaining its negative sign, becomes 
Significant in the later period. This is consistent with a greater net 
influence for employer ability to pay and/or higher opportunity costs of 
Striking in reducing the frequency of stoppages during periods of high 
profits. 
With respect to the remaining variables; the real wage term again enters 
the equation with a significant negative sign. Also in this connection, 
re-estimation of the equation with separate money wage and price terms (as in 
equation 3) confirms their individual significance, with the latter variable 
entering with the expected positive coefficient, and the former with a 
Significant negative coefficient. Finally, the post income restraint dummy 
enters the equation with a significant positive sign, confirming the existence 
. :" 
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of increased industrial unrest following the demise of wages policy. 
Reference to equation 4 in Table 7.N.1 also suggests that these results are 
not significantly altered by the use of strike frequency in manufacturing as 
the dependent variable in place of aggregate strike frequency. 
~age Behaviour. 
Important contrasts between the two sub-periods identified above are also 
apparent in the context of wage determination. Nevertheless, as noted in 
Chapter 4 and illustrated again in equation 5 in Table 7.N.1, a conventional 
price expectations Phillips curve fitted for the entire period 1953-1977 is 
still capable of providing a reasonaNy good explanation of changes in hourly 
wage rates in manufacturing industry. In fact, the fitted equation explains 
65% of the variation in the latter variable, with both the unemployment and 
price variables significant and correctly signed. Examination of the pattern 
of residuals plotted in graph 7.N.2 does, however, reveal the equation's poor 
predictive performance prior to 1963, as well as its inability to explain 
either the wage escalations of 1964 and 1971, or the level of settlements 
emerging during the government's unilaterally imposed wage policy of 1966-67. 
Moreover, as equations 6 and 7 in Table 7.N.1 clearly illustrate, 
SUpplementing the basic equation with either lagged strike frequency in 
manufacturing, o~lagged strike vol~~e in manufacturing, does little to remedy 
this situation. 
Considerably greater light is shed on the pattern of wage changes in the 
Dutch context when separate equations are estimated for the sub-periods 
1954-1962 and 1963-1975. As equation 8 indicates, during the earlier period 
Of centralized wage policy wage changes were largely insulated from market 
forces, with neither unemployment nor price changes reaching acceptable levels 
Of significance. Wi th the breakdown of the centralized policy, and the 
'. ',,:-,-.. 
-," . 
7.16 
development of more decentralized bargaining, this situation changed 
substantially. As equation 9 illustrates, during the period 1964-1975 both 
unemployment and price changes are significant predictors of wage changes, 
accounting for 78% of the variation in the latter variable. Again, however, 
as Graph 7.N.3 indicates, this basic expectations Phillips curve is unable to 
account fully either for the wage escalations of 1964 and 1971, or for the 
depressed level of settlements in 1966-1967. This deficiency is at least 
partly remedied by the inclusion of a -lagged manufacturing strike frequency 
variable (as can be seen in the plot of the residuals from this augmented 
equation in Graph 7.N.3). However, while reference to equation 10 in Table 
7.N.1 indicates that the lagged strike variable enters the augmented equation 
with a highly significant positive sign, it is also apparent that this success 
10 
is achieved partly at the expense of the unemployment variable, as well as 
involving a decline in the value of the 'F' statistic. Finally, in line with 
~ priori expectations, it appears from equation 11 that the substitution of 
lagged strike volume in manufacturing for strike frequency makes no 
Significant contribution to the performance of the basic expectations Phillips 
Curve over the period 1963-74. 
~~ 
'E3ble 7.N. 1 ~t:eJ:mi.nant:s of st:riJre fl'"equen<:y and W'fge Inflation: 'Ihe Net:herl.ands 
1954-1975 
Estimated O:Jefficients on: 
" 
7l3:ble 7.N. 1 Cbntinuaticn t;et;ezminant:s of St;rike FZ-equenqy and ~ge Inflaticn: 
1954-1975 
-1 
Fqn. Dep. variable C U 
t t 
5 W:1ge Inflation 0.0116 210.04 
( 1954-1975) (0.009) (4.710) 
6 W:1ge Inflation 0.328 213.26 
( 1954-1975) (0.197) (4.580) 
7 W:1ge Inflation 0.0471 210.00 
(1954-1975) (0.035) (4.660) 
8 W:1ge Inflation 2.45 158.10 
( 1954-1%2.) (0.833) (1.240) 
9 W:1ge Inflation -0.172 247.40 
( 1963-1975) (-0.101) (6.085) 
10 W:1ge Inflation 0.804 129.50 
(1963-1975) (0.342) (1.753) 
11 l'age Inflation -0.164 247.40 
( 1963-1975) (-0.083) (5.737) 
NJtes: Fi<pres in brackets are 't' statistics 
All variables are as previoosly defined 
SJuroes: See Appendix 1 
EStimated Cbefficients on: 
P S V 
1::-1/2 t-1 1::-1 
1.133 
(7.470) 
1.097 -0.006 
(5.770) (-0.320) 
1.167 -0.024 
(7.350) (-0.815) 
0.564 
(0.699) 
1.089 
(5.627) 
0.964 0.084 
(3.644) (3.776) 
1.087 0.0004 
(4.042) (0.0108) 
The Net:herlands 
2 'F' 
R rrw stat w 
t 
.649 2.14 17.64 8.92 
(2,19) 
.651 2.18 11.23 8.92 
(3,18) 
.662 2.21 11.77 8.92 
(3,18) 
.429 2.39 2.25 6.95 
(2,6) 
.779 1.44 15.86 10.51 
(2,9) 
.838 1.41 9.40 10.51 
(3,8) 
.779 1.44 9.40 10.51 
(3,8) 
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§"WEDEN 
§!rike behaviour 
In the SWedish context the best fitting equation took the following 
form: 11 
The dummy variable Ft is included to control for the strike wave occur-
ring in 1970, following a period of increasing strain in the industrial rela-
tions arena over the operation of the Solidarity Wage Policy. 
As can be seen from equation 1 in Table 7.S.1, estimation produces a fit-
ted equation which explains 86% of the variation occurring in strike frequency 
OVer the period 1953-1977. Moreover, reference to the actual and fitted 
values plotted in Graph 7. S.1 also shows the equation to be a satisfactory 
predictor of the strike waves occurring in SWeden in the early and mid 1970s. 
In terms of the performance of individual variables, all coefficients 
except that on lagged profits (measured as the ratio of aggregate profits to 
total compensation) are significant. Specifically, a significant positive 
relationship is established between strike frequency and the level of unem-
Ployment, while a significant negative relationship is established with the 
rate of change of unemployment. Thus, as in Belgi\L1l\, and the Netherlands 
prior to the demise of the central wage policy, strike frequency is increased 
during periods of high un~nployment, and during periods of falling unemploy-
As argued previously, this result may be attributed to the combined 
effects of a centralized bargaining structure, and a leadership commitment to 
restraint in the pursuit of gains during periods of labour market tightness. 
\ 
I," 
7.17 
With respect to inflation, the non-significance of a simple price change 
variable in earlier estimations prompted eX2erlinentation with a quadratic 
Specification. When specified in this form the variable enters the equation 
with a highly significant positive coefficient, indicating strike sensitivity 
to higher levels of inflation. 
In terms of the effects of wage changes on strikes, equation 1 pOints to 
the existence of a significant positive relationship between these variables. 
in,s c.leclri1 runs counter to the predictAor\S,:; of an expectations-achievement gap 
interpretation of the type hypothesized in the Ashenfelter-Johnson model 
(1969), lending support instead to an interpretation based upon a co®nitment 
to the maintenance of wage structure and the pattern of differentials. 
Indeed, in the Swedish context, such a commitment has been of particular sig-
nificance in the case of white collar workers and professionals, who have 
become increasingly concerned over the erosion of differentials consequent 
upon the LOis pursuit of the Solidarity Wage Policy, as well as over the ero-
sion of their disposable income in the face of a highly progressive tax 
System. Thus, while the separate tax variable appeared statistically insigni-
ficant in preliminary estimations, a tax effect may still have been an impor-
tant contributor to industrial unrest through a process in which high settle-
Inents combined with high marginal tax rates to produce frustrated wag,expec-
tations. In addition, attention should probably also be drawn to the impact 
Of, the mining sector where, as in Belgium, declines in the relative wage posi-
tion vis a vis manufacturing industry were associated with significant 
increases in worker protest, despite the depressed state of the industry. L2 
Finally, turning to the last of the significant variables, the strike 
wave/post-restraint dummy variable enters equation 1 with a significant 
7.18 
POsitive sign, reflecting the escalations in both unofficial blue collar, and 
official white collar protest that emerged in 1970 over the operation of the 
SOlidarity Wage Policy. 
~age Behaviour 
In the context of wage determination, as noted in Chapter. 4, a simple 
price expectations Phillips curve provides a poor explanation of changes in 
hourly wage rates in manufacturing in SWeden over the period 1953-77. As can 
be seen from equation 2 in Table 7. S.1, only 39% of the variation in the 
dependent variable is accounted for; while the unemployment rate, though cor-
rectly signed, is insignificant. In addition, the coefficient on the price 
term suggests the presence of substantial money illusion. 
Inclusion of a lagged strike frequency variable produces a worthwhile 
improvement in this performance. As equation 3 illustrates, not only is the 
lagged strike variable significant and correctly signed, bllt its inclllsion 
also brings about a significant improvement in the performance of the unem-
Ployment variable. An even more dramatic improvement in the equation's 
performance is achieved by the substitution of a lagged strike 
VolUme index in place of strike fr.equency. As can be seen from equation 4, 
the new variable is highly significant and correctly signed, and 75% of the 
Variation in the wage variable is successfully explained. Further confirma-
tion of the superiority of this equation over equation 2 is provided in Graph 
7.S.2, which plots the residuals generated by the t'tlO equations; while evi-
dence of its overall predictive power is presented in Graph 7.S.3,which plots 
the fitted values produced by the equation against the actual wage series. 
Though equation 4 is clearly the most satisfactory of the three wage 
equations, its success does appear to contradict the argument advanced earlier 
7.19 
that under cooperative incomes policies wage gains are more likely to be 
brought about by unofficial action, which, in turn, is most adequately 
proxied by strike frequency rather than strike volume. An important quali-
fication must be made to this argument in the Swedish context, however. In 
particular, Sweden's Solidarity Wage policy was operated primarily at the 
instigation of the blue-collar L.O. Unions, with only grudging acquiescence 
from the white-collar unions T.C.O. and S.A.C.O. Indeed, as noted earlier, 
Over time the latter organizations became increasingly concerned at the 
progressive erosion of economy-wide differentials which the policy pro-
duced. As a result, when the protests against the solidarity policy sur-
faced in the major strike escalations of the early 1970's, they were to a 
much larger extent than elsewhere based upon official - and notably white-
collar - action, and therefore had a significant and immediate impact on 
total working days lost. Thus, in the Swedish context, the latter variable 
is also a satisfactory index of trade union discontent over wage restraint. 
On the basis of the results presented in Table 7.5.1., one may clearly 
conclude that Swedish unions have had a significant autonomous impact on the 
pace of wage change over the period under consideration. Indeed, as further 
confirmation of this, reference might be made to the significant reduction 
in the size of the constant term brought about by the addition of the 
strike volume index (from 6.75 in equation 2 to 1.83 in equation 5); a 
reduction associated wiJ~ the augmented equation's ability to 'explain' 
a substantial element of wage change accounted for in equation 2 simply 
as autonomous wage-push. This should not be taken to imply that trade 
union action has always been associated with an upward displacement of the 
Phillips curve, since between 1955 and 1964 such action is apparently 
associated with its downward displacement. However, where upward wage 
pressure from unions is evident, it would appear that tight labour markets 
have not been a necessary precondition. Thus, as Calmfors (1977) has 
7.l9a 
argued: 
"Because of the political priority given to the goal of full 
employment, trade unions may • • • expect the necessary 
validation of cost push increases to be forthcoming through 
an endogenously determined economic policy. This should 
especially be the case after long periods of successful 
employment policy such as that of the 1960s in Sweden, which 
probably weakened the 'unemployment ghost' as a factor 
restraining trade unions" 
(Calmfors 1977; pp. 518-519) 
This argument is clearly consistent with both the increase in the 
significance of the unemployment variable between equations 2 and 4, and 
with the positive relationship between strikes and unemployment depicted 
in equation 1. 
Tc:tble 7.S.1 Eeter:rni.nantsof st:rike FreqtJel'l<y' and r-.age Inflation: s.eden 
1953-1977 
B:;timated Cbefficients on: 
Fqn. Dep. variable 
1 Strike FraruencY 
C 
t 
36.78 
-1 
U 
t 
-6164.8 
U 
t 
-1.41 
.2 
p 
t 
0·.3<+5 
(1.486) (-3.836) (-2.073) 0-4-2.k] 
-1 
Eqn. Dep. Variable C U 
t t 
2 vage Inflation 6.751 18.18 
(hrurly rates in (3.642) (0.594) 
manufacturing) 
4 vage Inflation 4.010 41.46 
(2.476) (1.750) 
5 W3.ge Inflation 1.826 75.73 
( 1.352) (3.805) 
l-btes: 1 . Jlggregate strike frequency 
~ggregate strike volune 
Figrres in bradcets are 't' statistics 
All variables as previously defined 
s:mrces: ~e Appendix 1 
P 
t-1/2 
0.309 
(4.456) 
0.196 
(2.96) 
0.368 
(9.235) 
W 
t 
2.54 
(2.274) 
V 
t-1 
0.01152 
(5.757) 
D 
t-1 
-0.0161 
F 
t 
87.43 
(-0.287) (6.136)_ 
S 
t-1 
0.0512 1 
(3.189) 
2 
R 
.862 
2 
R 
\ . .389 
.564 
.750 
D-W 
1.93 
D-W 
2.06 
2.33 
2.07 
'F' 
stat 
18.71 
(6,18) 
'F' 
stat 
7.012 
(2,22) 
9.05 
(3,21 ) 
21.02 
(3,21) 
S 
t 
35.4 
W 
t 
8.62 
8.62 
8.62 
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Strike Behaviour 
Previous empirical work on French strike activity has not been supportive 
of the notion that they are responsive to economic factors (Shorter and Tilly 
1974; Snyder 1975). Rather, French strikes have been viewed as essentially 
Political phenomenon, more responsive to variations in organizational factors 
and changes in the constellation of forces in the political arena' than to 
changes in economic conditions. This contention is not, however, confirmed by 
the findings of the present research, which suggests that at least over the 
period 1956-1976 (excluding the strike explosion of 1968) 13, French strike 
frequency was broadly responsive to such factors as the state of the labour 
market, the profit share (measured as the ratio of aggregate profits to total 
compensation) and to some extent also real wages. 
The best fitting equation in the French context took the following 
form: 14 
S 
t 
= a + a V 
o 1 t 
+ a W 
2 P 
t 
+ a D. 
3 t 
Where the dependent variable St is an all-industry strike frequency series; 
V t is the level of unfilled vacancies ( which proved a better proxy for 
labour market conditions than the level of unemployment in preliminary 
estimations) and, as previously, W and D are the current change in real 
P t 
t 
wages, and a profit variable respectively. 
7.21 
As indicated by equation 1 in Table 7.F.1, 81% of the variation in strike 
frequency over the period 1956-67 and 1969-76 is explained. A further 
indication of the equation's overall explanatory power is provided in Graph 
7 .F.1, which contains plots of the fitted values generated by the equation, 
together with the actual values of strike frequency over the estimation 
period. Though clearly not the sole determinant of aggregate fluctuations in 
strike frequency in France, it is clear that economic conditions are still of 
considerable significance. 15 
In terms of the performance of individual variables, the vacancy rate 
enters the equation with a significant positive sign, a finding consistent 
with increased union aggressiveness during periods of labour market tight-
ness. The profits variable also appears highly significant, and enters with a 
negative sign, suggesting on balance a greater employer willingness to concede 
when profits are high. In actual fact, in the context of a politically 
oriented labour movement, this is not intuitively the most likely outcome. On 
~ ~riori grounds it would seem reasonable to suppose that union movements with 
macro political objectives would be vigorous defenders of labour's income 
share. Finally, the real wage variable enters with an insignificant negative 
Sign. 
One variable not included in equation 1, but which nevertheless warrants 
SOme discussion, is incomes policy. As noted in Chapter 6, th ough attempts 
to introduce an overall system of wage restraint in 1964 through concertati~n 
were unsuccessful, the operation of the ToutEie procedure had some effect in 
prOmoting restraint in the public sector between 1964 and 1967. Moreover, it 
has been argued (Soskice 1978), that the discriminatory impact of this policy 
between public and private sectors was responsible, at least in part, for both 
the wage and strike explosions of 1968. Thus, on the one hand the greatest 
....... , ~,. .. ' . ' . ' .. ~.' ... ~ .. : -.. .-
, ....... ·w·, \' 
.,.,:.... 
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wage increases of 1968 were apparently concentrated among those public 
employees who had been subject to the most determined restraint (Ulman and 
Flanagan 1971), while on the other, there is evidence that the early strikes 
of May 1968 were also concentrated in the public sector (Goldey 1970). 
Regardless of how compelling such documentary evidence for an incomes policy 
effect in the French context may be, the empirical estimation of its precise 
lllagnitude remains problematical. First, the strike data reported to the 
International Labour Office (and utilized here) 16 is confined, at least in the 
case of France, to strikes in the industrial sector, and thus excludes strikes 
oCcurring in the public sector. Second, official statistics on the extent of 
the 1968 strike wave are lacking - a fact which also accounts for the exclus-
ion of 1968 from the estimating equation. 
~e Behaviour. 
Turning to the pattern of wage changes, reference to equation 2 in Table 
7. F.1 indicates that a basic price expectations Phillips curve is able to 
account for 83% of the variation in changes in weekly wage rates in manufac-
turing over the period 1956-1976 (again excluding 1968). Both the labour 
lllarket (as proxied by the level of unfilled vacancies) and price variables are 
significant and correctly signed. Examination of the pattern of residuals 
Plotted in Graph 7.F.2 indicates the good overall performance of the equation, 
though its explanatory power does show some deterioration from 1972 onwards. 
In addition, there is some evidence of systematic over-prediction of the 
actual rate of wage inflation in manufacturing during the period of public 
Sector wage restraint, though its magnitude is not large. Nevertheless its 
OCCurrence is consistent with the operation of some form of public/private 
Sector demonstration effect with respect to wage determination. 
,: .. 
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Despite the generally satisfactory performance of equation 2, by 
way of experimentation it was re-estimated first with the addition of 
lagged (all industry) strike frequency, and then with the corresponding 
lagged strike volume series. The results are reported in equations 3 and 
4 in Table 7.F.l. As can be seen, both strike variables enter the equation 
with significant positive signs - a finding consistent with the argument 
that strike activity in France has been associated with an upward displace-
ment of the pace of wage change. It is also evident from equations 3 and 
4, however, that the addition of these strike variables is associated with 
a decline in the value of the 'F'statistics as well as in the significance 
of unfilled vacancies 17 • Furthermore, in the French context, the inclusion 
of the strike variables cannot be justified via recourse to the argument 
presented in Chapter 6 in relation to the effects of cooperative incomes 
policy. In view of this, equation 2 must be the preferred equation~ and 
the most appropriate conclusion would seem to be that while French unions 
have been able to achieve significant increases in nominal wages as a result 
of autonomous pressure on certain specific occasions (as in 1968 for example) , 
they have been unable to achieve this result on a sustained or continuous 
basis. Indeed in 1969, the year following the wage explosion associated 
with the May/June strike outbursts, the rate of increase in real wages was 
the lowest for a decade. Also of significance is the fact that labour's 
share in national income remained unchanged between 1963 and 1971. On the 
basis of such evidence it is difficult to quarrel with Salin and Lane's 
(1977) assessment that: 
" ••• real wages cannot be determined autonomously, except in 
the special social and political conditions characteristic of 
1968 when the government both accepted an exceptional increase 
in wages and adopted a very liberal credit policy - or when, 
maybe, everyone took it for granted that monetary and credit policy 
was very expansionary" 
(P. Salin and G. Lane 1977~ pp. 574-
--,. 
I i 
/ I ! 
<' 
.t/ 
-~ 
-: 
:zable 7.F.1 'lbe Det:ermi.nant:s of All-InciJstzy St:rike frequency and ~ge Inflation in Mmufact:uring: Prance 
1956-67; 1969-~ 
Eqn. Dep. Variable C
t 
V
t 
1 strike Frequency 9010.9 6.489 
(All In<bstry) (4.240) (2.226) 
Fqn. Dep. Variable C
t 
V
t 
2 vage Inflation 3.660 0.0352 
(Mmufacturing) (3.731) (4.726) 
3 vage Inflation 1.510 0.0212 
(Mmufacturing) (1.0e7) (2.192) 
4 vage Inflation 2.720 0.0303 
(Mmufacturing) (2.680) (4.176) 
Estimated CDefficients on: 
~ 
P
t 
-0.392 
(-1.310) 
• 
D
t 
-17.780 
(-3.340) 
Pt:-1/2 
0.585 
(4.010) 
0.546 
(4.030) 
0.524 
(3.817) 
5t:-l SVt _ 1 
0.0014 
(2.030) 
0.524 
(1.977) 
W 
2 
R 
.810 
2 
R 
.831 
.868 
.866 
D-W 
1.88 
D-W 
2.09 
1.93 
1.84 
'F' 
Stat 
21.38 
(3,15) 
'F' 
Stat 
39.43 
(2,t6 ) 
32.79 
(3,15) 
32.37 
(3,15) 
5t 
2560 
W
t 
9.95 
9.95 
9.95 
Notes: Figures in bradcets are "t" statistics; C
t 
is the ca1St:ant term; V
t 
\D1filled vacancies; P
t 
the prq:ortional change in real 
wages in manufacturing; D the ratio of profits' to total cx:tIpE!nsation; P the lagged prop:>rtional change in CXJI"lS1.l\l& 
t t:-1/2 
prices; 5t:-1 laggOO strike fre:pency (all indlstries);5Vt:-1lagged strike volune (manufacturing) per 10,000 \tlOrldng days 
lost. 
Sources: l£e Appendix 1 
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ITALY 
~
~rike Behaviour. 
Like France, strikes in Italy have been characterized as responding 
primarily to organizational and political currents, rather than to variations 
in economic conditions (Synder 1975). As noted in Chapter 3, however, the 
empirical support for such a contention is far from compelling. These doubts 
are further reinforced by the present findings. 
The best fitting equation in the Italian context took the following 
form: 18 
5 
t 
= a 
o 
-1 
+aU +aU 
1 2 t 
+ a W 
3 P 
t 
+ a D 
4 t-1 
As equation 1 in Table 7.1.1 illustrates the above specification explains 
86% of the variation in aggregate strike frequency over the period 1956-1975. 
The satisfactory nature of this overall performance gains further confirmation 
from Graph 7. 1.1., which indicates a generally close correspondence between 
actual and fitted values over the period, with the notable exception of 
Significant over-prediction in 1966-67 followed by under-prediction from 
1%8-1971. 
Reference to the performance of individual variables in equation 1 
Provides strong evidence for the existence of behavioural relationships of the 
type conventionally assumed in economic analyses of strike determination. 
Thus, a significant positive relationship is established between strike fre-
quency and the inverse of the level of unemployment, implying that strike 
activity is increased during periods of labour market tightness. In addition, 
the real wage variable enters with a significant negative sign, a finding 
broadly consistent with an expectations - achievement interpretation in which 
./ 
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high real wage increases are associated with satisfied wage expectations, and 
hence with fewer strikes. In terms of the remaining variables, both the rate 
of change of unemployment, and the level of real profits enter the equation 
with positive signs, but only achieve significance at the 10% level. In the 
case of the unemployment variable this implies increased strike activity 
during the downswing of the cycle, a finding consistent with the argument 
advanced by Smith (1976), that unions tend to refer to recent levels of un-
employment in framing their demands and assessing their power, while employers 
tend to act on the basis of projections extrapolated from current changes, so 
that when unemployment is rising, the gap between unions and employers is 
widened. In the case of the lagged profits variable (measured in this case as 
real aggregate profits), the existence of a positive coefficient suggests the 
dominating influence of a union aggression effect over the counterveiling 
tendency for employers to adopt a more concessionary attitude when their 
ability to pay and opportunity costs of striking are high. 
Additional insight into the impact of the Italian institutional environ-
ment on strike behaviour is realed when equation 1 is re-estimated with the 
real wage variable divided into its separate money wage and price components. 
As equation 2 indicates, while the money wage variable enters with a 
Significant negative sign, the price variable, though positive, is insignifi-
Cant. The most obvious explanation for this is that it is the result of the 
operation of the system of automatic wage indexation (scala mobile), which 
provided for automatic wage adjustments to cost-of-living changes during the 
period under investigation (Brandini 1975). As in Belgium, therefore, wage 
indexation appears to have been an effective device for reducing worker 
hostility over price inflation. 19 It is also interesting to note that 
re-estimation of the equation using strike frequency in manufacturing as the 
"!., 
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dependent variable does little to alter the equation' s overall performance. 
As equation 3 indicates, the only substantive change is a drop in the 
Significance of the rate of change of unemployment. 
In relation to incomes policy, as noted in Chapter 6, with a generally 
unsupportive institutional environment and universal union opposition, formal 
restraint policies have been largely precluded wi thin the Italian context. 
Given this, no formal allowance was made in the estimating equation for an 
incomes policy effect. As Ulman and Flanagan ( 1971 ) have argued, however, 
" nothwithstanding the unions I reluctance to commit themselves to a formal 
incomes policy, the Government was able to induce unions to postpone the 
re-opening of their contracts in 1965. II Of particular significance in this 
respect was undoubtedly the restraint evident in the pattern-setting three 
Year agreement signed by the metalworkers in 1966. It could therefore be 
argued, with some justification, that a de facto - though informal - system of 
~age restraint was operative in Italy over the period 1966-1968. Moreover, it 
is surely no mere coincidence that this period broadly corresponds with that 
Of the over-prediction of equation 1 evident in Graph 7. I .1., or that it 
immediately preceeds the period of under-prediction from 1968-1971. 
~e Behaviour. 
Additional light is shed on the incomes policy issue by consideration of 
the ~age equations presented in Table 7.r.1. In particular, it is clear both 
from equation 4, and from the data plotted in Graph 7.r.2, that while a basic 
Price expectations augmented Phillips curve provides a generally satisfactory 
eXplanation of the pattern of wage inflation (as measured by changes in the 
index of hourly wage rates in manufacturing) over the period 1956-75, it is 
neVertheless prone to significant over-prediction between 1965 and 1968, and 
under-prediction in 1970 and 1973. It would thus appear that there are 
, .' ........ ' 
.. : .. ' "~ ,," 
/ 
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certain parallels in the performance of both the strike and wage equations 
induced at least in part by the operation of the informal incomes policy,20 
with both strike and wage variables falling below their predicted values in 
the mid to late 1960s , and exceeding their predicted values in the early 
19705 • 
To explore this issue further, the basic equation was re-estimated, 
first with lagged strike frequency in manufacturing as an additional explanatory 
variable, and subsequently with lagged strike volume in manufacturing. The 
results are presented in equations 5 and 6. As equation 5 illustrates, 
though the strike frequency variable enters with a significant positive co-
effiCient, its inclusion causes a decline in the 'F' statistic: while multi-
collinearity between the lagged strike variable and unemployment (r = 0.76)21 
also causes the latter to drop from significance. Reference to equation 5, 
however, reveals that substitution of lagged strike volume brings about an 
improvement in the equation's overall explanatory power, with the new 
variable both highly significant and correctly signed. Thus, while multi-
collinearity again causes the unemployment variable to drop from significance 
(r = 0.60) , inclusion of the strike variable is associated in this case 
with an increase in the value of the equation's 'F' statistic. Reference to 
Graph 7.I.2 reveals, however, that this improvement in fit derives largely 
from the augmented equation's superior performance in 1970. Given this, it 
Would be possible, as Spinelli (1976) has observed, to replace the lagged 
strike volume index with a simple dummy variable for 1970 without prejudicing 
the equation's explanatory power. Indeed, estimation of just such an 
equation over the period 1954-1973 by Spinelli (1970: p. 217) confirms this 
result, producing a highly significant positive coefficient on the dummy 
variable and an improvement in the equations overall explanatory power. 
In the light of these findings it is difficult to 
7.27a 
challenge the conclusion reached by Spinelli that, 
" in the long run, there is no systematic and significant 
influence of strike activity on the Italian rate of wage 
inflation, and that the union militancy hypothesis is to be 
rejected as a basis for a sensible explanation of the 
inflation phenomena experienced in Italy during the last 
fifteen years." 
(Spinelli 1970; pp 217-18) 
Indeed, such a conclusion would also seem to accord with supposed weakness 
of the Italian labour movement as reflected in the hypotheses advanced in 
the context of strike behaviour by Snyder (1974, 1975). 
I 
'.labie 7.I. 1 'lhe Det:enninant:s of Aggregate st:.rike Fr~ and Hfige Inflaticn in Manufacturing: Italy 
1956-1975 
Eqn. IEp. Variable 
1 StrikeFr~ 
2 StrikeFr~ 
3 StrikeFr~ 
(Manufacturing) 
Eqn. IEp. Variable 
4 rage Inflation 
(Manufacturing) 
5+ rage Inflation 
(Manufacturing) 
6+ rage Inflation 
(Manufacturing) 
C 
t 
-2896.9 
(-1.443) 
-4691.9 
(2.339) 
-1580.9 
(-1.596) 
C
t 
-2.830 
(-0.735) 
-2.956 
(-0.939) 
0.968 
(0.449) 
-1 
U 
t 
2586860 
(3.889) 
2928700 
(-2.600) 
1380210 
(3.293) 
-1 
U
t 
5311.03 
(1.808) 
1141.0 
(0.341) 
1210.9 
(0.062) 
Estimated O:>efficients on: 
U
t 
P
t 
0.786 
(1.390) 
0.944 30.660 
(1.637) (0.594) 
0.4369 
(1.149) 
Pt-1/2 
1.235 
(4. 895) 
0.977 
(4.732) 
0.948 
(7.080) 
W
t 
-79.01 
(-3.233) 
St-1 
0.004 
(1.828) 
~ 
P
t 
-74.10 
(-3.033) 
-55.36 
(-3.345) 
V 
t-1 
0.007 
t4-. 7z.o) 
D 
t-1 
0.240 
(1.404) 
0.3608 
( 1.657) 
0.1463 
(1.637) 
2 
R 
.862 
.870 
.829 
2 
R 
.745 
.778 
.877 
D-W 
1.41 
1.55 
1.68 
D-W 
2.00 
2.04 
1.89 
'F' 
Stat 
23.37 
(4,15) 
18.76 
(5,14) 
18.14 
(4,15) 
'F' 
Stat 
24.89 
(2,17) 
19.90 
(3,17) 
40.29 
(3,17) 
St 
3379 
3379 
1838 
.-
W
t 
10.62 
10.62 
10.62 
Notes: Figures in brackets are :t' statistics. ct is the constant; u:~ reciprocal of the unatployment level; Ut the rate of 
change of une:rp~~t; Pt the prq:orticnll change in prices; Wt is the prop:>rtional change in hourly wage rates in 
manufacturing; ~ is the prq-ortional change in real wages; Dt -1 is lagged real aggregate profits; St-1 lagged strike 
Pt 
frepency in rranufacturing; andVt -1 lagged '#Prking days lost in manufacturing (10,000's). 
+1956-1976 
Sources: ~e 1\ppendix 1 
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~ike Behaviour 
Very little empirical work has been done on the determinants of aggregate 
strike activity in Japan. The impression given by the comparative industrial 
relations literature, however, is that Japanese strike patterns are most 
Closely akin to those of France and Italy (Ross and Hartman 1960). In each 
Country strikes are frequent but short, while the industrial relations envir-
°nments from which they derive are seen as similarly characterized by rival 
Unionism, significant communist influence, and patterrr$ of labour-management 
relations which, like their respective labour movements, are both weak and 
unstable (Shirai and Shimada 1978; Korpi and Shalev 1979). Moreover, given 
the importance of the state in Japan in determining the terms and conditions 
of employment, (Dore 1973), and organized labour's exclusion from political 
POwer, strikes have been viewed, like those in France and Italy, as largely 
POlitical in character. LL 
Given this institutional background, it might be presumed, at least on 2 
~ grounds, that Japanese strikes are likely to be unresponsive to 
'Iariations in economic conditions, responding instead to organizational and 
POlitical factors. In practice, though the above characterizations are 
brOadly historically acccurate, they present a misleading picture of post-war 
indUstrial relations in Japan. Thus, within the larger Japanese firms, 
COllective bargaining between management and enterprise unions is now well 
established. Moreover, on the wage front, the actions of individual enter-
\ 
Prise unions have, since 1955, been actively coordinated by sOhyo (Japan's 
largest union federation) into the spring wage offensive, or Shunto, during 
wh' ~ch target wage demands are advanced via coordinated strike action. These 
'" '" 
;,.~ t •• 
." 
",';.".,. 
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strikes are undoubtedly based upon partly political considerations, however 
their timing and frequency is also heavily influenced by prevailing economic 
Conditions. This fact emerges strongly from the empirical work presented 
below. 
The best fitting equation in the Japanese context took the following 
form: l3 
S 
t 
-1 
= a + a U + a W + a P + a D 
o 1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t-1 
Estimation shows this equation (equation 1 in Table 7.J.1) to be consis-
tent with 97 per cent of the variation in strike frequency over the period 
1956-1975. Further confirmation of its overall explanatory power is presented 
in Graph 7.J.1. which plots the actual and fitted values derived from the 
above equation. 
In terms of the perforlnance of individual variables, both current wage 
Changes and current price changes enter with significant positive signs (in 
fact, the latter variables exhibit a high degree of multicollinearity (r' = 
The lagged profits variable (expressed as aggregate real profits 
lagged 01\e period) also enters the equation with a signifi~ant positive sign, 
a finding consistent with the employer's willingness to concede during periods 
of high profitability being more than counterbalanced by increased union 
aggressiveness in the face of enhanced ability to pay.lO 
The remaining variable - the inverse of the level of unemployment -
enters the equation with a significant negative sign. This implies tha t 
Strike frequency in Japan is incred.sed during periods of high unelnployment. 
While this finding is consistent with that appearing in Belgium, Germany, the 
~etherlands and Sweden under cooperative incomes policies, its explanation in 
,,; ~ '~.' ", .::: 
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the Japanese context, where a formal incomes policy has never been introduced, 
is very different. In practice, the most likely explanation for this rela-
tionship is Japan's lifetime employment system. Under this system the so-
called 'permanent employees' of Japanese companies - who also account for the 
lion's share of the membership of the enterprise unions - are effectively 
cUshioned from lay-off during periods of economic slowdown. This situation 
arises from the fact that when employment cut backs are considered necessary, 
they are typically made from within the "ranks of the non-unionized 'temporary' 
workers and/or through reductions in the use of sub-contractors. As a result, 
unemployment is a much less effective constraint on union wage demands in the 
Japanese context than elsewhere. If, however, employers still respond to high 
unemployment by making significant reductions in their wage offers, the net 
result will be a widening of the gap between offers and demands, and an 
.2.5" A 
increase in the probability of strike action. 
While the existence of the life-time employment system provides a consis-
tent explanation for the existence of a positive relationship between strikes 
and unemployment, it also casts obvious doubts over the value of the latter 
Variable as a satisfactory indicator of the state of the labour market. In 
View of this, equation 1 was re-estimated substituting the unfilled vacancy 
rate, Vt , in place of the unemployment variable. The results, as equation 2 
in Table 7.J.l indicates, are fully consistent with those obtained using the 
Unemployment variable, with Vt entering with a significant positive sign. 
Fi.nally, as equation 3 illustrates, none of the relationships estimated in 
eqUation 1 are qualitatively effected when strike frequency in manufacturing 
is Substituted for aggregate strike frequency as the dependent variable • 
• ~'! .. .'." 
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!age Behaviour. 
Turning to the process of wage determination, as equation 4 illustrates, 
a basic Phillips curve, employing unfilled vacancies as an index of labour 
market conditions, and supplemented with a lagged price variable, is capable 
of accounting for 85 per cent of the variation in Shunto wage settlements over 
the period 1956-1975. Lb This satisfactory performance is also confirmed by 
reference to the pattern of residuals generated by equation 1, which are 
Plotted in Graph 7.J.2. As the plots indicate, apart from over-predictions in 
1973 and 1975, and the under-prediction of the extreme level of settlements 
oCCurring in 1974, the equation is generally consistent with recent 
experience. 
While no theoretical justification can be given in relation to the 
effects of incomes policy on trade union behaviour to justify the inclusion of 
strike variables, their performance is nevertheless of interest given the 
institutional details of the wage determination process under Shunto. Here, 
as has been noted, target wage demands are pressed through coordinated strike 
action among the major enterprise unions. Equation 5 indicates the effect of 
adding strike frequency in manufacturing to the basic equation. In this case 
the strike variable is added in unlagged form because the dependent variable 
is settlements rather than current actual wage changes (i.e. it is assumed 
that whereas actual wage changes in time t are based on bargaining activity, 
and hence also strikes, in time t-1; settlements in time t are based upon 
bargaining, and hence also strikes, in time t). As can be seen from the 
eqUation, while strike frequency enters with a significant positive coeffic-
ient, multicollinearity with the lagged price variable (r ;: 0.87) causes the 
la.tter to drop from significance. The addition also produces a decline in the 
value of the 'F' statistic and, as can be seen from Graph 7.J.2, the expanded 
.. :.. ~ .... " ' . 
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equation is also unable to account for settlement behaviour over the period 
1972-5. Similar problems are evident if figures for current working days 
lost in manufacturing are substituted for strike frequency. As equation 6 
illustrates, in this case not only is the significance of the coefficient 
On the price term reduced, but the strike variable is also non-significant 
at the 5 per cent level. The superior performance of the strike frequency 
variable over strike volume is easily explained in the Japanese institutional 
context, given the emphasis on the short but frequent stoppages as an 
important adjunct to wage bargaining. 
The very close correspondence between strike frequency and price changes 
makes it impossible to disentangle the separate influence of these variables 
in the wage determination process, at least on the basis of the results 
presented in equation 2. More detailed studies of Japanese inflation 
experience (Komiya and Suzuki 1977) have, however, argued that it was largely 
a demand side phenomenon (though the role of rising import prices is also 
acknowledged). Thus, the price explosion of 1974 is traced to the unusually 
high rate of money supply creation between 1971 and early 1973, and to the 
combined effects of tax cuts in 1971 and increasing government expenditure 
during the upswing of 1972-73. On the basis of this argument inflation 
Was a cause rather than a consequence of trade union militancy. Thus, even 
though the strike explosion of 1974 was associated with increases in the 
wage base of large firms by upto 33 per cent it has been argued (Komiya and 
, 
Suzuki 1977; p.~23 ) that without such increases both labours share in 
national income and real wages would have declined considerably in the face 
of the rapidly rising cost of living. On the basis of this argument, 
therefore, the strike augmented wage equation (equation 2) must be rejected 
in favour of the basic expectations Phillips curve in equation 1. 
TcJble 7.J.1 7he £et::e.rnrinant:s of Aggregate strike n-equen<:y and r18ge settlanent:s Wlder .shWlt:o: Jap3ll 
1956-1975 
Eqn. D:!p. Variable 
1 strike Frequency 
2 Strike Frequency 
3 Strike Frequency 
(Mmufacturing) 
Eqn. D:!p. Variable 
1 S1unto 
Sett1anents 
2 S1unto 
Settl.arents 
3 S1unto 
Settlerents 
C 
t 
636.14 
(1.460) 
-919.55 
(-2.587) 
389.4 
(1.289) 
C 
t 
-4.73 
(-2.540) 
-1.92 
(-1.130) 
-6.05 
(-2.998) 
-1 
U 
t 
-691710 
(-2.873) 
-382213 
(-2.299) 
V 
t 
0.0373 
(6.713) 
0.0239 
(3.737) 
0.0638 
(6.793) 
f! 
t 
75.98 
(4.116) 
119.90 
(5.504) 
28.57 
(2.248) 
Estimated Cbefficients on: 
¥I 
t 
122.41 
(7.233) 
53.58 
(2.835) 
76.02 
(6.430) 
P 
1::-1/2 
0.478 
(3.806) 
0.196 
(1.144) 
0.310 
(1.860) 
D 
t-1 
0.0592 
(3.690) 
0.065 
(2.897) 
0.026 
(2.340) 
S 
t 
0.004 
(2.380) 
V 
t 
2.287 
(2.826) 
IDL 
t 
0.0098 
(1.459) 
R2 
.968 
.943 
.949 
'2 
R 
.834 
.889 
.871 
D-W ~t -S 
t 
2.02 113.7 1795 
(4,15) 
2.02 61.31 1795 
(4,15) 
1.99 69.42 1002 
(4,15) 
'F' 
D-W stat W 
t 
2.00 49.53 12.98 
(2,17) 
2.03 42.631 12.98 
(3,16) 
1.99 35.95 12.98 
(3,16) 
Notes: figures in bradrets are 't' statistics~ C is the oonstant term; u-1 the reciprocal of the level of unatplO}mel1.t~ V 
unfilled vacancies~ f! t the prop:>rtional cknge in prices~ ¥It the Jop:>rtional change in manufacturing wage rates (m::nfruy) ; 
D1::-1 lagged real aggregate profits; St rurrent strike fre:pmcy in rnanufacturin~ and IDL current ~rking days lost in 
manufacturing in 10,000'5. 
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£...ANADA 
~rike Behaviour 
A nwnber of previous studies of Canadian strikes have confirmed their 
responsiveness to economic conditions (Smith 1972, 1976; Walsh 1975; Cousineau 
and Lacroix: 1976). The present study is no ex:ception. The best fitting 
equation took the following form: L? 
As equation 1 in Table 7.C.1 indicates, this specification gives an out-
standingly good fit, accounting for 97 per cent of the annual variation in the 
log of strike frequency over the period 1952-1975. Further confirmation of 
tho ~s performance is provided by Graph 7.C.1, which plots the actual and fitted 
"alues derived from the estimation of equation 1. In terms of the performance 
Of individual variables, the inverse of the level of unemployment, the rate of 
Change of unemployment and the proportional change in consumer prices all 
enter with positive signs, and are significant at the 5 per cent level. The 
two remaining variables, namely the proportional change in nominal wage rates 
in manufacturing, and profits (ex:pressed as the ratio of current aggregate 
profits to total compensation), also enter with positive signs, but are Signi-
ficant only at the 10 per cent level. The latter finding, of positive coeffi-
Cients on both wage and profits variables, contradicts the earlier findings of 
Smith (1972) and Walsh (1975), both of whom report significant negative coef-
ficients. Thus, while it might be argued on the basis of equation 1 that in 
recent years Canadian workers have become more concerned over wage differen-
tials and increases in the share of profits than previously, such an argument 
also serves to anphasise the relative instability of the behavioural relation-
Ships involved. 
. . I "\ .; .~, ..... " 'I:~. ~ ... .., ,\ '-. '~-:, ~'. ,.: .. \':':-;~~~ ~ ,::'.i, t .!", ".~:- ... ;. :~-:.-.' 
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As far as the two labour market variables and the rate of inflation are 
concerned, the present findings are fully consistent with those of previous 
studies. Thus, canadian strikes show a decline in frequency during periods of 
high unemployment, while also, and on the face of it somewhat paradoxically, 
tending to increase with increases in the level of unemployment. The latter 
finding is, as noted above, consistent with that reported by Smith (1976) in 
his study of canadian strikes. As Smith argues, if employers are more future 
oriented in their labour market responses than unions, when unemployment is 
r' , ~S~ng employers will base their current wage offers on an assumption of even 
Slacker labour market conditions over the contract period, and reduce their 
Wage offers accordingly. By tending to widen the gap between offers and 
demands in this way, increasing unemployment will tend to be associated with 
an increase in strikes. 
As equation 2 in Table 7.C.1 illustrates, re-estimation of the equation 
USing frequency in manufacturing as the dependent variable is associated with 
seVeral changes in significance, though not in sign. Thus, the coefficient on 
the rate of change in unemployment drops below significance at the 5 per cent 
level; while the coefficient on the profits variable gains significance at the 
5 per cent level, implying that trade union pushfulness in response to high 
prOfits outweighs employer acquiescence in the face of an increased ability to 
Pay in the manufacturing sector. 
'. :" '. '6' ,: ...... {j; 
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Finally, equation 3 in Table 7.C.1 presents the results obtained from 
Substituting a composite real wage variable in place of its separate money 
wage and price components. As can be seen, the real wage variable enters the 
equation with a significant negative sign, a finding that is consistent with 
that reported in previous studies. 
~e Behaviour 
In the context of wage determination, as equation 4 in Table 7.C.1 
illustrates, a basic Phillips curve, supplemented with a lagged price term, 
aCCounts for approximately 77 per cent of the variation in changes in hourly 
wage rates in Canadian manufacturing industry over the period 1952-1975. 
Reference to the pattern of residuals generated by the equation, and plotted 
in Graph 7.C.1, also confirms its overall explanatory power, although there is 
Some evidence of deterioration from 1968 onwards. This deterioration has been 
allUded to in previous studies [Kaliski 1972; Rowley and Wilton 1974(a), 
1974(b)] • Several explanations have been advanced. Two of which might use-
~Ully be mentioned by way of example. First, progressive increases in con-
tract length during the 1960's greatly complicated the temporal specification 
Of the explanatory variables ,leading to the possibility of bias in Phillips 
Curve estimates. Second, some doubt exists over the consistency of unemploy-
ment as an appropriate indicator of labour market excess demand,ltl because of 
demographic changes (Economic Council of canada,1976). 
In the present context, both the level of aggregation employed and data 
aVailability place severe restrictions on the allowance that can be made for 
t 29 
hese factors. One factor that can be allowed for, however, is the possibl~ 
influence of trade unions, whose members account for over 70% of the produc-
tion workforce in Canadian manufacturing industry. Thus, equation 5 prese~ts 
the results obtained from supplementing the basic expectations Phillips curve 
:" , ' ' .. , ':" 
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With lagged strike frequency in manufacturing. As can be seen from Table 
7.C." not only does the variable enter with a highly significant positive 
Sign, but its addition to the equation is also associated with an increase in 
the 'F' statistic. Reference to the pattern of residuals plotted in Graph 
7.C.2 also shows that there is some improvement in the augmented equation's 
predictive power I especially with more recent data, over that of the basic 
equation; though significant under-predicitions are still evident in '971 and 
1972. Less desirable, however, is the fact that addition of the strike 
variable also brings about a decline in the significance of the unemployment 
variable (though the simple correlation coefficient between these variables is 
Only -0.3);J U. As one possible means of allowing for this probl~~, an 
additional equation was estimated using a 'standardized' strike variable 
corresponding to the residuals generated by regressing the unemployment 
Va . 
rl.able on lagged strike frequency. As can be seen from equation 6, while 
a.ll variables are significant and correctly signed, the substitution is 
aSSociated with declines in both the correlation coefficient and 'F' 
Sta.tistic. 
In the final equatioa presented in Table 7.C.', lagged strike volume is 
SUbstituted for the strike frequency variables. Again the additional variable 
is correctly signed, highly significant, and associated with an improvement in 
the equation's 'F' statistic over that in the basic equation. I-breover, this 
finding is also broadly in line with that reported in a quarterly an.11ysis of 
Wage change data over the period 1955(1) to 1969(2) (Swidinsky 1972). In the 
light of this evidence it is hard to dismiss Canadian Union activity, and 
their strike behaviour in particular, as irrelevant to the process of wage 
d ~OA 
etermination. 
I J.\"" 
I~ 
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Table 7.C.l. The Determinants of Strike Frequency and Wage Inflation in Manufacturing: Canada 1952-1975. 
Eqn.Dep. 
Variable 
1 Log.Strike 
Frequency 
2 Log.Strike 
Frequency 
(manufac-
turing) 
C
t 
4.991 
(7.847) 
3.532 
(3.832) 
3 Log.Strike 5.567 
Frequency (8.015) 
Eqn.Dep. 
Variable C t 
4 Wage Infla- 0.850 
tion (hour- (1.254) 
ly rates) 
5 Wage Infla- -2.470 
tion (0.193) 
6 Wage Infla-
tion 
7 l'lage Infla-
tion 
0.828 
(0.830) 
0.899 
(0.694) 
-1 Ut 
. 
U
t 
209.34 0.002 
(4.748) (4.358) 
221. 21 0.001 
(3.466) (1.602) 
223.15 0.002 
(5.071) (4.095) 
-1 
U 
t 
. 
Pt-~ 
1283.6 0.359 
(3.205) (3.048) 
517.0 0.264 
(1.933) (2.05) 
587.41 0.717 
(2.704) (6.885) 
300 . 40 O. 477 
(1.061) (4.247) 
. 
P
t 
0.0162 
(3.603) 
0.0159 
(2.447) 
St-1 
0.016 
(5.353) 
0.012 t 
(4.382) 
Notes: Figures in brackets are 't' statistics. 
. 
the rate of change of unemployment; 
Estimated Coefficients on: 
. 
~\ 
0.022 
(1. 595) 
0.0266 
(1.359) 
V
t
_1 
0.014 
(4.903) 
. 
W 
P
t 
-0.014 
(-2.971) 
D
t 
0.035 
(1. 582) 
0.0564 
(1. 785) 
0,045 
(1. 956) 
R2 
.969 
.943 
.962 
R2 
.768 
.866 
.826 
.853 
D-W 
2.01 
2.50 
1.86 
D-W 
1. 78 
2.11 
2.21 
2.25 
'F' 
Stat 
113.49 
(5,18) 
59.95 
(5,18) 
120.78 
(4,19) 
'F' 
Stat 
34.71 
(2,21) 
43.24 
t3,20) 
31.61 
(3,20) 
38,57 
(3,20) 
-
St 
5.948 
5.202 
5.948 
. 
W
t 
5.98 
5.98 
5.98 
5.98 
-1 • C is the constant; U the reciprocal of the unemployment U 
t· t t W
t
, ; are the proportional change in prices, wages and real 
is the ratio of aggregatetprofits to total compensation; St_l and Vt - l are lagged 
P
t 
wages respectively; D
t 
strike frequency and lagged strike volume in 10,000's. 
t = corrected for pnemp1oyment. 
Sources: See Appendix 1. 
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~ITED STATES 
~rike Behaviour 
As noted in Chapter 2, the first attempt to apply econometric techniques 
to the estimation of the relationship between fluctuations in strike activity 
and the various components of the business cycle was made in the U.S. context 
by Ashenfelter and Johnson in 1969. Despite the many criticisms that have 
been made of the operational model derived from thiS analysis, it is signifi-
Cant that the best fitting equation emerging from the present study of annual 
st . 
rl.ke frequency data is virtually identical to the original Ashenfelter-
Johnson quaterly model. The only major difference between the models, apart 
from the obvious one of the periodicity of the data, and the omission of the 
trend term, is the inclusion in the present equation of a dummy variable 
taking the value of one during the operational phases of wage policy (namely 
1951-1952; 1962-1965; 1971-1972). 
The complete specification is as follows: jl 
As equation 1 in Table 7.U.S.1 indicates, the above specification 
aCCounts for 93 per cent of the variation in aggregate u.s. strike frequency 
OVer the period 1953-1974. Further confirmation of this performance is prov-
ided in Graph 7.U.S.1, which contains plots of the actual and the fitted values 
generated by equation 1. In the context of individual variables, all of the 
hYpotheses originally advanced by Ashenfelter and Johnson are broadly con-
firmed. Thus, u.s. strike frequency appears to be inversely related to both 
the level of unemployment and to real wage changes; although in contrast to 
AShenfelter and Johnson's findings, the lagged profits variable (expressed as 
the ratio of aggregate profits to total compensation), enters the present 
. . .. ~ .. ,"" 
1 ' :. ,,~,. ~ " 
" •. '1' •.•. . ~, 
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equation with a significant negative sign. Consideration of the wage res-
traint dwnmy also shows strike frequency to have been significantly reduced by 
incomes policies, although a re-entry dwruny variable included in earlier esti-
mations proved insignificant. A recent quarterly study of U. S. strikes has, 
however, established a significant positive re-entry effect (Shalev 1980). 
The explanation for this discrepancy is simply that annual data are not sensi-
tive enough to pick this up where operational and re-entry phases occur within 
the same year. 
Re-estimation of equation 1, substituting separate money wage and price 
'Iariables in place of the single real wage variable, (equation 2), produces 
the expected significant positive coefficient on the price term; but while the 
Coefficient on the wage term is negative as expected, it is insignificant. 
Finally, re-estimation using strike frequency in manufacturing in place of 
aggregate strike frequency as the dependent variable, as in equation 3, pro-
duces no qualitative changes in the results. 
~ Behaviour 
In the context of wage determination, as equation 4 in Table 7. U. s.1 illu-
strates, a basic Phillips' relation, supplemented with a lagged price term, 
aCCOunts for approximately 83 per cent of the variation in changes in hourly 
Wage rates in U.S. manufacturing industry over the period 1953-1974. Refer-
ence to the pattern of residuals generated by the equation, and plotted in 
Graph 7.U.S.2, offers further confirmation of the equation's explanatory 
Power, though as in canada there is some evidence of deterioration in the 
equation's perfonnance from 1968 onwards. Indeed, comparisons between the 
';,. . II ,~'.' " . 
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residuals generated by the basic expectations Phillips curve after 1968 in 
Cdnadd and the United States reveal a remarkably similar pattern,a fact which 
Clearly points to the possibility of cOlnmon causality. 
Given the existence of an incomes policy effect in the U.S. strike data, 
and in order to e~~mlne further the role of the unions in the wage determin-
at' . loon process, equations 5 and 6 present the results obtained from supple-
menting the basic equation. first with a lagged manufacturing strike frequency 
Variable, and then with a lagged manufacturing strike volume variable. As can 
be seen, in neither case are these additional variables significant, and in 
the case of the frequency measure the coefficient also has the wrong sign. In 
addition, in each case inclusion of the strike variable is associated with a 
deCline in the 'F' statistic. Given these results, it is hard to sustain the 
propOsition that the strike behaviour of American unions has been effective in 
extracting a pattern of wage settlements that diverges significantly from 
those dictated by prevailing labour market conditions~4 
,r.'" .. •• • ~,' ~' • ~"'j~' . .' "t. .,,: 
--;,f .• 
Table 7.U.S.l. The Determinants of Aggregate Strike Frequency and Wage Inflation in Manufacturing: The United States 
1953-1974. 
Estimated Coefficients on: 
. 
Eqn.Dep. -1 . . W I R2 'F' Ct Ut Pt Wt D F D-~v St Variable Pt t-1 t Stat 
1 Strike 9257.2 13664800 -139.29 -743.90 -464.67 .931 2.37 57.29 4369 
Frequency (28.449) (17.532) (-3.841) (-19.91) (-4.550) (4,17) 
2 Strike 8478.1 12590600 140.10 -86.47 -671. 37 -394.60 .934 2.38 45.31 4369 
Frequency (8.850) (8.602) (3.82) (-1.213) (-7.325) (-3.010) (5,16) 
3 strike 3483.4 6007390 -75.99 -252,.06 -237.12 .868 2.16 27.93 2157 
Frequency (15.640) (11.315) (-3.240) (-10.170) (-3.380) (4,17) 
(manufac-
turing) 
Eqn.Dep. -1 . R2 'F' . Ct Ut Pt-~ S Vt _1 D-W Wt Variable t-1 Stat 
4 Wage Infla- 3.82 13767.5 0.220 .834 2.05. 47.56 4.58 
tionlhour1y (1.615) (6.143) (1.970) (2,19 ) 
rates) 
5 Wage Inf1a- 6.25 13649.5 0.229 -0.CXJ07 .851 1.96 34.33 4.58 
tion (2.049) (6.332) (2.094) (-1.423) (3,18) 
6.Wage Infla- 4.003 13330.4 0.2217 0.CXJ04 .835 2.08 30.44 4.58 
tion (1.566) (5.322) (1.934) (0.421) (3,18) 
Notes: Figures in brackets are It' statistics. C 
• t is the constant; 
U- 1 
t 
the reciprocal of the level of unemployment; 
•• W 
Wt Pt and P are the proportional changes in wages, prices, and real wages respectively; Dt _ l is the t 
lagged profits ratio; Ft a wage restraint d~~y; St-l 
volume respectively, both in manufacturing and; St· and 
Sources: See Appendix 1. 
:nd· Vt - l are lagged strike frequency and lagged strike 
W
t 
are the means of the dependent variables. 
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2!!.ITED KINGDOM 
~rike Behaviour 
While the first econometric study of British strike statistics provided 
strong support for the economic model developed by Ashenfelter and Johnson 
(Pencavel 1970), subsequent work has been much less supportive. In 
particular, as noted in Chapter 2, the predicted inverse relationship between 
unemployment, used as a proxy for the state of the labour market, and strike 
frequency, has not been confirmed by all subsequent studies (Shorey 1977, 
Xnight 1972, Hunter 1973); while coefficients with both positive and negative 
signs have been found to be significant for real corporate profits. 
Considerable ambiguity is also evident in the literature on the precise impact 
Of incomes policy. Thus, despite the widespread conviction that such policies 
have had a depressive effect on strike frequency, empirical confirmation of 
this result has proved elusive. 
As can be seen from equation 1 in Table 7.U.K.1, estimation of the basic 
mOdel over the period 1952-1976 does little to resolve the ambiguities 
Outlined above. Only three variables appear significant at the 5 per cent 
level: namely, the rate of change of unemployment and the ratio of pre-tax to 
POst-tax disposable income Rt" which are both inversely related to strike 
frequency; and the post incomes policy re-entry variable, F1t( entered in 
1971 and 1974), which is positively related to strike frequency. Of the 
l:'emaining variables, both unemployment and price c:1anges enter with the wrong 
Sign, implying that strike frequency is increased during periods of high 
unemployment ~nd reduced during periods of high inflation. In addition, 
earlier estimation including dummy variables for 'hard' and 'soft' operational 
Phases of incomes policy also produced insignificant results. 
,',. .:,. I' '.: • "~. ',. " ',: • 
" 
,', 11" 
/. 
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In view of this poor performance, the basic model was re-estimated for 
the sub-periods 1952-1965 and 1966-1975. The latter period is of particular 
interest because it includes that over which the original Ashenfelter and 
Johnson model appears to break down. It also reflects a period of unusual 
turmoil in the area of collective bargaining I with accelerating rates of 
domestic and world inflation, growing unemployment, a decline in the rate of 
profit, and of particular relevance in the present context, a much greater 
degree of government intervention through successive incomes policies.' In the 
Brit' l.sh context these policies took a wide variety of forms, ranging from 
Short term unilaterally imposed freezes, to long run appeals for cooperation 
in programmes of restraint. In order to examine more adequately the impact of 
this variety of forms of intervention, a quarterly model is substituted for 
the later sub-period. In the earlier period, (1952-1965), however, an annual 
speCification of the following form provided the best fit to the data 3J • 
Where the dependent variable is aggregate strike frequency excluding mining; 
Ut and Ut are the level, and changes in the level of unemployment 
respectively; P is the current proportional change in the retail price index; 
t " 
• 
Wt the current proportional change in weekly wage rates in manufacturing; D~ 
is Current gross trading profits deflated by the retail price index; and R 
t 
-.:,'" 
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is the ratio of post-tax to pre-tax disposable income. 
As can be seen from equation 2 in Table 7. U .K.1, this specification 
explains over 98 per cent of the variation in non-mining strike frequency over 
the period 1952-1965, with all variables except real profits significant at 
the 5 per cent level. Further confirmation of this performance is presented 
in Graph 7.U.K.1,which contains plots of the actual and fitted values 
aSSoCiated with equation 2. Additional reassurance may be derived from 
the fact that the results embodied in equation 2 are consistent with those 
reported by Pencavel (1970), and discussed in some detail in Chapter 2. Thus, 
in both the present equation and that of Pencavel, the level of unemployment 
and money wage changes are inversely related to strike frequency; while price 
Changes and real profits are positively related (though in the case of the 
latter variable the coefficient is only significant at the 10% level). In 
addition to supporting the basic Ashenfelter and Johnson model and re-
confirming the findings of Pencavel,equation 2 also suggests the importance of 
two additional variables in the U.K. context. First, strike frequency appears 
to be significantly reduced by increasing (as well as high) unemployment; 
second, strike frequency appears significantly increased by erosions in 
worker's post-tax disposable income. 
For the later sub-period 1966-1975, the best fitting qUolrterly equation 
took the following form: 34 
St = a o + a 1ut + a 2 iio Pt - i + a 3Rt +aSDt 
+ a 6Y2t+ a 7Y3t + a 8Y4t + a 9Tt + a 10F 1t + a 1 ,F2t + a 12 F3t 
" < ," 
: ,'":.: ',. '. 
".' • • ... 1 • ,', 
/ 
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The additiond variables 
'Y 2 I 'Y3 I and are seasonal dummies 
representing the second, third/and fourth quarters of the year respectivelY1 
while the variables F1t, F2t I and F3t are incomes policy dummies 
representing hard, soft, and re-entry phases of the 
I "bS 
policies operations. The 
price variable is entered as a four-quarter lagged value. It should also be 
noted that both the level of unemployment and the wage variable have been 
dropped since neither appeared significant on the basis of normal statistical 
Criteria. 
As can be seen from Table 7.U.K.1./ the equation has been fitted with 
three separate dependent variables: namely, aggregate strike frequency; pay 
strike frequency;and non-pay strike frequency. The rationale behind this is 
simple. Since the model of strike activity developed in Chapters 5 and 6 is 
based on the assumption that all disputes occur over wages, or wage related 
issues, it would seem appropriate that where data is available (as in the 
United Kingdom), it should be tested using pay stoppages as the dependent 
variable. 30 This approach contrasts markedly with that followed in previous 
Studies, as well as so far in this chapter, where sole reliance is placed upon 
the total number of disputes beginning in each period. The usual 
justification given for this is that official statistics of pay stoppages 
(where they are available) mis-state the true measure because they emphasize 
the single immediate causes of a stoppage I rather than the complex of 
Underlying issues. However, while it is accepted that any attempt to classify 
SUCh a complex form of social action as a strike is liable to be somewhat 
arbitrary, it is nonetheless considered that some distinction between pay and 
non-pay stoppages is worth making. 
In terms of results, reference to equations 3, 4 and 5 in Table 7.U.K.1. 
and to Graph 7.U.K.2 confirms this model's overall explanatory power. In the 
• 
",r '.\" 
",.,' 
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case of equation 3, all coefficients except those on the third and fourth 
quarter seasonal dummies, the trend term, and the hard and soft phases of 
incomes policy are significant; though the real profits variable is only on 
the margin of significance at the 5 per cent level. 
In equation 4 ,with pay strike frequency as the dependent variable, all 
coefficients except those on the third and fourth quarter seasonal dummies, 
the trend term, and real profits variable are significant. Finally, in 
equation 5 all coefficients except those on the second quarter seasonal dummy 
and the soft phase of incomes policy are significant, though in the case of 
the latter variable the coefficient is only marginally below significance at 
the 5 per cent level. 
Comparison of the three equations indicates that the rate of change of 
unemployment, the expected rate of inflation, and the erosion of net 
disposable income all appear to have had a significant impact on both pay and 
non-pay strike frequency, and hence on aggregate strike frequency. More 
specifically, increasing unemployment has been associated with a decline in 
~trike frequency, while inflation and the erosion of net disposable income has 
tended to stimulate them. 
With respect to real profits, the seasonal dummies, and the income policy 
variable, important contrasts are evident between the three equations. In 
relation to seasonal variations in strike activity, there is evidence for the 
eXistence of peaks in pay strike frequency during the secOlld, and to a lesser 
eXtent during the fourth quarter of the year. An obvious explanation for this 
is that these are periods of heaviest wage bargaining activity, and hence the 
probability of a strike occuring is likely to be correspondingly higher at 
SUch times. In terms of non-pay strikes, by contrast, strikes appear to be 
Significantly lower during the last six months of the year. This pattern may 
, 
.... 
",:1. 
" . 
/ ~ .-. 
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be interpreted as broadly in line with variations in the costs of striking, 
since expenditure commitments are likely to be higher during the summer 
hOliday period, and before Christmas. Finally, turning to the seasonal 
pattern in aggregate strike frequency, as one would expect, equation 3 
reflects the net effect of the different seasonal patterns in pay and non-pay 
strikes, with the only significant coefficient appearing in the second 
quarter. 
An interesting contrast is also apparent in the context of the real 
profits variable. This variable, it will be recalled, is capable of 
Conflicting interpretations since 'ability to pay' might be considered to 
affect both union wage demands and employer wage offers in the same direction, 
as well as affecting employer's estimates of the opportunity costs of 
Striking. As equation 4 indicates, in relation to pay strikes the appearance 
Of a negative but insignificant coefficient for real profits is consistent 
With these various influences having largely cancelled one another out - a not 
unexpected result given the multiple role that the real profits variable is 
called upon to perform. Turning to non-pay strikes, as equation 5 
illustrates, the profits variable enters with a highly significant negative 
Sign. An obvious explanation is that while high profits might tend to make 
employers more willing to grant concessions over non-pay related issues in the 
face of a strike threat because of the higher opportunity costs involved, 
there is, in contrast to the situation prevailing ~n the case of pay issues, 
no corresponding tendency for workers to increase their demands over such 
issues when profits are high. Thus, turning to the aggregate strike frequency 
equation, the marginally significant negative coefficient on real profits may 
be readily interpreted as reflecting the net effect of the separate 
relationships outlined above. 
,~ , 
... ' ... .' ,.,'. 
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The most interesting contrast between the findings of the three 
equations is undoubtedly that which occurs with respect to the impact of 
incomes policy. It will be recalled that in general it was expected that the 
Operational phases of such policies would be associated with a decline in 
strike frequency. In the context of pay strikes this expectation is largely 
confirmed. Thus, according to equation 4, both 'hard' and 'soft' phases of 
incomes policy have been associated with reductions in strikes, with the soft 
Phase apparently more significant in this respect. The importance of the 
re-entry variable is also confirmed, with the one year period following the 
demise of an incomes policy associated with a significant increase in strike 
frequency. Considered over its complete life-cycle, therefore, the net impact 
Of incomes policy on pay strike frequency, though still significantly 
negative, is considerably less pronounced than sole reference to its 
Operational phases would suggest. 
Reference to equation 3 serves to confirm the importance of the re-entry 
~ariable for aggregate strike frequency; however in this case, neither of the 
coefficients on the policy's operational phases are statistically 
Significant. Indeed, in the case of the 'hard' phase of the policy, the 
coefficient is actually positive, suggesting that periods of wage-freeze and 
Severe restraint have actually been associated with an increase in aggregate 
Strike activity. The answer to this apparent paradox is provided by equation 
6, whi~h indicates that both hard and soft phases of incomes policy have been 
aSSociated with an increase in the frequency of non-pay strikes. Moreover, in 
the case of the hard phase, this increase has been sufficient to more than 
Outweigh the decrease occuring in the frequency of pay stoppages. 
", .... ". - .. , . 
.. . '
.r'. 
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One possible explanation for this result is that stricter forms of 
incomes policy, which involve a greater degree of government intrusion into 
Collective bargaining, have tended to promote greater union antagonism. Thus, 
if the union rank and file are strongly against incomes policy, the political 
Cost to the union leadership of acceding to it will be high, reducing the 
Costs of striking; however, the policy will also serve to increase the 
potential political costs to the union of striking to obtain wage increases in 
excess of the statutory maximum. An obvious solution to this dilemma is for 
rank and file antagonisms to be channelled into non-pay areas, where the 
pOSsibility for gaining management concessions is unconstrained by external 
gOVernment interference. 
~e Behaviour 
Given the present concern with the role of trade union action in the 
Colective bargaining process, the ideal dependent variable is some measure of 
negotiated wage settlements, rather than a more conventional series such as 
Wage rates or earnings. For most of the countries in the present sample, with 
the notable exception of the Shunto settlements in Japan, such a series is 
Unavailable. This, however, is not true of Britain 37, and a settlement series 
is therefore employed in subsequent regressions. 
As was noted in Chapter 4, and as equation 1 in Table 7.U.K.2 indicates, 
the performance of a simple price expectations Phillips curve fails to provide 
a fully satisfactory expl:mation of U.K. wage settlements over the period 
1952-1975. While 78 per cent of the variation in the dependent variable is 
I 
eXplained', the labour market variable enters with a significant negative 
Sign - implying higher settlements during periods of increased unemployment. 
Reference to Graph 7.U.K.~. also highlights the equation's uneven 
Performance. First, over the period 1952-1965 substantial prediction errors 
are evident. Re-estimation of the basic equation for this sub-period, 
7.48 
however, produces a much more satisfactory expectations Phillips curve, 
COntaining a significant and correctly signed unemployment term (see equation 
2), as well as a more acceptable pattern of residuals (Graph 7.U.K.4~: though 
even here there is evidence of a deterioration in explanatory power around the 
paY-pause of 1961-62. Returning to the original equation, consistent 
oVer-prediction is apparent from 1962 until 1968, a period corresponding to 
the operation of incomes policy; while the breakdown in the policy in 
1969-1970 is associated with significant under-predicition, of the actual 
pattern of settlements. Significant under-prediction is also evident in 1972, 
a year of more or less free collective bargaining; while over-prediction again 
OCCurs in 1973, during a period of severe wage restraint. At least from the 
early 1960' s, therefore, it appears that the prediction errors generated by 
equation 1 are related in a fairly systematic way to the operation of incomes 
policies. 
As equation 3 in Table 7.U.K.1 illustrates, inclusion of strike frequency 
in b f 1 manufacturing (specified in unlagged form ecause of the use 0 sett ements 
as the dependent variable), significantly increases the equation's explanatory 
POwer, with the new variable entering with a highly significant positive 
Sign. In addition, it appears that once the influence of strike action is 
Controlled for, the unemployment variable drops from significance, and loses 
1 ~ 
ts anomalous negative sign. Reference to the pattern of residuals generated 
by the augmented equation also illustrates its improved performa:1ce over 
eqUation 1, particularly in relation to the wage escalation of 1970. Despite 
the later success, however, the equation still has a tendency to overpredict 
dUring the period 1962-1968, and is also unable to explain the wage 
escalations of 1972. Finally, as equation 4 indicates, substitution of 
WOrking days lost in manufacturing in place of strike frequency actually 
'., ..... 
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Worsens the performance of the equations, even though the additional variable 
is both correctly signed and significant. 
To summarize, on the basis of these results, it seems clear that British 
Unions, acting through the medium of strike activity, have had a significant 
impact on the pattern of wage settlement. Moreover, the exercise of this 
influence appears to be closely related to the operation of incomes policy, 
With settlements dropping during the operational phase of the policy, and 
riSing substantially during re-entry phases to the accompaniment of 
Significant escalations in strike frequency. 
I " , 
I"" 
.• 1 
I 
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Table 7.U.K.1. The Determinants of Aggregate Strike Activity in the United Kingdom 1952-1965; 1966(i) to 1975(iv) 
Eqn. Dep 
Variable 
1 Strike 
Frequency 
(ex-mining) 
1952-76) 
2 Strike 
Frequency 
(ex-mining) 
1952-65 
C
t 
24434.4 
(3.340) 
14814.2 
(2.856) 
Estimated Coefficients on: 
-1 U
t 
. 
Ut 
. . 
P
t 
W
t 
-1193.7 -2.250 -47.18 14.91 
(-1.108) (-2.981) (-1.643) . (1.016) 
64780.4 -1.504 109.78 -140.22 
(1.867) (-4.725) (3.697) (-4.100) 
. 
W 
P
t 
D
t 
R
t FIt 
-0.0759 -258.4 709.36 
(-0.652) (-3.425) (3.964) 
0.0939 -170.39 
(1.534) (-3.13) 
R2 D-W 
.935 1.88 
.987 2.25 
F 
Stat 
314.82 
(8,16) 
77 .12 
(5, 7) 
St 
1519 
841 
3 
Eqn.Dep C U ~ P D Y Y Y T F F F R2 'F' 
Variable t t. t-i t Rt 2t 3t 4t t It 2t 3t DW Stat 1.=0 
3 Aggregate 10449.3 -1.86 28.81 -34.41 -114.78 98.31 -6.86 -35.26 5.17 39.48 -16.05 202.86 I 0.804 1.99 10.42 
Frequency (4.20) (-3.47) (3.49) (-1.69) (-3.74 (2.11) (-0.39) (-0.77) (0.93) (0.74) (-0.23) (3.75) (11,28) 
1966(i)-
75(iv) 
4 Pay-Freq- 7388.7 -29.82 1 18.96 -13.31 -82.26 88.74 12.03 32.33 2.14 -72.25 -113.91 119.15 10.868 2.08 16.75 
uency 1966 (3.94) (-4.18) (2.75) (-0.82) (-3.59) (3.57) (0.43) (1.33) (0.43) (-1.66) (-1.88) (2.78) (11,28) 
(i) -75 (iv) 
5 Non-Pay 3695.6 -0.508 13.09 -24.39 -38.14 -9.81 -48.22 -83.73 3.87 94.10 44.43 37.71 10.656 1.99 4.86 
Frequency (3.75) (-2.42) (4.36) (-3.21) (-3.14) (-0.36) (-2.69) (-3.11) (1. 77) (4.70) (1.63) (1. 78) (11,28) 
1966(i)-
75 (iv) 
Notes: Figures in brackets are 't' statistics; C
t 
is the constant; all other variables are as defined in the text • 
1 The unemployment variable 
. 
U
t 
is entered in logarithmic form in the quarterly equations. 
Sources: See Appendix 1. 
r 
Table 7.U.K.2. The Dererminanrs of Wage Serrlemenrs in Unired Kingdom Manufacruring Industry: 1952-1975 
Estimated Coefficients on: 
-1 . 2 'F' . Eq. Dep. Variable Ct Ut P St Vt R D-W Wt t-~ Stat 
1. Settlements 7.372 -1242.9 0.642 .788 1. 72 38.98 7.51 
(3.758) (-2.208) (5.290) (2,21) 
2. Settlements 0.9057 1074.24 0.2l3 .553 1.98 6.81 5.19 
(1952-1965) (0.712) (3.343) (1. 722) (2,11) 
3. Settlements 0.255 243.5 0.605 0.0033 .878 1. 76 48.17 7.51 
(0.107) (0.421) (6.487) C3.866) (3,20) 
4. Settlements 4.853 -782.1 0.593 0.0005 .824 1.88 31.22 7.51 
(2.445) (-1.534) (5.580) (2.295) (3,20) 
Notes: -1 Figures ~n brackets are 't' statistics; C is the constant term; Ut the reciprocal of the unemployment level; P _~ the proportional change in €he Retail Price Index lagged half a period; St and V
t 
are unlagged 
strike fr~quency in manufacturing and unlagged strike volume in manufacturing respectively. 
Sources: See Appendix 1. 
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Conclusions 
In Chapters 5 and 6 a model of the collective bargaining process was 
developed in which the frequency of strike action was related to the level 
and rate of change of unemployment, the rates of change of money wages and 
prices, profits, the ratio of post-tn~= disposable income to pre~tax income, 
the level of manufacturer's stocks, and finally to operational and break-
down/re-entry phases of incomes policy. In addition, a model of wage 
determination was specified in which changes in wage rates in manufacturing 
Were related to the inverse of the unemployment rate, lagged price changes, 
and the degree of rank and file acquiescence in incomes policy as proxied 
by a strike frequency index. The purpose of this chapter has been to test 
empirically this model using data derived from the member nations of the 
Group of Ten. 
Estimation of an operational specification of the strike model 
reveals that strike activity is broadly responsive to economic conditions, 
a finding which appears true for all the industrial relations systems 
included in the present sample. This is clearly inconsistent with the 
hypotheses and evidence advanced by Shorter and Tilly (1974) and Snyder 
(1974 and 1975) reviewed in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, it is also apparent 
from the results presented in this chapter that there are significant 
inter-country differences in the model's performance, with marked differences 
in the nature of the behavioural response to economic variables under 
different institutional arrangements. There is also evidence of 
significant inter-temporal instability in these behavioural responses, 
particularly in the context of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; 
though elsewhere, as in Canada, the United States, Italy and France, 
contrasts between the present findings and those of earlier studies also 
provides evidence of instability. It should, however, be added that this 
7.51 
instability has not been totally random, and appears to be predictably 
related in many instances to changes in the nature of the institutional 
environment. This finding is also at odds with work reviewed in Chapter 
3: namely that of Hibbs (1976), which argues in favour of the existence 
of common behavioural responses to economic variables across institutionally 
diverse industrial relations systems. 
In the context of the model of wage determination the results 
presented in this chapter provide solid confirmation of their responsiveness 
to both the state of the labour market and price changes. While this offers 
support to demand pull theories of inflation, it is also clear that wage 
changes have not been totally independent of trade union activity in all 
countries. Confirmation is also provided for the importance of the 
mediating impact of incomes policies. 
Considering these issues in somewhat greater detail, it is evident 
from the data summarised in Table 7.1 that the state of the labour market 
has exerted a significant influence over strike activity in all ten 
countries; however the nature of that influence appears crucially dependent 
upon the prevailing institutional environment. In particular, where 
institutional features such as organizationally secure unions, well 
established centralized collective bargaining, and politically integrated 
labour movements have facilitated the emergence of cooperative incomes 
policies (as in Belgium, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands prior to 1963), 
a significant positive relationship is apparent between unemployment and 
strikes. In each of these countries, except Germany (where the dependent 
variable is strike volume), the rate of change of unemployment is also 
Significant, but is negatively related to strikes. These, on the face 
of it contradictory results are argued to be consistent with the combined 
influence of two aspects of the institutional environment. First, the 
~"'''''''''' 
TABLE 7.1 
Country U -1 
Belgium (1953-74) -** 
Germany (1953-75) -** 
Sweden (1953-77) -*** 
Netherlands (1954-62) -** 
Netherlands (1963-75) +*** 
a 
France (1956-67; +** 
1969-76) 
Italy (1956-75) +*** 
Japan (1956-75) -*** 
Canada (1952-77) +*** 
U.S.A. (1953-74) +*** 
U.K. (1952-65) +* 
U.K. 1966 (i) -1975 (iv) 
(aggregate) 
U.K. 1966(i)-1975(iv) 
(pay) 
U.K. 1966 (i) -1975 (iv) 
(non pay) 
Source: Table 1 Notes: 
The Det:erminant:s of Aggregace ScrikcA_c_t:i vi_t:y_- The __ Group of Ten 
Signs on coefficients on: 
U P W W p D R J L T H R2 
-** +** + -*** -*** .952 
-** +*** +** .529 
-** +*** +*** +*** .861 
-** -** .771 
+** -*** -** +*** .944 
-*** .810 
+* + -*** +* .870 
+*** +*** +*** 
.968 
+*** +*** +* +* .969 
+*** -*** 
-** .934 
-*** +*** -*** +* -** .987 
J l J 2 
-*** +*** -* -*** + +*** + .804 
-*** +*** 
-*** -* -*** +*** +** .868 
-*** +*** 
-*** -*** +*** +* +*** +** .656 
*** Denotes significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level. 
a ::v<'lcancies J, L = operational and re-entry phases of incomes policy respectively. 
D-t'1 
2.08 
2.03 
1. 95 
2.26 
1.43 
1. 89 
1. 55 
2.02 
2.01 
2.39 
2.25 
1.99 
2.08 
1.99 
-..J 
U1 
N 
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existence of a centralized bargaining structure which allows employers noe 0",1,) 
scope for granting discretionary supplements at plant level during periods 
a \~o t:."'e o.bl\ ,\:-~./ 
of labour market tightness, but/to remove them during periods of labour 
market slack - action which has the effect of precipitating (usually 
unofficial) protests by workers at plant level, initially of a defensive 
character/but subsequently, as the market improves, of a more offensive 
Character. Second, the operation of a centralized wage policy under 
which union leaders are prepared to forego the full exploitation of their 
labour market power when unemployment is low. Elsewhere, by contrast, 
the predominant labour market effect involves a significant inverse relation-
ship between unemployment and strikes. Thus, in the U.S., Canada, Italy, 
and the U.K. prior to 1966, low unemployment has exerted a stimulating 
effect on strike frequency; while in France a parallel response is found 
when labour market conditions are proxied by unfilled vacancies. In two 
cases, Canada and Italy, increasing unemployment is also associated with 
increased strike frequency. This is explained by reference to the greater 
historical orientation of organized labour in formulating their demands 
relative to the planning horizon of employers in these countries. Without 
much more detailed micro research into strikes, however, it is not clear 
Why this result should be peculiar to these two countries. 
In the context of the labour market, three countries warrent special 
consideration. These are Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
In Japan a positive relationship is established between strikes and the 
level of unemployment. This finding is attributed to the unique features 
of the life-time employment system operating in that country. In the 
Netherlands and Britain, where separate estimations are undertaken for 
Specific sub-periods, institutional changes are associated with significant 
shifts in the nature of the relationship between the labour market and 
strikes. Thus, in the Netherlands the disintegration of national wage 
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policy and a shift towards more decentralized bargaining is associated 
with the emergence of an inverse relationship between strikes and unemploy-
ment over the period 1963-75, replacing the positive relationship of the 
earlier period. In the context of the U.K., the operation of some form 
of incomes policy over the period 1966-75 on a more or less permanent 
basis is associated with the disappearance of the significant inverse 
relationship between strikes and unemployment that characterised the 
earlier period. The rate of change of unemployment does, however, retain 
its significant inverse relationship with strikes. 
Inflation appears to have been an important determinant of strikes 
in Japan, Canada, the United States and Britain, but not in France .or 
Italy. In the case of France, for example, the simple correlation coeffi-
cient between strike frequency and the rate of change of retail prices 
prior to 1968 is actually negative (r = -0.23); while in Italy, though 
correctly signed, the coefficient on the price terms is insignificant. The 
latter result is undoubtedly explained by the operation of a system of 
wage indexation (scala mobile) during the estimating period. This 
explanation also appears relevant for Belgium, where the price term only 
obtains significance when entered in squared form, although in the Belgian 
context it could also be plausibly argued that the operation of social 
programming was instrumental to some extent in restraining trade union 
responsiveness to inflation. This would also appear to have been the 
case in Sweden, where again the price term only achieves significance 
when entered in squared form, and in the Netherlands prior to 1963 where 
the simple correlation coefficient between strikes and price changes is 
only 0.20. The most perplexing result is undoubtedly that occurring 
in Germany, where a significant inverse relationship is established between 
strike volume and inflation. A plausible (though admittedly ex poste) 
rationalization for this result is that it derives from the unions' extreme 
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sensitivity to the evils of inflation in the light of the experience of 
hYIwri'nflation in 1923/and of the suppressed hyperinflation following 
World War II (Fels 1977). Reference might also be made, however, to the 
unions acquiescence in restraint under what has been described as 'the 
incomes policy from below'. 
The rate of change of money wages also appears as a significant 
determinant of strikes, although the precise nature of this variable's 
impact shows considerable international variation. This result is not 
really surprising given the variables ambiguous a priori implications. 
Thus, in Germany, Sweden, Japan and Canada, money wage changes are 
significantly positively related to strikes. A similar relationship is 
evident in Belgium, but is not statistically significant. On the other 
hand, significant inverse relationships are apparent between money wage 
changes and strikes 
in Italy, the U.K. over the period 1952-1965) and the Netherlands over 
the period 1963-1975; while a negative but insignificant relationship 
appears in the U.S. Finally, no statistically meaningful relationship 
is evident between strikes and money wage changes either in the Netherlands 
Over the period of centralized wage policy from 1954-1962, or in the U.K. 
during the period of sustained incomes policy intervention from 1966-1975. 
These contrasting results are perhaps only to be expected/given the 
ambiguous a priori implications of the wage variable. Furthermore, 
examination of these cross-country variations in response reveals no 
obvious pattern as is the case with the unemployment and price variables. 
Profits also appear to have an ambiguous effect on strike activity, 
a conclusion which again accords with the indeterminacy of the a priori 
restrictions placed upon the sign of this variable. Specifically, significant 
negative coefficients are obtained in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands 
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Over the period 1963-1975, France, the U.S.A. and in Britain "in the 
Context of non-pay stoppages over the period 1966-1975. On the other 
hand, positive coefficients are obtained in Italy, Japan, Canada and on 
aggregate strikefiequency in the U.K. over the period 1952-1965. In 
terms of international patterns, it is tempting to argue that the existence 
of cooperative incomes policies (as in Belgium, Germany, Sweden and the 
Netherlands prior to 1963), or even sustained policies (as in the U.K.)/ 
has exerted a restraining influence on union propensities to pursue gains 
when profits are high. However, while the results presented in this chap-
ter are broadly consistent with such a conclusion, the result is not 
peculiar to these countries, since the same result also pertains in the 
U.S./and somewhat paradoxically in the context of this argument, also in 
France. I could, moreover, also be argued that explanations of this type 
place much too much emphasis on the behavioural responses of the unions, 
without gi~ng any consideration to the behaviour of employers. 
The results presented in this chapter also appear highly supportive 
of the significance of incomes policies in influencing the incidence of 
strike activity. One obvious conclusion is that those countries in which 
cooperative incomes policies have operated with some long term success 
have all been characterised by comparatively low levels of collective 
industrial conflict. However, while the overall levels of strike activity 
in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are significantly lower 
than those characteristic of the other countries in the group, each has 
nevertheless experienced escalations in (usually unofficial) strike 
activity as the result of the operation of incomes policy. In Sweden 
and the Netherlands this effect is proxied by the appearance of a positive 
and highly significant re-entry/breakdown dummy, in Belgium by a signifi-
cant negative coefficient on a dummy variable entered for the period of 
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social programming, and in Germany (given the non-significance of simple 
Concerted Action dummies) by a significant positive coefficient on a rate 
of change of union density variable. 
Incomes policies have also been of significance in the U.S. and 
Britain. In the U.S., for example, the operation of wage-price guideposts 
(1962-1965; 1971-1972) has been associated with significant reductions 
in strike frequency. In the U.K., on the other hand, the results of the 
dis aggregated quarterly equations indicate that while the operational 
phases of incomes policy have been associated with significant declines 
in pay-strike frequency, they have actually stimulated strikes over non-pay 
issues. Indeed, in the context of hard phases of the policy (involving 
either outright wage freezes or severe restraint), increased strike action 
OVer non-pay issues has more than outweighed the decline in strikes over 
pay to produce an increase in aggregate strike frequency. In the British 
Context, the breakdown of incomes policy has also been associated with 
Substantial increases in both pay and non-pay disputes such that over their 
complete life cycle British policies have actually been associated with a 
significant increase in aggregate strike frequency. 
In the case of Japan, France and Italy, no specific allowance is 
made for separate incomes policy effects, given the absence of formal com-
prehensive intervention in these countries. Nevertheless, in the cases 
of both France (in relation to the Toutee procedure) ,and Italy, reference 
to the pattern of residuals does reveal evidence of some moderation in 
strike frequency during periods of government exhortation in the mid 1960s,moreover 
in each case this moderation preceeds substantial strike explosions (1968 
in France, and 1969 in Italy) • 
,Finally, the tax variable, measured by the ratio of post-tax disposable 
income to total income before tax, only appears significant in the context 
Table 7.2 The Determinants of Wage Inflation in Manufacturing industry - The Group of Ten 
Estimated Coefficients on: 
-1 . R2 Country Ct Ut Pt-~ S V t-1 D-W Mean t-1 
Belgium (1953-74) -2.92 473.69 1.162 0.040 .939 1.87 8.5 
(-2.51) (4.821) (5.37) (4.010) (87.39) 
Germany (1953-75) 2.590 1198.0 0.542 0.533+ .743 1.88 8.4 
(1. 239) (5.330) (2.299) (3.064) ,,(18.29) 
Sweden (1953-77) 1.826 75.46 0.368 0.0115 .750 2.07 8.6 
(1. 352) (3.805) (9.235) (5.757) (21.02) 
Netherlands (1954-62) 2.45 158.10 0.564 .429 2.39 7.0 
(0.833) (1. 240) (0.699) (2.25) 
Netherlands (1963-75)-0.172 247.40 1.089 .779 1.44 10.5 
(-0.101) (6.085) (5.627) (15.86) --.J . 
lJ1 
co 
Netherlands (1954-75) 0.0116 210.04 1.133 .649 2.14 8.9 
(0.009) (4.710) (7.470) (17.64) 
France (1956-67; 3.660 ++ 0.0352 0.585 .831 2.09 10.0 
69-76) (3.731) (4.726) (4.010) (39.43) 
Italy (1956-75) -2.830 5311.03 1.235 .745 2.00 10.6 
(-0.735) (1.808) (4.895) (24.99) 
Japan (1956-75)* -4.730 0.0373++ 0.478 .834 2.00 13.0 
(-2.540) (6.713) (3.806) (49.53) 
Canada (1952-75) -2.470 517 .0 0.264 0.016 .866 2.11 6.0 
(0.193) (1.933) (2.050) (5.353) (43.24) 
US (1953-74) 3.82 13767.5 0.220 .834 2.05 4.6 
(1.615) (6.143) (1.970) (47.56) 
(Table 7.2 contd.) 
, 
Ct 
-1 Country Ut 
U.K. (1952-75) * 0.255 243.5 
(0.107) (0.421) 
U.K. (1952-65) * 0.9057 1074.24 
(0.712) (3.343) 
Notes: + rate of change of union density 
++unfilled vacancies 
* settlements 
**unlagged 
p 
t-~ s· t-l Vt _1 
R2 D-W Mean 
** 0.605 0.003 .878 1. 76 7.5 
(6.487) (3.866) (48.17) 
0.213 .553 1.98 5.2 
(1.722) (6.81) 
Figures in brackets under coefficients are 't' statistics; those under the R2 are 'F' statistics. 
\. 
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of the United Kingdom where it enters with a significant negative sign. 
Turning to the determinants of money wage changes, it is evident 
from the summary of results presented in Table 7.2 that the state of 
the labour market, proxied either by the reciprocal of the level of 
unemployment,or by the level of unfilled vacancies (as in the case of 
France and Japan), has exerted a significant influence over wage inflation 
in all Group of Ten nations with the apparent exception of the Netherlands 
prior to 1963 and Britain since the mid-late 1960s. In both instances 
this apparent suspension of market forces can be traced to the operation 
of comprehensive incomes policies. These policies also appear to have 
exerted a significant influence over the wage determination process in 
Belgium, Germany and Sweden. Thus, in each case the best fitting equation 
contains an additional variable proxying rank and file acquiescence in 
incomes policy. Moreover, in each case the inclusion of this variable is 
also associated with increases in both the size and significance of the 
unemployment terms. This finding, which is also apparent in the U.K. 
equation fitted for 1952-75, suggests that trade union activity is capable 
of influencing the pace of wage change (in an downward as well as upward 
direction) independently of the level of excess demand prevailing in the 
labour market. Support for this proposition is also evident in the strike 
equations, which show a positive relationship (or, in the British case, 
an insignificant relationship) between the latter ~ariable and unemployment 
OVer the relevant period. 
On the basis of the estimated equations, autonomous trade union 
pressure also appears to have been of some significance in France, Italy 
and Canada; though in each case addition of a strike variable is associated 
with a decline in both the size and the significance of the unemployment 
(or vacancy) terms. Moreover, as the strike equations indicate, 
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fluctuations in strike activity in all these countries have been signifi-
cantly positively related to the level of excess demand. In the case of 
France and Italy, the best assessment appeared to be that while 
autonomous trade union pressure has been responsible for increasing the 
pace of wage change on certain specific occasions, this has fallen ~~ short 
of sustained or continuous upward pressure exerted independently of the 
state of the labour market. In the case of Canada, though the best fitting 
equation contains a strike frequency variable, this finding is as plausibly 
attributable to the widely recognized inadequacies of the unemployment rate 
as an excess demand proxY,as it is to the influence of autonomous union 
wage push. In short, it is possible that in practice the strike variable 
is merely acting as a further proxy for excess demand pressure, rather than 
as an index of union pushfulness. 
Finally, reference to the price variable in Table 7.2 shows inflation 
to have been a significant determinant of wage changes in all countries 
except the Netherlands under centralized wage policy (providing further 
confirmation of the effe~tiveness of this policy in insulating wage changes 
from market forces). Nevertheless, substantial inter-country variation 
is evident in the size of the estimated coefficients. In Belgium, Italy 
and the Netherlands after 1963, the price coefficient actually exceeds 
one, a finding potentially consistent with the existence of an explosive 
wage-price spiral. In Belgium and Italy this absence of dynamic money 
illusion is undoubtedly a function of the operation of wage indexation 
systems over the estimation period. Alternatively, in the Italian 
context, and also in the Netherlands,the price term may have been 
biased upwards to some extent by the omission of a trade union pressure 
variable. For Germany, Sweden, France, Japan, Canada, -the U.S. and the 
U.K. -the coefficients on the price term are all consistent with the 
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eXistence of long-run Phillips-type trade-offs between wage inflation 
and unemployment. However, while this trade-off appears most pronounced 
in the u.s. and Canada, there is reason to expect some downward bias in 
the price coefficients. In particular, as Mitchell (1980) has argued, 
estimation of an aggregate wage equation including both union and non-union 
sectors,and within the union sector also wage changes from contracts of various 
lengths and with varying price adjustment clauses, is likely to result in 
a regression "with an implausibly low price coefficient". 
To summarize, the findings of this chapter clearly point to important 
differences in the nature of the wage and strike determination processes 
operating under different industrial relations systems. Moreover, .these 
differences have been shown to exert a significant influence over the responsive-
ness of both wage changes and strikes to variations in economic conditions. 
Of these effects that of most significance for public policy would appear 
to be that of cooperative or sustained incomes policies in mediating 
the influence of the labour market. However, as both strike and wage 
equations testify, this mediating influence has, without exception, 
proved highly vulnerable to attack from accummulations of rank and file 
protest. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 7 
1. Earlier estimations revealed the trend term and tax variable to be 
insignificant (their 't' values in each case were less than one), and 
they were dropped from subsequent regressions. The inventory variable 
was omitted because of data limitations. In terms of lags, estimates 
were undertaken with simple one and two period lags on the wage price 
and profit terms, however the best fit was obtained by specifying these 
variables in unlagged form. While this raises the possibility of 
reverse causality, it is reassuring to note that in all cases the signs 
remained unchanged through these lagging experiments. 
2. Of particular relevance in the present context is the fact that the 
various accords signed under social programming included union commit-
ments to maintain industrial peace. 
3. The trend and tax variables were omitted from the final equation as 
neither reached acceptable levels of significance in earlier estimations. 
In terms of lags, estimation with a simple one year lag on the real 
wage term (as well as its separate money wage and price components) and 
on the profits terms, produced the best results. 
4. 'Concerted Action' dummies were included for the periods 1966-68 and 
1970-72, while breakdown dummies were included for 1969 and 1973. 
5. Union density in Germany is much less responsive to variations in 
economic conditions (including prices, unemployment and wages) than 
in countries such as the U.K., U.S.A., Canada, Sweden and Australia. 
On the latter see Bain and Elsheikh (1976). 
6. Earlier estimations including a trend term and a tax variable showed 
that these variables did not significantly contribute to the explanatory 
power of the equation and they were therefore omitted from later 
specifications. In addition, given the short data span, a real wage 
variable is specified in place of its separate money wage and price 
components. In terms of lags, the best results were obtained by 
specifying the real wage term in unlagged form. It should, however, 
be noted that use of simple one and two period lags did not alter 
the sign on the coefficient. The lag on the profits variable was 
experimentally determined at one year. 
7. The problem, of course, is the extremely small sample size. The 
results obtained are, however, only intended as illustrative. 
8. The trend term, tax variable and the rate of change of unemployment 
were dropped because of their lack of significance in earlier 
estimations. The best fit was obtained by specifying the real wage 
variable in unlagged form, though lagging experiments produced con-
sistent signs throughout. The lag on the profits variable was experi-
mentally determined at one year. 
9. This variable takes the value of one in 1963, following the breakdown 
of the guided wage policy, as well as in 1970 following the breakdown 
of the government's statutory policy. 
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10. See the correlation matrices in Appendix 2. 
11. The trend term and tax variable were dropped after failing to 
achieve acceptable levels of significance in earlier estimations. 
In terms of lags, experimentation with simple one and two period 
lags on the wage and price terms produced less satisfactory results 
than specification in unlagged form, although the signs remained 
unchanged through these lagging experiments. The lag on the profits 
variable was experimentally determined at one year. 
12. Separate estimations for strikes in manufacturing are precluded in 
the Swedish context by the absence of suitable data. 
13. Strike statistics are not available for 1968 - the year of the 
major strike explosion. 
14. The trend term, the tax variable and the rate of change of 
unemployment were dropped after failing to achieve acceptable levels 
of significance in earlier estimations. In terms of lags, experi-
mentation with simple one and two period lags on the real wage and 
profit terms produced less satisfactory results than specification 
in unlagged form. Again, the signs on the coefficients on these 
variables remained unchanged throughout the lagging experiments. 
15. As Smith (1979) has argued, regardless of the institutional 
character of labour-management relations,if unions have the capacity 
for collective action it is always a rational strategy for them to 
take account of labour market conditions when exercising that 
strategy. One caveat should, however, be entered. Namely, that 
under certain circumstances (such as those pertaining in Group 
1 countries in Chapter 6, for example) union power may derive 
from sources other than the labour market. 
16. See Appendix 1. 
17. See Appendix 2 for full details of the correlation matrices. 
18. Earlier estimations containing a trend term and a tax variable showed 
these variables to be insignificant, so that they were dropped from 
subsequent regressions. An additional variable, measuring the 
extent of balance of payments deficits or surpluses, and included 
to test the proposition that balance of payments crises may have 
had a restraining influence on worker militancy, also failed to 
reach acceptable levels of significance. In terms of lags, 
equations were estimated with real wage (as well as money wage 
and price) variables specified with one and two period lags, however, 
the best results were obtained from specification in unlagged 
form. In all cases the signs on the coefficients remained unchanged. 
The lag on the profits variable was experimentally determined as one 
year. 
19. Replacement of p with (p)2 did little to improve the variable's 
performance. 
20. .This should not be taken as implying that incomes policy was the sole 
factor preCipitating this phenomenon. As Spinelli (1976) indicates 
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the period was also one in which deflationary policies were actively 
pursued (e.g. money supply growth slowed from 11.6 per cent in 1962 
to only 3.7 per cent in 1967). 
21. Full details are given in Appendix 2. 
22. This should not be taken to imply that the industrial relations 
system, or the typical orientation of workers in Japan is in any 
sense the same as that in France or Italy. The point is rather 
that each shares some relevant similarities, which might have 
significant bearing on the effect that economic and political 
forces have on strikes. 
23. Earlier estimations produced insignificant coefficients on the 
trend term, the tax variable and the rate of change of unemployment 
variable/and they were therefore omitted from the final equation. 
In terms of lags, experimentation with simple one and two period 
lags on the wage and price terms produced less satisfactory 
results than specification in unlagged form. The signs on the 
estimated coefficients were, however, unchanged irrespective of the 
lag specification. The best fit on the profits variable was obtained 
with a one year lag. 
24. Full details are given in Appendix 2. 
25. This result is consistent with the enterprise orientation of 
Japanese unions. The strong dependence of wages and salaries (as 
well as bonus and overtime payments which may amount to as much as 
a quarter or a third of workers' incomes) upon company profitability 
is emphasized in R. Komiya and Yoshio Suzuki, "Inflation in Japan" 
in Kral'S"! and Salent (1977). 
25A. Reference might also be made to the fact that the level of unemployment 
in Japan has typically been low even in recessions, with working 
hours and hence also over-time earnings subject to more significant 
cyclical variations. Thus increases in strike activity during periods 
of recession might also be traced to protests over reduced overtime 
earnings. 
26. Given that the present concern is with testing a model of the collective 
bargaining process/the ide&dependent variable is wage settlements I 
since these represent the immediate outcome of the bargaining activity. 
Unfortunately/statistics on settlements are not generally available, 
however in the Japanese context such a series is available in Shirai 
and Shimada (1978). 
27. The trend term and tax variable were omitted from the final specifica-
tion as neither reached acceptable levels of significance in earlier 
estimations. In terms of lags, the price, wage and profits variables 
all performed most adequately when specified in unlagged form. It 
should, however, be noted that the signs on the coefficients remained 
unchanged through these lagging experiments. 
28. This problem is not confined to Canada. See, for example, the 
discussion of the U.K. on page 7.40 below. 
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29. Vacancy data, a potentially more consistent indicator of labour 
market excess demand is unavailable for the full period under 
consideration. 
30. Complete correlation matrices are presented in Appendix 2. 
30A. One caveat should however be added. In particular, it is possible 
that the strike term could be acting as an additional labour market 
proxy (given the unsatisfactory nature of unemployment referred to 
above). 
31. Earlier estimations including a trend term, the rate of change of 
unemployment,a tax variable,and a re-entry dummy/showed that these 
variables made no significant contribution to the equation's overall 
explanatory power, and they were therefore dropped from the final 
equation. In terms of the specification of the price and wage 
terms/the best fit was obtained by entering these variables in 
unlagged form. The signs on the estimated coefficients were, 
however, unchanged when simple one and two period lags were specified. 
32. Estimation of separate wage equations for the union and non-union 
sector does, however, indicate that in general a simple price 
expectations Phillips-curve view is less applicable to the union 
sector than the non-union sector. In particular union wages 
appear less sensitive to labour market conditions and more sensitive 
to price changes (Mitchell 1980). 
33. Earlier estimations including a trend term showed the variable to 
be insignificant and it was dropped from subsequent regressions. 
In terms of lags, experimentation showed that the best results 
actually derived from estimations of the price, wage and profits 
variables in unlagged form. It should be noted, however, that 
in all cases the signs were unchanged through these lagging 
experiments. 
34. The level of unemployment, the wage variable, and the stock-output 
ratio were dropped from the final estimating equation since none 
appeared significant on the basis of normal statistical criteria. 
The price variable was estimated using a second degree polynomial 
with a lag tapering to zero after three quarters. 
35. Incomes policy dummy variables were specified as follows: 
Fl (hard) 1966(3)-1967(4); 1972(4)-1974(1); 1975(3)-1975(4). 
F2 (soft) 1966(1)-1966(2); 1968(1)-1969(2); 1974(2). 
F3 (re-entry ) 1969(3)-1970(2); 1974(3)-1975(2). 
36. The official statistics classify stoppages by cause as follows: 
(a) pay (defined to include wage rates and earnings levels, and 
extra wage and fringe benefits); (b) trade union matters; (c) 
working conditions and supervision; (d) manning and work allocation; 
(e) dismissal and other disciplinary measures. 
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37. The settlement series is derived from R.F. Elliot and A.J.H. Dean, 
"The official Wage Rates Index and the size of Wage Settlements', 
Oxford Bulletin of Econ.and Stats.Vol. 40, No.3, 1978. pp. 249-261. 
38. Ideally, the strike variable should be pay-strikes in manufacturing, 
since as established above aggregate strike figures are not as 
sensitive to incomes policy (at least during its operational 
phases) because of the offsetting influence of non-pay strikes. 
Unfortunately, however, pay strike data is not available by sector. 
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Chapter 8 
Summary and Conclusions 
In the preceding chapters a variety of issues relating to the 
collective bargaining process, and specifically to the processes of strike 
and wage determination, were discussed. The purpose of the present chapter 
is to provide a brief summary of these issues and to outline some of the 
implications that may be derived from the empirical work. 
The present study began with an examination of a variety of models 
of the economic determinants of strike fluctuations at the individual country 
level. Despite differences in the precise theoretical underpinnings of 
these models all were primarily microeconomic in orientation, that is all 
were explicitly derived from a basic conception of the strike as the result 
of a breakdown in plant level negotiations over pay. Moreover, on an 
operational level each was ultimately tested on the basis of a similar 
estimating equation. This included such familiar business cycle components 
as unemployment, wage and price changes and profits, though the ad hoc 
addition of dummy variables to represent institutional factors such as 
incomes policy and changes in government was also common. The great divide 
came in terms of the empirical significance of the explanatory variables. 
Thus, while something of a consensus emerged from the first wave of 
multiple regression analyses (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969; Pencave1 1970; 
Smith 1972) in relation to the impact of the various explanatory variables 
in the institutional contexts of the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Canada; more recent findings challenged this notion in the United Kingdom 
(Hunter 1973; Shorey 1974). Of particular concern in this respect was: 
first, the apparent decline in the significance of unemployment as an 
'explanation' of strike fluctuations (at a time when its explanatory power 
/ 
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in the context of wage changes was also called into question); and second, 
the inability of the conventional economic model to explain the significant 
escalations that occurred in the frequency of strike activity in Britain 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Britain was not, however, unique in 
experiencing strike explosions at this time. Indeed, her experience was 
shared by most other member nations of the Group of Ten. In view of this the 
search for factors contributing to the breakdown of the economic strike 
model in Britain was broadened in Chapter 3 to encompass the insights of 
comparative studies of strike activity •. 
It is at an international level that the economists' monopoly 
OVer the quantitative analysis of strike activity has been subject to the 
most sustained criticism. Although even here, as Chapter 3 indicated, 
they have not been without allies. For example, on the basis of an 
ambitious study of the determinants of fluctuations in strike volume across 
a ten country sample (Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US), Hibbs concluded that workers' 
responses to unemployment and wage and price changes were broadly the same, 
despite significant differences in institutional arrangements. In reaching 
these conclusions, however, Hibbs drew selectively, and it was argued Ol~o 
incorrectly, on the earlier work of Ross and Hartman (1960) in isolating 
the prevailing bargaining structure - and specifically the degree of centrali-
zation or decentralization of collective bargaining - as the sole institu-
tional source of variation in the process underlying strike fluctuations. 
These problems were then further compounded both by errors of classification 
and by the inappropriate use of the technique of pooling data across countries 
to estimate his model. Of much more sUbstantive significance than these 
methodological criticisms, however, is the fundamental challenge to the 
primary economic explanation of strike fluctuations provided by the work of 
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sociologists. Chapter 3 gave detailed consideration to two such works, 
namely those of Shorter and Tilly (1975) and Snyder (1974, 1975 and 1977) . 
Rejecting the notion that strikes can be universally treated 
as a purely economic weapon employed by business unions operating in 
atomistic markets, Shorter and Tilly advance an alternative view of the 
strike as a primarily political form of collective protest. This view, 
derived from an exhaustive analysis of strikes in France, is then used to 
advance a model in which strikes fluctuate not in line with economic 
factors, but rather in response to variations in the unions' capacity for 
collective action (as measured by union density), and to changes in the 
constellation of forces in the political arena. Following on from this, 
Snyder's analysis then represents an attempt to reconcile these conflicting 
economic versus organizational/political views of the strike. Drawing 
upon the earlier work of both Ross and Hartman and Shorter and Tilly, 
Snyder postulates three features of the institutional environment as 
crucial to the process underlying strike fluctuations: namely, the organiza-
tional strength of the unions; labour's relationship to the polity; and 
the degree of acceptance by employers of unions and collective bargaining. 
These features are then used to draw (an excessively rigid) dichotomy 
between pre-institutionalized and institutionalized labour relations 
systems, with the prediction that in the former the organizational political 
model of strikes is appropriate/while in the latter the economic model is 
appropriate. Empirical tests of this model in the context of supposedly 
pre-institutionalized systems such as these of France and Italy,and 
institutionalized systems such as those of the United States and Canada, 
are not overwhelmingly supportive of Snyder's predictions, but do nevertheless 
strongly question the applicability of a purely economic interpretation of 
strike activity in the context of Italy and France. As with the work of 
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Hibbs, however, theoretical, methodological and statistical weaknesses cast 
doubts over the reliability of Snyder's results, and hence the conclusions 
derived from them. Moreover, apart from the clear implication that the strike 
escalations of the late 1960s and early 1970s were primarily political pheno-
rnena in France and Italy, and primarily economic phenomena in the United 
States and Canada, Snyder's analysis is unable to cast any precise empirical 
light on this issue since his regressions, like those of Hibbs, stop short 
of the period of increased conflict. 
While the choice between these rival approaches to the explanation 
of fluctuations in strike activity must ultimately be based upon systematic 
econometric tests, it is important not to lose sight of the historical 
Context within which these strike flucuations have occurred. Thus in 
Chapter 4 the focus was broadened as attention was directed towards his-
torical explanations advanced to explain one specific historical episode 
that has generated a tremendous amount of public debate: namely, the inter-
national strike and wage explosions of the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
The debate between rival explanations for this episode has provided a 
~ 
substantial amountrcircumstantial evidence of relevance to the choice among 
the competing strike models. One of the most influential of these accounts 
was identified as the international monetarist view, which traces both wage 
and strike escalations to excess demand created by increases in world 
money supply. In terms of wages ,changes are explained by reference to the 
level of excess demand in the labour market and to the expected rate of 
price-inflation; while in terms of strikes, escalations are attributed primarily 
to the emergence of unanticipated inflation. Trade union action in general, 
and strike action in particula~ is thus assigned a responsive or consequential 
rather than an active or causal role. The relevant policy prescription for 
governments wishing to reduce the incidence of inflation and strikes is 
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control over the money supply. 
The main alternative to this account was identified as the cost-
push (sociological or structural) explanation; an approach which pictures 
inflation as a symptom of the struggle between competing interest groups 
over the distribution of income. In marked contrast to the proponents of 
the excess demand view,with its emphasis on money supply and exclusion of 
both collective bargaining and the wage determination process as.causes of 
inflation, the cost-push view identifies a crucial causal role for organized 
labour in generating inflation. Thus trade union pressure, and the 
increases in wage-push inflation that it induces/are seen as the important 
causal mechanism in worldwide inflation. Two implications might be mentioned. 
First, the analysis is perfectly consistent with either an economic or an 
organizational/political theory of strikes. Second, the appropriate policy 
prescription for the control of inflation is the provision of some device 
for lessening distributive conflict/or directly restraining the pushfulness 
of organized labour. The device most frequently referred to in this context 
is some form of incomes policy. 
With regard to the evaluation of these rival explanations, the 
monetarist approach possesses the distinct analytical advantage that it is 
able to account in a fairly convincing way for such features of international 
inflation experience as the simultaneous acceleration in inflation rates 
across countries ,in the late 1960s; the broad similarity in inflation rates 
across countries during the 1960s and their divergence since 1972; the 
coexistence of higher rates of inflation and high unemployment; as well as 
the broadly simultaneous emergence of industrial unrest. In short, the 
approach is able to provide an international explanation of what was 
undoubtedly an international phenomenon. By contrast, cost-push approaches, 
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with their emphasis on an essentially domestic causal mechanism,have generally 
failed to provide a convincing explanation for the international transmission 
of distributive conflict or wage-push illflation. Their emphasis on the causal' 
significance of trade union militancy is, 'quite simply too parochial in 
outlook, and confuse{s) the description of inflation with the analysis 
of its causes', (Laidler 1975). 
Though the monetarist analysis is able to provide the most satis-
factory explanation of the international character of the wage and strike 
escalations, detailed scrutiny nevertheless revealed certain weaknesses. 
First, the domestic theory of inflation based upon labour market excess 
demand and price expectations provided unsatisfactory results in the context of 
the excess demand variable in Sweden and the United Kingdom~ implausibly 
I 
high price coefficients in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands; and under-
predictions of the actual pattern of wage changes in all countries in the 
early 1970s. Second, the implied monetarist theory of the strike waves -
namely that they derived largely from the emergence of unanticipated infla-
tion - though consistent with the strike models of Chapter 2, is questioned 
both by the timing and by the relative size of the price escalations. Third, 
the international transmission of inflation through the expansion of world 
money supply did not, in fact, pre-date the initiation of either the wage 
or strike explosions :i.n 1969/70, thereby making the attribution of causality 
problematical. Finally, the monetarist analysis is unable to account for 
the fact that in Europe the origins of worker protest were based primarily 
at plant level, rather than in the more centralized structures of official 
trade unionism, or to account for the fact that the protest was in several 
important instances primarily unofficial. 
These issues formed the basis of the alternative cost-push analysis 
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of Soskice (1978). While accepting a significant initial role for world 
money supply/this analysis also places important emphasis upon the role 
played by similar behavioural responses to similar economic experiences 
by governments, employers, unions and their members in different countries. 
Of particular relevance in this connection is the broadly similar response 
of European governments in the early 1960s to the emergence of balance of 
payments deficits. Thus, constrained by a regime of fixed exchange rates, 
the common response was the institution of some form of incomes policy as 
a means of restraining domestic costs. Against this background the strike 
and wage explosions of the late 1960s and early 19705 are argued to derive from 
the combined influence of a variety of frustration factors, including 
increased employer pressure at shop-floor level during periods of labour 
market slack and declining profitability, the subsequent recovery of corporate 
profits at a time when real wages were being eroded by increasing world 
prices, and finally the further restraining influence on real wage growth 
exerted by incomes policies into which national unions were/in several 
instances/voluntarily coopted. The escalation in wage inflation is then 
seen as a consequence of the need, perceived by employers, to 'buy-off' 
grass roots industrial conflict. In essence, therefore, Soskice's analysis 
may be seen as implying a macroeconomic theory of strikes in which the 
Waves of the 1960s and 1970s are a function of the state of the labour 
market, real wage growth, corporate profitability and the impact of incomes 
policy; while wage changes, at least during this historical episode, emerge 
as significantly dependent upon rank and file pushfulness. 
To summarize the implications of Chapter 4, one conclusion that 
emerges forcefully from both attempts to account for the international character 
of the strike/wage escalations is that they were primarily an economic 
phenomenon. In the context of strikes, however, this proposition is based 
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Upon largely circumstantial evidence. In neither case is any attempt made 
to formally specify and test a model of strike activity with a view to 
providing quantitative evidence on either the regularity or the magnitude 
of the hypothesized relationships. It is this task which formed the basis 
of the analysis of Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 was concerned with the 
development of an institutionally more realistic economic model in which 
strike activity is related to a variety of economic variables by means of 
a framework in which the strike decision is based upon the relative wage 
demands and wage offers of unions and employers, and upon variations in 
their respective bargaining attitudes. In this connection, the decision 
to strike is viewed as depending on a rational choice strategy which includes 
the probable political costs as well as the purely economic costs anticipated 
by union leaders, their rank and file membership, and employers. In the 
Operational specification of the model emerging from this analysis the 
frequency of strike activity is related~ variety of business cycle compo-
nents,including the state of the labour market as proxied by the level and 
rate of change of unemployment, corporate profits, and the rate of change of 
wages and prices, as well as tax induced changes in disposable income. While 
this specification is not substantially different from that employed in 
previous studies, one consequence of the attempt to achieve more industrial 
relations realism is greater ambiguity in the interpretation of several 
of the independent variables. Thus, in contrast to the economic models 
outlined in Chapter 2, only two variables are identified as having an 
unambiguous impact on strike activity: namely, price changes and the tax-
induced erosion of disposable income, both of which are assumed to stimulate 
strike activity. 
In Chapter 6 this model was expanded to include the effects of 
incomes policy on collective bargaining. Here it was argued that the impact 
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of such policies on strikes will be crucially dependent upon both the 
form that they take and the degree of rank and file acceptance they are 
able to achieve. In general, it was suggested that while operational 
phases of the policy might be associated with significant declines in strike 
activity, at least over pay; removalorbreakdown, by reducing the macro 
Political costs of striking, would be likely to provoke significant strike 
escalations as the inevitable frustrations caused by the policy worked 
themselves through the collective bargaining system. 
Chapter 6 also gave detailed consideration to the influence of the 
institutional environment - including such factors as the size and structure 
of the labour move~ent: the maturity of collective bargaining and the level 
at which it is primarily conducted; and the political relationship between 
government and the trade union movement - on the form of incomes policy 
intervention. Following the pioneering study of Ross and Hartman, and in 
Contrast to the more recent analysis of Shorter and Tilly, Snyder and Hibbs, 
it was argued that attention should be given to the nature of the overall 
industrial relations configuration, rather than to specific emphasis on 
any single element of that configuration. On the basis of this analysis 
it was concluded that three distinct types of incomes policy interv.ention 
could usefully be distinguished, each corresponding to a broadly distinct 
institutional configuration. Of particular significance in this connection 
was the argument that a configuration consisting of organizationally secure 
and united trade unions, well established and centralized (or co-ordinated) 
collective bargaining, and politically and/or iGeologically integrated labour 
movements was compatible with the emergence of ~ durable cooperative incomes 
policy. This combination was viewed as providing, in effect, the necessary 
institutional supply-side conditions for some systems of durable income 
restrai~t. The demand side was then derived from the political and economic 
pressures placed upon governments for the simultaneous achievement of such 
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macroeconomic policy targets as full employment, price stability, balance 
of payments equilibrium and economic growth. The net outcome was argued 
to be the emergence of a political exchange relationship under which restraint 
was exercised both in the use of the strike as an economic weapon, and in 
the full exploitation of the union's labour market power in pursuit of wage gains. 
It was this notion which formed the basis of the model of 
wage determination advanced in Chapter 6. The implications of this model 
were that during the operational phases of cooperative incomes policy 
official union acquiescence in wage restraint would be associated with 
Wage settlements at a level somewhat below those that would normally occur 
given the level of excess demand prevailing in the labour market. This 
state of affairs was, however, seen as potentially unstable, being highly 
vulnerable to disruption from unofficial action by the union rank and 
file. Thus, while union leaderships were seen as willing to engage in 
long-term trade offs between the pursuit of wage gains in the labour market 
and gains in the political market, rank and file acquiescence was viewed 
as potentially much more vulnerable to short-term disruption from factors 
such as real wage erosion, disturbed differentials, and changes in labour's 
share in national income. In short, those factors contained in the hypo-
thesized strike model. The obvious conclusion, therefore, is that in 
addition to requiring the existence of a variety of institutional supply-
side pre-requisites, durable exchange relationships involving rank and 
file restraint a~so demand certain economic pre-requisites, foremost amongst 
which is an acceptable level of real wage growth. Where this is not forth-
coming, as was largely the case in the mid-late 1960s and the early 1970s, 
restraint policies, even previously cooperative ones, become vulnerable to 
outbursts of unofficial rank and file protest. These protests were then 
seen as calling forth wage settlements in excess of the level which would 
normally have occurred given the level of labour market excess demand. 
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On this basis it was argued that, in the presence of sustained incomes 
policy intervention, the observed pattern of wage changes could only be 
adequately explained if account was taken of the degree of trade union 
t.~ 
acquiescence in such intervention. It wasrargument which, in turn, justified 
the inclusion of a lagged strike frequency index in the wage equation. 
The results derived from estimation of operational specifications 
of the strike and wage models were ~resented in Chapter 7. Since they 
have already been discussed in some detail they need not be restated here. 
Certain of the implications of these findings for the preceding analyses 
might, however, be usefully summarized: first, in relation to the explana-
tion of strike fluctuations; and second, in relati.on to the rival theories 
of inflation. 
I. Theories of Strikes 
One point that emerges clearly from the results of Chapter 7 
is that strike activity is broadly responsive to economic conditions. 
Moreover, this conclusion apparently applies regardless of the precise 
nature of the institutional environment, at least within the bounds of 
the ten countries included in the present study. This responsiveness is, 
however, far from homogeneous across countries [as is implied, for 
example, by the work of Hibbs (1976)]. Institutions clearly do matter. 
Thus, while it is possible to conclude that in expressing their feelings 
of discontent through strike action, workers an~ their representatives 
do take stock of prevailing economic conditions, their response to these 
conditions is far from mechanistic. More particularly, 'unless the 
institutional and normative structures of the system are taken into account, 
it becomes difficult to explain the specific form of action to which ••• 
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discontent may lead • • expressions of discontent • • • do not occur 
as direct and automatic responses to objective economic conditions', 
(Ingham 1974; p. 36). 
The danger inherent in an excessively behaviouristic approach 
to analysing strikes, for example by hypothesizing mechanistic responses 
to economic conditions on the part workers, is also clearly illustrated 
by the relative inter-temporal instability of several of the estimated 
relationships reported in Chapter 7. This was clearly evident with respect 
to the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, where different time periods have 
been associated with significant differences in the behavioural response 
to variables such as unemployment, wage changes and profits. In both 
I 
instances these differences were associated in a. fairly systematic way 
with the mediating influence of incomes policies. 
Significant inter-temporal contrasts in worker's responses to 
economic conditions were also evident in France and Italy/as witnessed by 
the fact that the present findings differ markedly from the earlier ,con-
clusions of both Snyder and Shorter and Tilly. The most sensible explana-
tion for these contrasts is not that these earlier contributions were 
wrong (though several methodological and empirical weaknesses were referred 
to in Chapter 3), it is rather a reflection of the fact that industrial 
relationships are dynamic phenomena. Thus, the present research draws 
upon rather more recent data than previous studies: data; that is, from 
a period during which important institutional dev~lopments were taking 
place in both France and Italy pertaining to the organizational strength 
of the unions, and to their use of collective bargaining as a mechanism 
of effective job regulation. Perhaps not surprisingly, these developments 
appear to have made workers' strike behaviour considerably more responsive 
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to economic conditions than hitherto. 
Expressed in the language of sociology, the contrasts between the 
present findings and those of earlier studies may be viewed as merely 
symptomatic of an ongoing process of institutionalization of industrial 
conflict. in France and Italy. The findings of Chapter 7 do, however, also 
serve to caution against acceptance of the notion that institutionalization 
is necessarily a unilinear process. Thus the emergence of substantial 
escalations in strike activity in previously 'low conflict systems' such 
as Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden during the period under 
investigation is ample testimony both to the limits of institutionalization, 
and to its potential for breakdown and reversal. As Ingham (1974) has 
expressed it, while 'the institutionalization of industrial conflict in 
the form of the emergence of procedural and • • • substantive norms 
mediates between objective economic conditions and expressions of discon-
tent, (it) ••• is itself vulnerable when rapid changes occur in material 
conditions' (Ingham, p. 37). The vulnerability to unofficial rank and file 
action of the 'cooperative incomes policies' established in Belgium, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden (and more recently, also Britain), one 
obvious manifestation of a fairly high level of institutionalization/would 
appear to be a prime illustration of this process. 
In the light of the foregoing observations it is misleading to 
suggest that the present research has in any sense established the global 
supremacy of a purely economic approach to the analysis of strike fluctua-
tions. Economic influences are clearly too important to ignore, but their 
precise impact cannot be understood unless account is taken of the 
institutional environment within which these influences operate. More-
over, one key element of this environment appears to be the existence or 
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otherwise of some form of incomes policy. 
Theories of Inflation 
In terms of the rival arguments. presented in Chapter 4, it is 
Possible to reconcile at least partially cost-push and excess-demand 
approaches by allowing for the possibility that monetary and fiscal policies 
are endogenous rather than exogenous (Mitchell, 1980). That is, if it is accep-
ted that for political reasons money supply is largely accommodative, 
then arguments over the role of money supply as the immediate or proximate 
cause of inflation become largely semantic. This, however, does little 
to resolve the issue of the fundamental determinants of monetary expansion. 
While monetarists are themselves divided on the issue, there is a tendency 
to concur with the view that, 'inflation is caused by governments for 
their own benefit' (Parkin 1975); although, it is not inconsistent with 
a monetarist analysis to hypothesize that union pressure is the proximate 
cause of monetary growth and therefore the fundamental cause of inflation, 
(a notion which, incidentally, forms the basis of Hicks (1955) argument 
that the gold standard as a constraint on monetary growth had been replaced 
by a 'labour standard'). Significantly, even Friedman himself has shown 
some degree of ec~ticism on the issue, suggesting that the forces that 
have led governments to indulge in inflationary finance have varied so 
Widely over time and space that it is impossible to assign primacy to any 
single explanation for excessive monetary growth. 
While in the absence of systematic empirical evidence Friedman's 
eclecticism is probably the wisest course, the results of Chapter 7 do 
shed important light on this issue. Thus the wage equations estimated in 
that chapter reveal a significant independent role for trade union action 
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(and more specifically for rank and file pressure) in generating the 
wage escalations of the late 1960s and early 1970s in four countries: 
namely, Belgium, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. All four countries 
were also characterized by some form of incomes policy intervention on a 
more or less sustained basis. Moreover, in each case the most determined 
use of these policies appears to have occurred during periods of social 
democratic/labour party rule. Thus ifJas Hibbs (1977) has demonstrated, 
governments tend to pursue mac~oeconomic policy configurations that broadly 
favour their core electoral supporters - more specifically, if leftist 
governments tend to pursue full employment rather than anti-inflation 
Policies - then money supply is clearly more likely to be accommoditive 
to union wage demands under such governments. On this argument incomes 
Policies not only become easier to implement, as argued in Chapter 6, 
but also become more desirable as a potential means of reducing the 
inflationary pressure on the monetary authorities. 
~fhile 'bourgeois' governments are likely to be less amenable 
to the systematic pursuit of a monetary policy endogenously linked to the 
demands of organized labour, they are apparently not totally immune from 
such pressures. Thus, as the findings of Chapter 7 indicated, the labour 
movements in both Italy and France were able to exert significant upward 
pressure on wages at periodic intervals. Elsewhere, however, (particularly 
Canada, Japan and the United States) wage inflation appeared fairly 
closely linked to the level of excess demand and price expectations, with 
the unions acting,to use Friedmarrsterm,'as the thermometers registering 
1 
the heat, rather than the furnace causing the heat. 
As with fluctuations in strike activity, the results of Chapter 
7 indicate that in the process of wage determination, institutional factors 
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are of considerable significance in mediating the behavioural response of 
Workers, their unions and employers to changing economic circumstances. One 
crucial factor in this context is clearly incomes policy, and analyses which 
ignore its effects are likely to show significant prediction errors in 
relation to the time series profile of wage changes. This fact, amply 
illustrated by the results of Chapter 7, clearly highlights the need for 
more adequate analyses of the political economy of wage determination rather 
than the further elaboration of purely economic approaches. 
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Appendix A. 
Notes on Statistical Sources 
The purpose of this Appendix is not to provide a treatise on 
the comparative validity of either strike statistics or the other economic 
data employed in this study. In the context of strike statistics this 
task has been addressed extensively in the literature (for example : 
M. Fisher, 'The Measurement of Labour Disputes and Their Economic Effects', 
O.E.C.D., 1973; M. Shalev, 'Lies, Damned Lies, and Strike Statistics: The 
Measurement of Trends in Industrial Conflict' and 'Problems of Strike 
Measurement' in Crouch, C. and A. Pizzorno, 'The Resurgence of Clan Conflict 
since 1968', London, MacMillan, 1978.) While attention here will there-
fore be devoted largely to questions of definition, some comments are 
nevertheless in order in relation to the suitability of the data employed 
for estimations of the type undertaken in Chapter 7. 
I Strike Statistics 
In all cases the source of the strike frequency and strike 
volume statistics is the International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics, (1950-1978). In the case of Britain, the quarterly strike 
statistics on aggregate, pay, and non pay strikes, and the annual statis-
tics on aggregate strike frequency outside mining are derived from the 
Department of Employment Gazette, (various issues). 
The first problem for any comparative analysis of strikes is 
that of definitional variation across countries. What does and does not 
constitute a strike is subject to different measurement criteria. Thus 
while none of the countries included in the present sample counts 'partial' 
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forms of industrial action (overtime bans, work to rule etc), such 
actions as late starts or early departur~s tend only to be included in 
the official statistics if certain minimum criteria relating to the number 
of workers involved, the total number of man-days lost from the dispute 
and the length of the dispute are fulfilled. These criteria are 
summarised in Table A.l.l. 
Table A.l.l Strike Definitions The Group of Ten 
Min. Number Min. Number Minimum Political 
of workers of days lost duration conflict 
Belgium none none 1 day incl. 
Canada 6 10 1 day excl. 
France none none none incl. 
Germany 10 t 1 day incl. 
Italy none none none excl. 
Japan none none ~ day incl. 
Netherlands none none none incl. 
Sweden none none none incl. 
U.K. 10 t 1 day excl. 
U.S.A. 6 none 1 day/ excl. 
shift 
Source: ILO Yearbooks; Shalev (1978); Sweet and Jackson (1978). 
Notes: t dispute counted if 100+ man-days lost; 
excl. = excluded; incl. = not officially excluded. 
These differences of definition and measurement clearly make 
the international comparison of strike action a potentially hazardous 
procedure. However, while these hazards are likely to be overwhelming 
with regard to the comparative analysis of strike levels, it is still 
possible to make meaningful statements about strike trends or strike 
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fluctuations. This has been the purpose of the present study. Moreover, 
the method adopted here has been to compare the relative performance of 
explanations of strike fluctuations under different institutional arrange-
ments, rather than make direct cross~country comparisons of strike 
statistics. 
The above approach still begs certain questions, however. In 
particular, the validity of the techniques employed in Chapter 7 is 
strongly dependent upon the assumption that measurement error within each 
of the countries in the present sample remains either constant ~ random 
Over time. Nevertheless it is well known that strike statistics, and 
their definition and measurement in particular, are socially determined 
phenomena (Ingham, 1974). These social definitions are, moreover, subject 
to change. Thus in the case of Sweden, the historical neglect of unofficial 
stoppages was reversed in the 1970s with more recent statistics covering 
them much more systematically. (Korpi, W. 'Unofficial strikes in Sweden', 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, March, 1981, pp. 66-86). Such 
changes clearly question the intertemporal consistency of the official 
statistics. However, it is surely naive to believe that such problems 
are in any way peculiar to strike statistics. The major requirement of 
quantitative research is therefore that it employs the best data avaiable, 
that it explicitly acknowledges the limitations of that data, and that it 
cautions against too much weight being placed upon the precise values of 
the parameter estimates obtained in empirical testing. Thus the results 
of Chapter 7 should be reenas deriving their credibility as much from the 
consistency of certain findings across countries as from the magnitude 
and estimated statistical significance of the reported coefficients. 
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II Wage, Price and unemployment/vacancy Statistics 
Unless otherwise stated all wage, price and unemployment/vacancy 
statistics were derived from O.E.C.D. Main Economic Indicators, 
Historical Statistics 1955-71 and 1966-79, plus individual issues. All 
figures are expressed as averages for the year. Specific country defini-
tions were as follows: 
Belgium 
Wages: hourly rates in manufacturing 
Consumer prices: all goods and services, 1963 = 100 
unemployment: insured persons ('OOOs). 
Canada 
Wages: hourly earnings in manufacturing 
consumer prices: all goods and services, 1963 = 100 
unemployment: male unemployed ('OOOs). 
France 
Wages: hourly rates in manufacturing 
consume"c prices: all goods and services, 1963 = 100 
unemployment: unfilled vacacies ('OOOs). 
Germany 
Wages: hourly earnings in manufacturing 
A.S 
Consumer prices: all goods and services, 1963 = 100 
unemployment: registered unemployed ('OOOs). 
Italy 
Wages: hourly rates in manufacturing 
consumer prices: all goods and services, 1963 = 100 
unemployment: registered unemployed ('0005). 
Japan 
Wages: monthly earnings in manufacturing of regular workers (including 
bonus) - for strike equations; 
Shunto wage settlements (source Dunlop and Galenson 1978) - for 
wage equations. 
consumer prices: all goods and services, 1963 = 100. 
unemployment: insurance beneficiaries ('OOOs); vacancies ('OOOs). 
~etherlands 
Wages: hourly rates (males) in manufacturing, including mining and 
construction. 
consumer prices: all goods and services, 1963 = 100. 
unemployment: registered unemployed ('0005). 
Sweden 
Wages: hourly earnings in mining and manufacturing 
consumer prices: all goods and services, 1963 = 100. 
unemployment: insured unemployed ('0005). 
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United Kingdom 
Wages: hourly rates in manufacturing (for strike equation); 
settlements (Elliot and Dean 1978) for wage equations. 
consumer prices: all goods and services, 1963 = 100 
unemployment: registered unemployed ('OOOs). 
For the quarterly model all data was derived from Economic Trends, and 
in all cases is seasonally adjusted. 
United States 
Wages: hourly earnings in manufacturing 
Consumer prices: all goods and services, 1963 = 100 
unemployment: registered unemployed ('OOOs). 
III Profits Variables 
Profits data in all cases except the U.K. was derived from National 
Accounts of O.E.C.D. Countries, 1950-1978, Vol. I. The variable is defined 
as operating surplus (excess of value added of resident industries over the 
sum of costs of employee compensation, consumption of fixed capital and 
indirect taxes less subsidies). Alternative specifications were deflated 
by total employee compensation and the retail price index to give the profit/ 
compensation ratio and real aggregate profits respectively. 
For the U.K. all profits data was derived from Economic Trends 
(various issues). 
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Tax Variable 
In all cases except the U.K. the source was National Accounts 
Statistics of O.E.C.D. Countries, 1950-1978, Vol. I. The variable is 
defined as the ratio of employee compensation plus transfer or social 
security payments to employee compensation less taxes and social security 
Contributions. 
In the case of the U.K. the variable.is defined as the ratio 
of post-tax to pre-tax disposable income. The source was Economic Trends 
(various issues). 
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Appendix B 
Correlation Coefficients 
The following tables give the simple correlation coefficients between the 
different regressors. employed in the regressions reported in Chapter 7. 
Table B.loS Belgium 1953-1974 
. . 
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Table B.2.S Canada 1952-1975 
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" Table B.3.S France 1956-67; 1969-76 
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Ut W/Pt Dt 
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Table B.4.S Germany 1953-1975 
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Table B.4.N Germany 1953-1975 
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Table B.5.S Italy 1956-1975 
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Table B.7.S(i) Netherlands 1954-1975 
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Table B.7.S(iii) Netherlands 1963-1975 
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